Pay Equity or Pay Up: The Inevitable Evolution of Comparable Worth into Employer Liability under Title VII by Kaplan, Gail C.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
11-1-1987
Pay Equity or Pay Up: The Inevitable Evolution of
Comparable Worth into Employer Liability under
Title VII
Gail C. Kaplan
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gail C. Kaplan, Pay Equity or Pay Up: The Inevitable Evolution of Comparable Worth into Employer Liability under Title VII, 21 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 305 (1987).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol21/iss1/7
PAY EQUITY OR PAY UP: THE INEVITABLE
EVOLUTION OF COMPARABLE WORTH INTO
EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 306
II. THE WAGE GAP: BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM ...... 311
A. Earnings in Occupations and Industries: The Facts.. 311
B. Measuring for the Causes of the Gap ................ 313
C. Understanding the Comparable Worth Debate ....... 314
1. Wage-Setting: Classical and Institutional Views .. 315
2. The Costs-economics, inflation and lost jobs .... 317
3. Apples and Oranges-comparing dissimilar jobs.. 319
4. Debate Over a Partial Remedy for the Residual
G ap ............................................ 319
III. DETERMINING AND COMPARING JOB VALUES & WAGES. 322
A. History and Use of Job Evaluation Plans ............ 322
B. Job Evaluation Methodology ........................ 326
C. Gender-based Biases in Job Evaluations and Wage
Determinations ..................................... 330
IV. EXISTING FEDERAL LAW ............................... 331
A. Equal Pay Act Prohibits Discrimination for
Equal W ork ........................................ 332
B. Title VII May Prohibit Discrimination for
Comparable W ork ................................... 333
1. Title VII Burdens of Proof ...................... 335
2. Evidentiary Sufficiency: Claims & Defenses under
Disparate Treatment ............................ 338
3. Evidentiary Sufficiency: Claims & Defenses under
Disparate Impact ............................... 348
V. STATE ACTIVITY ........................................ 355
A. State Legislation .................................... 356
B. State Executive Orders and Local Laws .............. 360
C. Status of State Pay Equity Activities ................. 362
1. State Use of Job Evaluation ..................... 362
2. State Pay Equity Policies ........................ 363
3. State Pay Equity Studies ........................ 365
D. State Judicial and Administrative Decisions ......... 366
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:305
1. Alaska: harbinger or deviate? .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
2. Other States' Construction of State EPA & FEP
Law s ........................................... 370
VI. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL ................................. 371
A. Federal Legislation Presently Proposed .............. 371
1. H.R. 387 & S. 552: A Pay Equity Study of the
Federal Work Force ............................. 373
2. S. 5: A Pay Equity Program for Federal
Contractors ..................................... 377
3. Arguments For and Against Federal Study
Legislation ...................................... 379
B. A State Model for Future State &
Federal Legislation .................................. 385
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................ 386
VIII. APPENDIX: EXEMPLARY COMPENSATION LEGISLATION
FROM WASHINGTON STATE ............................. 389
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986 a full-time working woman earned sixty-four cents to every
dollar earned by a full-time working man, a penny more than she earned
relative to a man in 1956.1 The major reason for this persistent2 disparity
in earnings is that female workers are concentrated in a limited number
of occupations and industries where wages are lowest.3 Researchers can
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FACT SHEET ON
CIVILIANS 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER WORKING YEAR ROUND, FULL-TIME (ALL RACES)
(1987) [hereinafter CIVILIANS' EARNINGS]. In 1956, the earnings differential was 63.3%; in
1986, 64.3%. Id.
2. Id. Thirty years of the gender-based wage gap is illustrated by a ratio of women's to
men's full-time, year-round median earnings for the years 1956-1986.
1986-64.3; 1985-64.6; 1984-63.7; 1983-63.6; 1982-61.7; 1981-59.2; 1980-60.3;
1979-59.7; 1978-59.4; 1977-58.9; 1976-60.2; 1975-58.8; 1974-58.6; 1973-56.6;
1972-57.9; 1971-59.5; 1970-59.4; 1969-60.5; 1968-58.2; 1967-57.8; 1966-57.6;
1965-59.9; 1964-59.1; 1963-58.9; 1962-59.3; 1961-59.2; 1960-60.7; 1959-61.3;
1958-63.0; 1957-63.8; 1956--63.3. Id.
3. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WOMEN IN THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 27, 29 (Nov. 1986) [hereinafter WOMEN IN THE ECONOMY]. 50.7% of
all women work in only 19 of 503 occupational categories listed by the Department of Com-
merce. Id. at 18, Table 8. All except one of the 19 occupations in which women are concen-
trated are at least 60% female, and 15 of the 19 predominantly female occupations pay in the
bottom half of 421 occupationally ranked earnings. Id. at 23.
Even women who fall within the 25-34 age bracket and who have five or more years of
college education are clustered in traditionally "female" jobs: 15.9% work as elementary
school teachers, and 15.6% as either secondary school teachers, social workers or registered
nurses. Id. at 20. Where women in the same age group have made advances, they have made
them in managerial and professional fields in predominantly female occupations. Id. at 22.
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explain up to approximately one-half the wage gap through differences in
job content4 and human capital5 factors such as education, work force
attachment and worker preferences. 6 Although unable to explain the re-
maining portion of the wage gap by statistical analyses,7 researchers gen-
erally conclude that present or past discriminatory employment
practices, or both, account for at least some part of the residual pay gap.'
Federal and state laws, executive directives and court decisions pro-
hibit gender-based wage discrimination in employment.9 Congress made
the payment of wages on the basis of gender unlawful almost twenty-five
years ago when it enacted the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA)' ° and Title
Between 1970 and 1980 when women moved into predominantly male occupations, they made
the most notable gains in service occupations (female bartenders increased 23.1%); and in"
sales, administrative support and technical occupations (female sales supervisors increased
14.5%; real estate saleswomen 14.0%). Id. at 22-23. Although males and females earn be-
tween 90% and 105% of each other at entry level, 30% earn less than 90% of the salary males
earn at skilled levels. Id. at 33. Additionally, fewer women than men attain higher level jobs.
Id. at 34.
Women also are clustered in industries. Primarily, women work in industries at the bot-
tom of the pay scale. Id. at 27. They work in four industry groups: professional and related
services, half of which are elementary and secondary schools and hospitals; retail; finance,
insurance and real estate; and business and repair services. Id. Two-thirds work in service and
retail trade industries and in state and local government. Id. at 27.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 87-94 for a discussion of job content.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 95-102 for a discussion of human capital.
6. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR
JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 42 (D. Trieman & H. Hartman, eds. 1981) [hereinafter WOMEN,
WORK, AND WAGES] (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission contracted for study by
National Academy of Sciences); GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, PAY EQUITY STATUS OF STATE ACTIV-
riEs, REP. No. 141BR, at 5-14 (1986) [hereinafter PAY EQUITY STATUS].
7. WOMEN IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 33; WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra
note 6, at 42.
8. WOMEN IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 33; WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra
note 6, at 43; PAY EQUITY STATUS, supra note 6, at 5-14. Some opponents of comparable
worth question that the earnings gap is actually attributable to sex discrimination, and they
name non-measurement of factors or other factors such as work interruptions and experience,
age, education, individual preferences and traditional cultural patterns, rather than employer
exclusionary practices, as contributors to the wage gap. See R. WILLIAMS AND L. KESSLER,
A CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARABLE WORTH 15-25 (1984) [hereinafter CLOSER LOOK AT COM-
PARABLE WORTH]; Cox, Equal Work, Comparable Worth and Disparate Treatment: An Argu-
ment for Narrowly Construing County of Washington v. Gunther, 22 DUQ. L. REV. 65, 85-90
(1983); Livernash, An Overview, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 3, 10-
17 (E. Livernash ed. 1984) [hereinafter ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES]; Milkovich, The Emerg-
ing Debate, in ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES supra, 25, 38-46.
9. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text for text of pertinent federal statutes; see
infra text accompanying notes 190-322 for a discussion of federal statutes and caselaw; see
infra text accompanying notes 327-358 and 386-420 for a discussion of state statutes, case law
and executive directives.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982) (EPA). The EPA is an amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (Supp. III 1986). The EPA provides in part:
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).II Under the EPA, the
employer has a duty to pay equal wages to male and female employees
performing "substantially" the same work which requires equal skill, ef-
fort and responsibility under similar working conditions.' 2 The EPA ap-
plies only to employees performing virtually the same jobs for unequal
pay. It does not apply to men and women working on different jobs
which the employer determines are of equal value.
Title VII extends the employer's duty beyond paying equal wage
rates to a broader responsibility to pay equal compensation.'3 Further-
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, be-
tween employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establish-
ment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite
sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system;
(ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided,
That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection
shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage
rate of any employee.
Id. § 206(d)(1).
11. §§ 701-18; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982) (Title VII). Title VII provides in perti-
nent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Title VII further provides:
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compen-
sation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona
fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production or to employees who work in different locations .... It shall
not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for an employer to differenti-
ate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation
paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized
by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.
Id. § 2000e-2(h).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982). Exceptions are permitted where wages are based on
seniority, merit, production or any other factor other than sex (FOTS). Id. The United States
Supreme Court and lower federal courts have interpreted equal work to mean either identical
or "substantially equal" jobs. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). See
infra text accompanying notes 194-97 for a discussion of the courts' interpretation of the EPA.
13. Whereas the EPA addresses employees' wages, Title VII addresses the broader con-
cept of all compensation, including wages and fringe benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Fur-
ther, EPA prohibitions are limited to employee categories within an establishment and under
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more, Title VII is not limited to the "substantially similar" requirements
under the EPA.14 Rather, this law applies to jobs which are both similar
and not substantially similar to the employer. Title VII makes it unlaw-
ful for the employer to intentionally compensate jobs at lower rates be-
cause they are held by women.15 Title VII also proscribes employer
conduct which adversely affects an employee's status by limiting, segre-
gating or classifying the employee.
1 6
The term "comparable worth," often used interchangeably with the
term "pay equity,"17 is a theory under which plaintiffs have attempted to
seek relief for gender-based wage discrimination under Title VII. Fed-
eral courts have addressed the evidentiary value of a comparable worth
claim to determine its viability for establishing a prima facie case." In
1981, the United States Supreme Court decided County of Washington v.
Gunther,19 and defined comparable worth as a "concept... under which
plaintiffs might claim increased compensation on the basis of a compari-
son of the intrinsic worth or difficulty of their job with that of other jobs
in the same organization or community."" ° The Gunther Court distin-
guished comparable worth claims from other claims of intentional wage
the purview of the Fair Labor Standards Act. An employee working in a "bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional capacity" is exempt from coverage under the EPA. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (Supp. III 1986). Under the EPA, a single establishment may encompass the em-
ployer's different locations. Id. §§ 206(d)(1), 213(a). Alternatively, Title VII covers all em-
ployees companywide, including those at different locations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
14. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). See infra text accompanying
notes 198-322 for a discussion of comparable work claims under Title VII.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Gunther, 452 U.S. at 180.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
17. See Federal Pay Equity Act of 1984, Parts I and II, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civ. Serv., 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). One commentator has noted:
Comparable worth and pay equity are broad terms with imprecise meanings and
are often used interchangeably. Pay equity, however, is a broader term denoting
fairness in setting wages. Comparable worth generally refers to measuring the rela-
tive values (or worth) to the employer of disparate jobs, specifically of those jobs
done primarily by men and those done primarily by women. Pay equity, whether it
be in the form of equal pay for equal work or equal pay for work of equal value,
concerns the pay relationships among jobs in the same firms. A popular tool for
establishing these pay relationships is a job evaluation or job classification system.
CONG. RES. SERV., L1BR. OF CONG., PAY EQUITY/COMPARABLE WORTH ACTIVITIES BY
STATE GOVERNMENTS: A SUMMARY CRS-2, 86-954E (Sept. 30, 1986) (A. Ahmuty & M.
Jickling, analysts).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 198-322 for a discussion of federal courts' decisions
regarding comparable worth claims under Title VII disparate treatment and disparate impact
analyses.
19. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
20. Id. at 166.
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discrimination which are actionable under Title VIIP and decided the
case on grounds other than a comparable worth theory.2" In his majority
opinion, Justice Brennan noted that the Court had not decided whether a
comparable worth claim is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of sex
discrimination. 3 To the present time, the Supreme Court has not ruled
on a comparable worth or pay equity claim. The Court, then, has yet to
determine whether a plaintiff's claim based, solely or in part, on compa-
rable worth theory provides either the direct or circumstantial evidence
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title
VII. 24
Consequently, lower federal courts have been left to grapple with
the role of comparable worth in gender-based wage discrimination
claims.2 The lower courts have explicitly rejected comparable worth as
the sole basis for establishing a cognizable claim under Title VII.26 Cur-
rently, when the employer pays employees in a predominantly female job
lower wages than employees in a predominantly male job, which the em-
ployer determines are equal in value, a court will not infer that the wages
are lower simply because the job classification is female-dominated.27
The plaintiff instead must present evidence in addition to comparable
worth that the employer intended to discriminate before a court will find
that the employer engaged in gender-based wage discrimination.28 Even
though comparable worth theory by itself is not sufficient evidence to
establish gender-based wage discrimination at the present time, several
options which include comparable worth are available to plaintiffs bring-
ing wage discrimination claims under Title VII. These options are based
on the theories of intentional discrimination (disparity in treatment from
the employer's practices) and disparate impact (disproportionate adverse
consequences from employer's practices).2 9
In addition to federal prohibitions against gender discrimination,
most states have equal pay acts and fair employment practice laws which
generally address the same issues as the federal EPA and Title VII.3 °
Many state statutes contain an equal pay for comparable work standard,
21. Id.
22. The Court found that the employer's non-compliance with its own job evaluation and
wage-setting system constituted direct evidence of intentional discrimination. Id. at 180-81.
23. Id. at 166-67.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 233-41 for a discussion of Gunther.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 242-322.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 242-322.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 233-92.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 233-92.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 198-322.
30. See infra notes 328-46 and accompanying text.
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yet practically all state judiciaries construe their laws as narrowly as the
federal judiciary construes the federal laws.3" The states, however, have
launched an accelerating effort to implement pay equity through collec-
tive bargaining, gubernatorial action and legislation.32 Nonetheless, de-
spite applicable federal and state laws and court decisions outlawing
gender-based discrimination in compensation, employment practices
which discriminate on the basis of gender persist and continue to result
in lower compensation for female employees than male employees.
This Comment will provide a legal, political and social analysis of
comparable worth, alternatively known as pay equity, in five sections.
First, it will examine various causes for the male-female wage gap. It
will analyze comparable worth opponents' and proponents' arguments
related to the gap. Second, this Comment will explain the key issue of
job evaluation and explore its significance to gender-based wage discrimi-
nation litigation. The analysis will include recommendations for evaluat-
ing and comparing job worth to establish legitimate claims and defenses
to pay rate differentials. Third, this Comment will analyze federal litiga-
tion to determine the present scope of cognizable gender-based wage dis-
crimination claims and defenses under the EPA and Title VII. Fourth, it
will review the scope of existing state laws-specifically to analyze how
state courts have and have not interpreted state statutes which prohibit
gender-based compensation practices. Fifth, this Comment will outline
pending federal legislation and existing state laws which are aimed at
closing a portion of the wage gap, and will suggest their potential impact
on gender-based wage discrimination litigation under Title VII.
II. THE WAGE GAP: BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
A. Earnings in Occupations and Industries: The Facts
The persistence of an earnings gap between female and male em-
ployees is an historically indisputable fact.33 In 1986, a full-time working
woman earned 64.3 percent of the amount a man earned. 34 By the year
2000, working women's wages are predicted to approximate seventy-four
percent of men's wages.35
31. See infra text accompanying notes 386-421.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 325-326.
33. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for chart demonstrating the ratio of year
round full-time female to male earnings between 1956 and 1986. The earnings differential has
fluctuated over the past thirty years. In 1956, a woman earned 63.3% of the wages a man
earned; in 1966, 57.6%; in 1976, 60.2%; in 1986, 64.3%. CIVILIANS' EARNINGS, supra note 1.
34. Id.
35. J. SMITH & M. WARD, WOMEN'S WAGES AND WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
82 (1984).
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The major determinant of this statistical earnings gap is the cluster-
ing of female workers in a limited number of occupations and industries
where wages are lowest.36 Seventy percent of women employed full-time
work in occupations which are at least sixty percent female-dominated.Y
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) noted that in occupational
segregation "[n]ot only do women do different work than men, but also
the work women do is paid less, and the more an occupation is domi-
nated by women the less it pays."' 38 Almost eighty percent of employed
women work in occupations which pay in the bottom half of the wage
scale.39 Although women are moving gradually into a somewhat broader
range of occupations, such as law and medicine, they still tend to work in
predominantly female occupations which pay less than those predomi-
nantly male.4" To illustrate, over thirty percent of women age twenty-
five to thirty-four with five or more years of college work as elementary
and secondary school teachers, social workers and nurses.41 As women
moved into predominantly male occupations during the last decade, they
significantly penetrated only two occupational groups: service and sales,
and administrative support and technical occupations.42 Women also are
failing to attain higher level positions within integrated occupational
groups.43 Even though females' earnings approximate males' earnings at
entry level, about one-third earn less than males at skilled levels."
Employed women are clustered into four industry groups with al-
most seventy percent in services and retailing and state and local govern-
ment.45 The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects increases in employment
to 1995 to occur in service industries in some of the job classifications
employing the largest numbers of women.46 Industries with the highest
36. WOMEN IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 27, 29.
37. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, 110 MONTHLY
LABOR REV., No. 6 (June, 1987).
38. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 6 at 28.
39. WOMEN IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 18.
40. Id. at 19-20. In 1980, 30% of law degrees were conferred on women compared to 5%
in 1970; and 23% of medical degrees in 1980 compared to 8% in 1970. Id. at 15. Women are
entering predominantly male managerial and professional specialty occupations (a 7.3% gain
between 1970 and 1980), but are overrepresented in clerical (85% in 1986) and service occupa-
tions (61% in 1986) and underrepresented in production, craft and labor occupations (9% in
1986). Id. at 23; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL
AVERAGE OCCUPATION TABLE (Dec. 1986).
41. WOMEN IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 23.
42. Id. at 22-23.
43. Id. at 34.
44. Id. at 33.
45. Id. at 37.
46. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKING WO-
MEN AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1984).
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percentage of women employees generally pay the lowest wages.4 7 Wo-
men have been and appear likely to remain clustered in low paying occu-
pations and industries. The issue then becomes whether the disparity
between male and female earnings is due to job, employee and workplace
characteristics or is the result of discrimination.
B. Measuring for the Causes of the Gap
Researchers have been able to offer only a partial explanation for the
wage gap.48 At the NAS, researchers identified labor market segmenta-
tion, job segregation and employment practices as factors which permit
earnings differentials between men and women.49 Other statistical stud-
ies attribute women's lower earnings partly to the following factors:
fewer work hours, age, marital status, worker preferences, mobility, and
access to information. 50
Correlation, however, is not equivalent to causation. What appears
to be the rational response to objective criteria may be laced with dis-
crimination; and, what appears to be discriminatory may be a rational
response to objective criteria. To the present time, no standard statistical
methodology has either proved or disproved that discrimination contrib-
utes to any of the pay gap.51 It is possible that "no statistical exercise can
ever prove definitively that any of the gap is caused by discrimination."52
Such studies can demonstrate that earnings or wage differentials are not
fully explained by employee characteristics or job-related factors. Alter-
natively, studies cannot rule out the notion that other unmeasurable vari-
ables, including voluntary and discriminatory behavior, help create the
wage gap.5 3 The important lesson to legislatures and the courts, then, is
that "[s]tatistical studies are just one type of evidence that people should
consider in evaluating whether pay differences are attributable to
discrimination.,
54
Debate between proponents and opponents of comparable worth fo-
cuses on how much of the residual wage gap is due to discriminatory
47. WOMEN IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 27.
48. See WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 6, at 13-43; Milkovich, The Emerging
Debate, in ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 38-46.
49. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 6, at 11.
50. H. AARON & C. LoUGY, THE COMPARABLE WORTH CONTROVERSY 13-15 (1986)
[hereinafter CONTROVERSY].
51. Id. at 12.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 12.
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employment practices.55 Depending on whether one is a proponent or
opponent of comparable worth, conclusions of cited studies vary. 6 Pro-
ponents and opponents agree that historical or present discriminatory
employment practices, or both, account for at least some unmeasured
part of the residual pay gap57 even though they are unable to isolate the
extent to which wage disparities result from discrimination.58
C. Understanding the Comparable Worth Debate
Opponents and proponents of comparable worth proffer various rea-
sons for the residual wage gap. Opponents focus on voluntary, non-dis-
criminatory factors to explain the gap. Proponents contend that current
and historical stereotyping and other conduct constituting discrimination
create a portion of the gap. Opponents and proponents also predict dif-
ferent results from implementing comparable worth, a program to elimi-
nate that portion of the gap attributable to women's occupational
concentration which correlates directly to lower wages for women than
men for jobs of equivalent value. Opponents predict a comparable worth
program would result in monumental costs, inflation and unemployment.
They argue for the perpetuation of a market system free of governmental
controls. Proponents contend that the market historically has been influ-
enced by government controls and that claims of astronomical costs, un-
employment and inflation are unfounded. Finally, opponents and
proponents offer different remedies to rectify a portion of the residual
gap. For opponents of comparable worth, the remedy for both wage dis-
crimination and occupational segregation is job integration. For propo-
nents, the remedy for wage discrimination is through job evaluation and
for job segregation, job integration. Thus, while opponents and propo-
nents agree job integration would remedy a portion of the gap, opponents
55. G. Milkovich, The Emerging Debate, in ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at
23-47; Shattuck, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination: A Management View, DEN. U.L. REV. 393
(1985) (opponents' view) [hereinafter Sex-Based Wage Discrimination]; WOMEN, WORK, AND
WAGES, supra note 6, at 44-68; Comment, Comparable Worth: The Next Step Toward Pay
Equity Under Title VII, DEN. U.L. REV. 417 (1985) (proponents' view)[hereinafter Next Step].
56. G. Milkovich, The Emerging Debate, in ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at
23-47; Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, supra note 55, at 393; WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES,
supra note 6, at 44-68; Next Step, supra note 55, at 417.
57. CONTROVERSY, supra note 50, at 6, 41-42; WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note
6, at 65; Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory
in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REV. 233 n.2 (1980) [hereinafter Perspective].
58. Perspective, supra note 57, at 253. "[T]he most that multiple regression analysis can
tell us is that some of the gross earnings differences between the sexes are accounted for legiti-
mately, while the remainder must result from unmeasured legitimate sources, and/or job sepa-
ration, and/or wage discrimination." Id.
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find job evaluation inappropriate to remedy an additional portion of the
residual gap.
1. Wage-setting: the classical and institutional views
Opponents of comparable worth have attempted to explain the ex-
isting wage gap and project the effects of implementing comparable
worth theory, paying females equitably for work performed, under the
classical economic theory of wage-setting in the marketplace. Opponents
claim that comparable worth will disrupt the free labor market economic
system by artificially determining wages.59 In their view, the market de-
termines wages through interaction between the freely competitive, neu-
tral supply of workers and the employer's demand for skills.1° They
claim that the existing system operates by avoiding subjective evaluations
and by focusing instead on making the labor market as freely competitive
as possible.6 ' Furthermore, opponents contend that, unlike comparable
worth, the current system successfully offers flexibility by modifying
wage rates to reflect the constantly changing interaction of supply and
demand.62 Opponents thus assert that a comparable worth system would
interfere with the free market system.
Proponents point out that the labor market, with its unfettered ad-
justment of supply and demand, has not functioned as a perfectly com-
petitive environment for employers' wage-setting. Historically, Congress
has intervened in the marketplace to protect laborers by legislating child
labor laws, health laws, collective bargaining, the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.63 Employers also have directly
interfered with the free market system by price-fixing, wage-setting and
59. Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, supra note 55, at 400-02; F. Morris, A Legal Perspec-
tive 23, in F. MORRIS, J. O'NEILL, J. CALHOON, J. SLOAN, S. MITCHELL & T. FAHNER,
JUDICIAL WAGE DETERMINATION... A VOLATILE SPECTRE: PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARA-
BLE WORTH (1984)[hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARABLE WORTH].
60. J. O'Neill, An Economic Perspective: An Argument Against Comparable Worth, in
PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 59, at 27-29; CLOSER LOOK AT COMPA-
RABLE WORTH, supra note 8, at 39. See P. England, Socioeconomic Explanations of Job Segre-
gation, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 28, 36-37 (H. Remick ed.
1984) [hereinafter COMPARABLE WORTH] for an in-depth discussion of neo-classical models,
including arguments that "pre-market discrimination" and "socialization" account for a large
part of the wage gap.
61. CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 8, at 48.
62. Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, supra note 55, at 401; CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARA-
BLE WORTH, supra note 8, at 40-41, 43.
63. The government also has intervened to save Chrysler, Amtrak and Lockheed from
bankruptcy. Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political Realities: Concluding
Remarks, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 285, 290; Next Step, supra note 55, at
443.
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controlling product markets to reduce risk, reduce costs and increase
profits." Some significant portion of governmental and employer inter-
vention, then, have proven to be successful contributors to the free-flow-
ing forces of supply and demand.
Even absent direct intervention in the market economy, factors
other than the supply of workers or their productivity still play a major
role in wage-setting over an extended time period.6" Employers often set
wages, not on the basis of the "classical view" of a competitive market-
place, but on the basis of an "institutional view," which focuses on inher-
ently rigid and inflexible factors not connected to the labor market.
66
Non-market institutional factors which influence wage-setting include
employer and employee preferences and custom, employer inacces-
sability to all possible employees, employee inaccessability to all possible
employers, promotional policies, seniority systems, collective bargaining
and segmentation of labor markets into non-competing groups, primarily
on the basis of sex, race and ethnicity of workers. 7
Opponents of comparable worth acknowledge that gender-based
wage differentials, determined on the basis of institutional factors, be-
come a customary company practice which reproduces itself throughout
a given labor market.68 They also concede that employment discrimina-
tion against women exists.69 Yet, they argue that an individual employer
is not and should not be liable for others' employment practices or for
existing market conditions which reflect historical undervaluation of
predominantly female jobs.7 ° Advocates point out that the individual
employer is not an innocent bystander; it is one employer's pay practices,
in combination ',ith all other employers' pay practices, that determines
the market. 71 The employer who thus reaps the beneficial effects of his-
torically discriminatory labor supply and demand conditions should pay
women the cost of the benefit received.
64. Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political Realities: Concluding Re-
marks, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 290.
65. CONTROVERSY, supra note 50, at 6-7.
66. CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 8, at 44-45; see also WOMEN,
WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 6, at 44-68, for an extensive discussion of institutional influ-
ences on the labor market.
67. Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, supra note 55, at 401; CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARA-
BLE WORTH, supra note 8, at 43-44; WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 6, at 118.
68. Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, supra note 55, at 401; CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARA-
BLE WORTH, supra note 8, at 43-45.
69. CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 8, at 46-48; Sex-Based Wage
Discrimination, supra note 55, at 401.
70. Id.
71. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 6, at 61.
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Finally, comparable worth opponents admit that the present system
determines wages by taking into account the same basic "subjective" val-
ues-such as skills, education, experience and working conditions-
which also permeate a job evaluation system under the comparable worth
theory.72 Job evaluation methodology, advocated by comparable worth
proponents, considers the market a factor in wage-setting and, therefore,
provides flexible responses to labor supply and demand.73 It is inaccu-
rate, therefore, for opponents to describe a wage-setting program based
on comparable worth as subjective, inflexible and designed to ignore mar-
ket forces.
2. The costs-economics, inflation and lost jobs
Opponents of comparable worth estimate that the cost to implement
comparable worth could range from $2 billion to $150 billion.74 Propo-
nents contend that these estimates are based on the assumption that all
employers will rectify all wage discrimination at the same time.75 They
argue that this assumption is unrealistic because "[m]ost legal reforms
that impact upon the labor market have been implemented in stages:
either the scope of coverage is initially restricted and gradually expanded
to cover a larger proportion of employees over time, or the legal standard
is introduced in steps."' 76 Employers have been and are likely to continue
implementing comparable worth in stages so that the costs will accrue
over time.7 7 To illustrate, proponents point to the Minnesota experience
where implementation of comparable worth cost only a small percentage
of payroll and was therefore manageable under the state budget.78
Opponents posit that full implementation of comparable worth will
increase inflation and unemployment because businesses will pass wage
72. Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, supra note 55, at 401.
73. Steinberg, A Want of Harmony, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 18.
74. Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political Realities: Concluding Re-
marks, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 290. See infra note 476 and accompanying
text.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citation omitted).
77. See Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political Realities: Concluding Re-
marks, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 290.
78. B. WATKINS, REMARKS OF PAY EQUrrY COORDINATOR, STATE OF MINNESOTA AT
CONGRESSIONAL STAFF BRIEFING ON PAY EQUITY: THE MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE 1 (May
15, 1987) (available at Loyola of Los Angeles Law School library) [hereinafter MINNESOTA
EXPERIENCE]. See infra text accompanying note 81. "Several states have estimated that com-
parable worth costs will run from less than I percent to about 5 percent of present payrolls.
The variations depend, of course, upon the degree of discrepancy found to exist between com-
parable male- and female-dominated jobs." Cook, Developments in Selected States, in COMPA-
RABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 283.
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increases to consumers without corresponding productivity increases and
will substitute capital or technology for labor. While proponents of com-
parable worth do not disagree that theirs is a potentially inflationary pro-
posal, they argue that the severity of inflation opponents project is
unwarranted because implementation will take several decades and dis-
count any inflationary effect.79 Proponents also can point to Australia
which has experienced minimal, if any, inflation or rising unemployment
subsequent to a nationwide implementation of comparable worth.Y0 Fur-
thermore, the State of Minnesota, which implemented pay equity at the
state and local government level over three years ago, has experienced
only a minimal increase in state and local payrolls and the percentage of
women working for the state has increased.81 Finally, the United States
Supreme Court established that cost does not justify discrimination.
8 2
79. See Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political Realities: Concluding Re-
marks, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 292.
80. Australia is the sole country from which to observe the results of a national application
of comparable worth. See CONTROVERSY, supra note 50, at 40. That country increased wo-
men's wages substantially and quickly to establish the principle of equal pay for comparable
worth. Following adoption of an "equal pay for equal work" standard in 1969, and an "equal
pay for work of equal value" standard in 1975, Australian women's wages rose from seventy-
four percent of men's wages in 1970 to ninety-four percent of men's wages by 1980. Id.
The consequences of Australia's sharp wage adjustment are disputed. Id. One study
shows that women's increased wages did not produce changes in resource allocation, that labor
force demand for women did not decline in the late 1970's and that the female unemployment
rate actually fell. Id. at 40-41. A second study reports that pay equalization slowed growth in
women's employment by one-third, led to a lower number of average hours worked per week,
and increased unemployment by 0.5 percent. Id. at 41. Neither study, however, found evi-
dence to support the dire predictions of comparable worth opponents-substantial and detri-
mental costs, inflation and unemployment.
The authors did not discuss the Australian economy in the late 1970's. Thus, we do not
know if an escalating economy may have created an increased demand for female labor in the
marketplace. Yet, the authors concluded from the Australian experience that implementation
of comparable worth in the United States would lead to only minor economic side effects.
Such an application of comparable worth would have little effect on overall eco-
nomic efficiency, even if the fears of its opponents are solidly grounded. This conclu-
sion is supported by the experience of Australia with wage adjustments similar to
those that would follow from comparable worth. Whether the labor market effects of
the Australian experiment with pay equalization were small or large, they suggest
that the impact on demand for women in the labor market would be negligibly af-
fected by ... comparable worth .... We conclude that the economic side effects of
the use of comparable worth.., will be minor.
Id. at 50.
81. The Pay Equity Coordinator for the State of Minnesota reported that the total cost of
implementing pay equity at the state level has been 3.7% of the state payroll and the average
cost at the local level has been 2.6% of payroll. The number of women working for the state
increased 6%. MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE, supra note 78, at I.
82. Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978).
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3. Apples and oranges
Opponents argue that like comparing apples and oranges, compar-
ing dissimilar jobs is not possible.83 Yet, employers have used job evalua-
tion systems for over 100 years to determine which different jobs are
equivalent in value from the employer's point of view." Job evaluation
methodology has traditionally provided employers with the ability to an-
alyze job prerequisites and responsibilities to classify and set wages for
different jobs.8" Proponents of comparable worth proffer that "the same
employer groups that have supported job evaluation systems when they
have been used to create and justify an existing organizational hierarchy
and wage structure contend that such systems cannot be used to compare
male-dominated and female-dominated jobs within that wage
structure.
86
4. The debate over a partial remedy for the residual gap
The comparable worth debate also focuses on the results of job con-
tent and human capital analyses, the notion that if job content and
human capital factors are held constant, and female employees are being
paid significantly less than male employees, the underpayment not due to
these factors must be or is not attributable to discrimination, at least in
the absence of any other explanation.87 Job content and human capital
serve two primary uses: (1) Employers often use these approaches to set
salaries on the theory that the chief determinants of compensation ought
to be the demands of the job (job content) and the attributes the worker
brings to the job (economic/human capital); and (2) on the basis of job
content and economic analyses, the employer evaluates the fairness of its
existing pay system.
Objective job evaluation is "a quantitative method of rating posi-
tions within occupations based upon factors such as the skill, effort, re-
83. Chamber of Commerce handout on S. 519 (available at Loyola of Los Angeles Law
School library). See also Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political Realities:
Concluding Remarks, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 288.
84. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
85. Prior to adopting a formal job evaluation system to determine the value of jobs, the
State of Minnesota was not able to analyze whether it was "fair" that workers, predominantly
female, who cared for mentally retarded people were paid less than workers, predominantly
male, who cared for animals at the state zoo. B. Watkins, supra note 81, at 2. See infra text
accompanying notes 136-80 for a discussion of basic job evaluation methodology.
86. Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political Realities: Concluding Re-
marks, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 289.
87. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., OPTIONS FOR CONDUCTING A PAY EQUITY
STUDY OF FEDERAL PAY AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS, REP. No. 37, AT 35 (MAR. 1,
1985) [hereinafter OPTIONS FOR PAY EQUITY].
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sponsibilities, qualification requirements, and working conditions
involved so that comparisons may be made with respect to the positions
and occupations involved."8 Job content analysis focuses on character-
istics of the job rather than on characteristics of the employee or the
workplace.8 9 The technique of job evaluation determines the relative
value of jobs to the employer and identifies pay differences between jobs
which are comparably evaluated.90 Although criticized for its subjectiv-
ity and limitations,9" job evaluation provides information which the em-
ployer can use to identify and reduce pay differentials between jobs the
employer determines are similar in value.9 2 Public and private sector
employers traditionally use job content evaluation to measure the value
of a job in relation to the value of other jobs and to set wages.93 Employ-
ers have found that job content analysis "provided a framework for pol-
icy determination, and eliminated pay inequities caused by favoritism or
undue pressure." 94
Employers also use the human capital theory, alternatively known
as economic theory, to explain and rectify the wage gap.95 Differing
from job content analysis, economic analysis measures "the extent to
which [wage] differentials are attributable to factors such as seniority,
merit, productivity, education, work experience, geographic factors, sup-
ply and demand factors, or any other factors, exclusive of sex, race, or
ethnicity . "..."96
Economic theorists contend that investments in labor, through such
activities as schooling or job experience, increase productivity and earn-
ings. Alternatively, theorists argue, the value of labor will decline and
the human capital will depreciate when job skills get rusty from non-
use.97 An economic theorist would posit that people who commit to the
labor force invest heavily in developing skills which increase their future
earnings.9 Theorists also state that women do not invest as much in
88. S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(7) (1987).
89. OPTIONS FOR PAY EQUITY, supra note 87, at 26.
90. Id. "[J]ob evaluation may not reveal the inherent value of jobs, but it can measure the
relative worth of jobs." M. GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH 95 (1983).
91. CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 8, at 56-57.
92. OPTIONS FOR PAY EQUITY, supra note 87, at iv.
93. E. JOHANSEN, COMPARABLE WORTH: THE MYTH AND THE MOVEMENT 13 (1984)
[hereinafter THE MYTH AND THE MOVEMENT].
94. Id.
95. OPTIONS FOR PAY EQUITY, supra note 87, at iv-v.
96. S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(6).
97. England, Socioeconomic Explanations ofJob Segregation, in COMPARABLE WORTH,
supra note 60, at 33.
98. CONTROVERSY, supra note 50, at 13.
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their future earnings capacity as do men and, therefore, their earnings
will not increase as quickly as will men's earnings.99 Theorists further
contend that differences between the job experience of men and women
contribute to the lower number of women in jobs which require much
seniority."° This hypothesis is belied by the fact that most fields are sex-
segregated even at entry levels. 10 1 Furthermore, at every level of experi-
ence, women earn more money when they work in predominantly male
as opposed to predominantly female occupations. 10 2 Moreover, women
do not increase their earnings to levels commensurate with men's earn-
ings even when women and men are making similar investments in the
labor force through schooling and job experience.
Economic and job content factors determine legitimate differences in
wages. Yet, even if economic and job content factors are substantially
the same for male and female workers, or even where they fully explain
wage differentials, discrimination is possible. 103 Discrimination may af-
fect economic and/or job content factors.' 0 4 For example, researchers
may have omitted discriminatory factors from their statistical analyses,
such as the influence of sexual stereotyping on determining a job's value.
Consequently, job content and human capital analyses have not ruled out
the possibility that wage differentials result, in part, from unmeasured
discriminatory variables. 105
Nonetheless, federal legislation currently under consideration pro-
poses use of a single, bias-free job evaluation system employing both job
content and economic analyses to identify and eliminate discriminatory
job classification and wage-setting practices.106
[O]bjective job-evaluation techniques now exist which are uti-
lized by many public and private employers to determine the
comparative value of different jobs through a system which nu-
merically rates the basic features and requirements of a particu-
lar job, and additional efforts should be made to develop,
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. England, Socioeconomic Explanations of Job Segregation, in COMPARABLE WORTH,
supra note 60, at 34.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 33-35. Beatty & Beatty, Some Problems with Contemporary Job Evaluation Sys-
tems, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 72-75.
104. Id.
105. CONTROVERSY, supra note 50, at 15.
106. S. 5, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(b), 6(b)(7)-(8) (1987); S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 4(a)(1) (1987); H.R. 387, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(a)(1), 6(a) (1987). See infra text accom-
panying notes 431-63 for a discussion of multiple job evaluation plans as a potential form of
gender-based wage discrimination.
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improve, and implement these techniques so as to help elimi-
nate discriminatory wage-setting practices and discriminatory
wage differentials. 1"7
Even though opponents to comparable worth contend that job content
and economic analyses are incapable of measuring for discrimination in
wages and, therefore, are inappropriate to remedy any portion of the
residual gap, Congress is likely to enact the proposed legislation in the
near future.'08 Thus, employers utilizing recognized, objective job evalu-
ation methods to identify and eliminate gender-based wage differentials
will likely be in the best position to be deemed in compliance with ex-
isting laws.
III. DETERMINING AND COMPARING JOB VALUES AND WAGES
A. History and Use of Job Evaluation Plans
Since the 1880's, management has employed systematic job evalua-
tion techniques to evaluate and compare jobs and to set wages. 109 The
pay equity issue, involving claims that women are underpaid, first arose
during World War I. ° During World War II, the National War Labor
Board (WLB), created by executive order in 1942, established several
precedents concerning equal pay for women."' First, women should be
107. S. 5, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(a)(8)-(9).
108. See infra note 430 and accompanying text; see infra text accompanying notes 464-91
for a discussion of arguments opposed to and in favor of proposed job evaluation study legisla-
tion currently under Senate and House consideration.
109. Beatty & Beatty, Some Problems with Contemporary Job Evaluation Systems, in COM-
PARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 67-68. Frederick W. Taylor designed the first formal job
evaluation system for a steel company. Id. at 67. Merrill R. Lott designed the first "point
factor" evaluation plan circa 1920. In the late 1930's or early 1940's, Edward N. Hay, Eugene
I. Benge and Samuel L. H. Burke developed the "factor comparison" method of evaluation.
Id. at 67-68. See also THE MYTH AND THE MOVEMENT, supra note 93, at 14. The 1923
Federal Classification Act, an initial attempt by Congress to establish a pay system for federal
white-collar employees, encouraged formal compensation systems using methods for analyzing
relative job value. Beatty & Beatty, Some Problems with Contemporary Job Evaluation Sys-
tems, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 67.
110. Steinberg, A Want of Harmony, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 6. The
National War Labor Board of World War I promulgated a policy of paying women equally for
equal work ordinarily performed by men. Bellace, Proving Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, 69
IOWA L. REV. 655, 658-59 (1984) (citing Rep. of the Sec'y of the Nat'l War Lab. Bd. to the
Sec'y of Lab. 69-71, Twelve Months Ending May 31, 1919, at 69-71 (1920)) [hereinafter Prov-
ing Discrimination]. The Board allowed a minimum wage rate lower for women than for men.
Id. Peace treaty negotiations following World War I used "equal pay for work of equal value"
terminology when establishing the International Labour Organization and at its subsequent
conferences in 1951, 1957 and 1975. THE MYTH AND THE MOVEMENT, supra note 93, at 14.
111. Exec. Order No. 9017, 1 War Lab. Rep. xvii (1942); 1 National War Lab. Bd., Termi-
nation Rep. 290-97 (1945). The WLB's General Order No. 16 allowed employers to "equalize
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paid the same as men for performing jobs not measurably different in job
content from jobs men performed or formerly performed.11 The WLB
allowed different rates of pay for quantity and quality of work performed
and specific additional costs incident to employing women workers, such
as need for extra help or rest periods. 113 Second, the WLB recognized
that many historically, predominantly female jobs were paid less than the
lowest predominantly male jobs and noted that a shortage of male work-
ers during wartime created the differential.' 14 Third, the WLB presumed
wage differentials were correct when women historically performed jobs
measurably different from men's jobs.115 Fourth, the presumption of cor-
rect wage differentials could be overcome by a comparison of the content
of predominantly male and female jobs.1 16 When female workers chal-
lenged wage differentials, the WLB remanded the issue to the parties to
negotiate the appropriate wage adjustment.' When the parties could
not agree, the WLB ordered job evaluation to establish job worth based
on job content, exclusive of gender as a compensable factor.1'8 Fifth,
when parties were still unable to agree, the WLB ordered an arbitrator to
determine the appropriate wage rate.119
Opponents of comparable worth argue that the policies of the WLB
are not determinative of the present market value of predominantly fe-
male jobs.' They also contend that the WLB was concerned only with
substantially equal, not comparable, jobs and did not engage in wage-
setting to support the notion that Congress and the courts should also
limit their inquiries to substantially equal jobs and not engage in wage-
setting. 12 1 Proponents claim WLB policies have reproduced themselves
over time and are present in today's market which also reflects other
the wage or salary rates paid to females with the rates paid to males for comparable quality
and quantity of work on the same or similar operations ...... 1 National War Lab. Bd.,
Termination Rep. 290 (1945). The WLB applied an equal pay for equal work standard to
Order No. 16. Id. at 290-97. See also United Electric Workers of America against General
Electric and Westinghouse, 28 War Lab. Rep. 666 (1945).
112. 1 National War Lab. Bd., Termination Rep. at 296-97; 28 War Lab. Rep. 668-69.
113. Differentials were not allowed for alleged costs, such as lack of prior training, relative
impermanence in the industry and providing sanitary functions. 28 War Lab. Rep. 666-67.
114. Id. at 666.
115. Id. at 670.
116. 1 National War Lab. Bd., Termination Rep. 296-97; 28 War Lab. Rep. 666, 677.
117. 1 National War Lab. Bd., Termination Rep. 294; 28 War Lab. Rep. 669-670.
118. 28 War Lab. Rep. 669-670.
119. Id. at 670-71.
120. Williams, The Legal Framework, in IssuEs AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 202-
09.
121. Id. at 203.
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discriminatory practices. 122 They argue that the WLB engaged in evalu-
ating similar and comparable jobs and in wage-setting to support their
contention that the federal government and the courts have historically
evaluated comparable jobs and set wages which they can capably do
today. 1
23
Since World War II, both private and public sector employers have
developed and used job evaluation to establish a hierarchy of jobs as a
basis for setting salaries. 124 At present, many private sector employers,
the federal government and most states use formal job evaluation systems
to determine and compare job value and to set wages. 125
The United States Supreme Court also has acknowledged the role of
job evaluation in American industry and its influence in creating the lan-
guage of the Eqfial Pay Act. 126 At the trial and appellate levels, judges
have historically relied on job evaluation findings in pay discrimination
litigation.'27 Some judges have analyzed job worth'28 and a few have
122. Steinberg, A Want of Harmony, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 6-9, 18;
WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 6, at 57-62.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF Sci., D. TREIMAN, JOB
EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW 1 (Interim Rep. to the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission) (1979) [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
125. Id. at 45. According to a Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) report, Hay Associates,
probably the largest and best known job evaluation consultants in the United States, "numbers
among its clients approximately 40 percent of the Fortune 500 companies." Id.
126. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 n. II (citing Coming Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 198-201 (1974)). The Corning Glass Court stated:
In both the House and Senate committee hearings, witnesses were highly critical of
the [Equal Pay] Act's definition of equal work and of its exemptions. Many noted
that most of American industry used formal, systematic job evaluation plans to es-
tablish equitable wage structures in their plants. Such systems... took into consid-
eration four separate factors in determining job value-skill, effort, responsibility and
working conditions-and each of these four components was further systematically
divided into various subcomponents. Under a job evaluation plan, point values are
assigned to each of the subcomponents of a given job, resulting in a total point figure
representing a relatively objective measure of the job's value.
Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 199 (footnotes omitted).
127. See infra note 129 and accompanying cases; see also Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15
(1st Cir. 1984) (relying on employer's management consultant's job evaluations of male and
female jobs, court found that employer paid female workers less for work substantially equal to
that of male workers, but court did not follow consultants' pay increase recommendations);
Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, 624 F.2d 945, 950, 953 (10th Cir. 1980) (Tenth Circuit affirmed
lower court's finding that female plaintiff performed substantial portion of duties of male ad-
vertising director and required that she be paid same salary).
128. Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970) aff'd, 445 F.2d 823
(8th Cir. 1971) (district court reviewed skill, mental and physical effort, responsibility and
working conditions of male and female punch press operators, paint line tenders, sub-assem-
blers, final assemblers, inspectors and packers and found that employer, gun factory, paid its
female workers less to perform substantially same work as male workers); Gunther v. County
of Washington, 502 F.2d 882, 885-88 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) (United States
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even found expert testimony unnecessary to determine job value and
wages. 1
29
In Title VII litigation, the employer's job evaluation system may
provide an available defense to a claim of pay discrimination.13 ° The
evaluation plan, however, must be bona fide in that it cannot discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex.' 3' Presently, plaintiffs are challenging the em-
ployer's job evaluation methods as circumstantial evidence of intentional
gender-based wage discrimination. 32  Concurrently, the courts are not
yet fully apprised of the subtle technicalities involved in job evaluation
and wage determination methods to be able to evaluate whether either is
laced with discrimination. The focus of litigation extends beyond County
of Washington v. Gunther,'3 3 where the employer implemented its
adopted evaluation plan for predominantly male jobs, but not for its
predominantly female jobs, which provided direct evidence of intentional
discrimination.134 The focus is evolving into whether the employer's job
evaluation and wage determination methods and practices are objective,
equitable and designed to identify and eliminate discriminatory wage
differentials.'
35
Supreme Court affirmed lower court holding that employer violated Title VII by paying une-
qual wages to females for unequal work, analyzed on basis of job skill, effort, responsibility and
working conditions); Brennan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 410 F. Supp. 84, 86-97 (N.D. Iowa
1976) (district court analyzed job requirements of male and female division store managers and
salespersons and found variations in job duties "ha[d] not affected the basic content of the job
or the basic sameness of the degree of skill, effort and responsibility required to perform the
jobs").
129. See, Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 264, 275 (D. Del. 1971),
modified on other grounds, 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973)
(court found expert testimony unnecessary in Equal Pay Act case to determine if jobs of male
and female salespersons, claimed by employer tor be dissimilar, required equal skill, effort and
responsibility); Murphy v. Miller Brewing Co., 307 F. Supp. 829, 836 (E.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd,
457 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972) (federal judge personally toured plant to determine whether jobs
of male and female product testers were substantially same and found employer paid female
employees less than male employees for jobs judge perceived as requiring equal skill, effort and
responsibility); Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490, 492-97 (4th Cir. 1972)
(Fourth Circuit determined that employer had violated Equal Pay Act by paying male who
worked at stock desk more than two females working at same stock desk because more highly
paid male had previously performed sixteen duties additional to those performed by females
but which court held made male no more valuable to company at his stock desk job).
130. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 201; Teamsters v. United States, 341 U.S. 324, 353 (1977).
131. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 201; Teamsters, 341 U.S. at 353 (seniority system is absolute
defense to Title VII claim only if bona fide, did not have its genesis in racial discrimination,
and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose).
132. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
133. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
134. Id. at 180-81.
135. See intfra note 293 and accompanying text; S. 5, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 552, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess.; H.R. 387, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
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B. Job Evaluation Methodology
Compensation practices address internal and external equity.136 In-
ternal equity determines the relative value of jobs within a company; ex-
ternal equity determines the value of each job in relation to its prevailing
labor market price. 137 Job evaluation is an industrial engineering tech-
nique which provides "a way of systematically rewarding jobs for their
content-for the skill, effort, and responsibility they entail and the condi-
tions under which they are performed."'' 38 At the heart of the gender-
based wage discrimination issue lies the technical question of whether job
evaluation techniques can objectively determine gender discrimination as
well as compare the value of different jobs and set wages.
Through job evaluation, the employer develops an internal job
structure by establishing a hierarchy of jobs. 139 The hierarchy denotes
the value the employer places on each job relative to other jobs within the
company. 140 The employer then compares a job with external labor mar-
ket prices to determine the correlation between the internal value of a job
and its labor market value. 
141
Although various established methods exist for conducting job eval-
uation, the most commonly used in the United States is the point-factor
method, developed in the 1920's. 142 While job evaluation systems may
differ in design and implementation, almost all employ a common meth-
odology.143 First, the employer chooses a packaged system of factors
and factor weights for the purpose of evaluating jobs within the firm,
called an a priori approach." Alternatively, the employer may choose a
policy-capturing approach, which uses a statistical analysis of the individ-
ual firm as the basis for generating factor and factor weights for job eval-
uation.'45 Under both the a priori and policy-capturing approaches,
136. Beatty & Beatty, Some Problems with Contemporary Job Evaluation Systems, in COM-
PARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 59.
137. Id.
138. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 6, at 95.
139. Beatty & Beatty, Some Problems with Contemporary Job Evaluation Systems, in COM-
PARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 60.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 66-75 for a description and discussion of job evaluation systems; see generally
ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 49-135.
143. D. Treiman, Effect of Choice of Factors and Factor Weights in Job Evaluation, in COM-
PARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 79; see also AM. Soc'Y FOR PERSONNEL ADMIN. & AM.
COMPENSATION A., ELEMENTS OF SOUND BASE PAY ADMIN. 8-9 (1981) [hereinafter
ELEMENTS].
144. Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political Realities: Concluding Re-
marks, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 286.
145. Id.
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factors may include skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions. 146
Factors the employer chooses constitute the job characteristics the em-
ployer desires to compensate.147 The employer assigns each factor a
maximum number of points and a relative weight.1
4 8
Next, the employer's job evaluator and the job incumbent or super-
visor, or both, write a job description for each position. 49 Typically, a
job evaluation committee analyzes the job description and assigns each
compensable factor a number value based on the amount of each factor
the committee evaluates to be present in the job.'50 The committee mul-
tiplies each factor's numerical value by the factor's assigned weight and
adds to create a total job worth score.
15 '
The committee then hierarchically ranks all evaluated jobs on the
basis of total overall points for each job.' 52 This hierarchy establishes the
value the employer places on each job relative to other jobs within the
company.15 3 The committee designates maximum and minimum cutoff
points for each grade and divides the ranked jobs into grades. The result
is that different jobs are usually in the same grade.15 4 For example, an
accounting clerk with a total job value score of 32 and a sales clerk with a
total job value score of 25 may both be in the same grade because they
both fall within the range of points assigned to that grade.' 55
To compare each job with external labor market salaries, the em-
ployer typically selects a labor market in which to conduct a salary sur-
vey.156 The selected market may be regional or national, or both.' 57 The
employer selects benchmark jobs, a sample of jobs representative of the
146. Id. at 287; see also ELEMENTS, supra note 143, at 4, 9.
147. ELEMENTS, supra note 143, at 9.
148. Id. at 8-9.
149. Id. at 4-6.
150. Id. at 9.
151. Id. at 8-9. For example, the maximum number of points for each factor may be 100
and the job being evaluated may have 40 points in the responsibility factor and 10 points in the
working conditions factor. The number of points evaluated for each factor are multiplied by
the weight the employer assigned to each factor. After multiplication, these subtotals for each
factor are added, establishing a total number of points for each job. For example, a job may
have the following score: Skill-60 X .35, Effort-80 X .15, Responsibility-80 X .40, Working
Conditions-1 x .10, generating a total score of 65.1. Id. at 7.
152. Id. at 8-9.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 10.
157. Id. The marketplace may include, for example, the employer's competitors located
within its recruiting area. Id.
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jobs in each grade.158 The employer surveys the market by collecting
salary data on benchmark jobs in the selected marketplace.'5 9 After
gathering pay data, the employer analyzes the information.160 Some em-
ployers choose the percent they will pay in relation to the average market
rate, such as 75%, 100% or 125% of market, and apply that percent
across the board to all salary information collected.161 While some em-
ployers simply use the going market rate, a percentage of the average of
the labor market's pay rate, others use more sophisticated analytical
techniques such as regression analysis.1 62 Through its analysis of labor
market rates, the employer determines its pay structure.
163
To create this pay structure, the employer establishes pay grades.'
64
Pay grades can be determined informally, through visual designation, or
formally, through the statistical methods used for analyzing market
data.16 After establishing pay grades, the employer creates salary
ranges.166 The employer develops pay ranges around the firm's salary
grades. Each salary grade is typically expressed in terms of minimum,
mid-point and maximum dollars.' 67 The resulting pay structure should
reflect a balance between the employer's objectives, the marketplace, in-
ternal job values, the employer's philosophy on how it wishes to pay ver-
sus the market and the employer's economic ability to pay at a given
level. 168
The employer usually conducts an annual survey to determine the
percent it will increase all its salary ranges to accommodate individual
158. Id. Collectively, benchmark jobs provide a statistical data sample representative of
jobs in the employer's firm. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Typically, the employer chooses to position itself in relation to the market on the
basis of such considerations as its profit projections and recruiting difficulties. The percent
competitive rate the employer chooses influences the final salary range for the grade. Id.
162. Id. Statistical analyses may include scattergrams, sample variances and standard devi-
ations, linear and multiple regressions, and correlation coefficients (r) or coefficients of deter-
mination (Fr). Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 11. Pay grades are numerically designated salary ranges which are placed hier-
archically to create the employer's salary structure. Id.
165. Id. at 12.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 11-13. The ranges reflect the lowest to highest pay rates the employer is likely to
pay for jobs falling within the pay grade. Additionally, the company's pay levels reflect a
percentage of salary rates paid in the market. The employer chooses whether to be a "pay
leader" by paying at the top or above market salaries, match or pay less than the market
average. Id. at 11.
168. Id. at 13.
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employee's annual salary increases.169 Additionally, throughout the
year, the employer regularly conducts surveys of selected key jobs, such
as those with which it is experiencing recruiting difficulties, to determine
if the job is placed in a competitive salary range. 7 ' A dilemma arises
when the market pays more for a job than the maximum the employer
has allocated to the job's salary range. To resolve this problem and to
retain and recruit employees for the affected job, employers often will
pay above the maximum of the salary range, paying what is referred to as
a "red-circled rate."
' 171
In addition to the employer's establishing a pay structure for the
company's jobs, the employer must establish procedures for setting and
changing individual employee's salaries. Typically, an employee's start-
ing salary is anywhere from the minimum to the mid-point of their job's
salary range, depending on a balance between the employee's experience,
labor market conditions and internal equity. 172 Employees new to a posi-
tion and inexperienced at the new job's level of responsibility usually re-
ceive a starting salary at or near the minimum of the job's salary
range. 173 The more experienced a recruit in the new job's responsibili-
ties, the higher into the salary range will be the new employee's salary.17 4
The labor market and internal equity influence both the experienced and
inexperienced employee's salary. 175
The employer provides continuing employees various types of salary
increases, including cost-of-living, promotional and merit increases.
176
Merit increase programs usually provide for increases in the form of per-
centage of current salary. 177 Most programs vary the size and timing of
the increase depending on the employee's current position in the pay
range and level of job performance. 178 Objective performance-based pay
increase programs require the employee's performance appraisal to be
based on direct measures of the employee's output or generated re-
sults. 179 Performance criteria should be objective and related directly to
the employee's job requirements.180 Performance appraisal, then, gener-
169. Id. at 12.
170. Id. at 13.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 12-14.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 14.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 17.
180. Id.
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ates each employee's merit increase and both programs together with pay
structure comprise the employer's wage-setting system. The employer's
job evaluation and wage-setting methodologies are subject to scrutiny for
illegal biases by plaintiffs and the courts in gender-based wage discrimi-
nation claims under Title VII.
C. Gender-based Biases in Job Evaluations and Wage Determinations
Each decision in job evaluation and wage-setting procedures is vul-
nerable to subjective and even discriminatory biases. While biases may
not be readily detected, they can substantially influence the employer's
determination of a job's classification and salary. To illustrate, job evalu-
ation committee members may possess both conscious and unconscious
biases which influence presentation of the job content through the job
description, choice of factors, assignment of factor weights and points,
and salary grade cut-off designations. As a result, "male" work may be
inflated while "female" work may be diminished. For example, the job
evaluator, job incumbent and supervisor might develop a job description
using stereotypical words to describe job responsibilities. Tough action
words such as "promote the product to penetrate the market" could be
used to describe a male sales task. Alternatively, nurturing soft words
such as "meets with prospective customers to explain the product" could
be used to describe the same sales task performed by a female. The likely
result is that the evaluation committee will determine the male sales job
to warrant higher points in the responsibility factor than the female sales
job. Consequently, the committee will assign the male sales job a higher
job classification and salary than the female sales job.
Evaluation plans can successfully mask another potential form of
gender-based wage discrimination. Employers frequently use more than
one job evaluation plan limiting the number of job families evaluated
under a single plan. Each plan may cover one of three groups-produc-
tion, clerical or technical-professional-managerial. The employer uses
different evaluation criteria like different job factors and different salary
ranges for each plan.'81 Job comparisons across job evaluation plan lines
are not possible. A multi-plan employer, for example, may have two
identical jobs, one predominantly male and the other predominantly fe-
male. The employer typically evaluates these jobs under two different
plans and pays the jobs different wages. Female accounting clerks, evalu-
ated under the clerical plan, perform work identical to that performed by
accountants, measured under the technical-professional-managerial plan,
181. Id.
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but the accounting clerk is paid significantly less than the accountant.
Although the jobs are identical, they are not compared because the em-
ployer has no system for measuring between evaluation plans.
The problem, then, is how to identify and eliminate or make adjust-
ments in the employer's job evaluation methodology for subjective and
even discriminatory biases to create a relatively bias-free plan. Compara-
ble worth has been addressing this problem and litigants, the states and
Congress are beginning to identify and to act to rectify gender-biased job
evaluation and wage-setting."8 2 To rectify this inequity, comparable
worth proponents require "the application of a single, bias-free point fac-
tor job evaluation system within a given establishment, across job fami-
lies, both to rank-order jobs and to set salaries." ' 3 While a bias-free
evaluation system has yet to be developed,I 4 employers can use job con-
tent and economic analyses to minimize biases. Job evaluation experts
probably will develop systems which will be significantly less capable of
capturing gender biases and which will reflect evolving national values.
IV. EXISTING FEDERAL LAW
The federal government first implemented a national policy on equal
pay for women during World War . 85 The National War Labor Board
required employers to pay male and female employees equally for equal
work." 6 During World War II, a new National War Labor Board
(WLB) promulgated a policy of equal pay for "comparable quality and
quantity of work on the same or similar operations" to achieve wage
equity.18 7 In practice, the WLB applied an equal pay for equal work
standard to "comparable work" and proscribed paying predominantly
female jobs lower wages than predominantly male jobs valued equal in
182. See infra note 293 and accompanying text for a discussion of recent comparable worth
litigation, see infra text accompanying notes 431-91 for a discussion of pending federal legisla-
tion, and see infra text accompanying notes 347-421 for a discussion of state pay equity
activity.
183. Remick, Major Issues in a priori Applications, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60,
at 99.
184. Id. at 100.
185. Steinberg, A Want of Harmony, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 6; see
supra note 110 and accompanying text.
186. Proving Discrimination, supra note 110, at 658-59 (citing Rep. of the Sec'y of the Nat'l
War Lab. Bd. to the Sec'y of Lab. 69-71, Twelve Months Ending May 31, 1919 (1920)). WLB
policy required that "[i]f it shall become necessary to employ women on work ordinarily per-
formed by men, they must be allowed equal pay for equal work and must not be allotted tasks
disproportionate to their strength." Id. at 659. Yet, the WLB permitted a minimum wage rate
lower for women than for men. Id.
187. 1 National War Lab. Bd., Termination Rep. 290 (1945).
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content, finding the practice to be sex discrimination. 8 8  The equal pay
issue next surfaced in 1963 when the Kennedy Administration proposed
federal legislation prohibiting gender-based wage discrimination "for
work of comparable character on jobs the performance of which requires
comparable skills."' 89
A. Equal Pay Act Prohibits Discrimination for Equal Work
The Equal Pay Act of 1963190 (EPA) enacted by the 88th Congress
limits its prohibitions against discrimination in wages to work of equal
character. 19' The EPA proscribes paying lower wages to employees of
the opposite sex for work equal in skill, effort and responsibility per-
formed under similar working conditions in the same establishment.1
9 2
Exceptions are permitted where wages are based on seniority, merit, pro-
188. Id. at 290-97. See also United Electric Workers of America against General Electric
and Westinghouse, 28 War Lab. Rep. 666 (1945).
189. Equal Pay Act of 1963: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Lab. of the Senate Comm.
on Lab. and Pub. Welfare, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1963) (quoting S. 882, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
109 CONG. REC. 2770 (1963) and S. 910, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., 109 CONG. REc. 2886 (1963))
(emphasis added).
190. For text of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). See supra note 10 and
accompanying text for text of Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
191. The basic purpose of the EPA as introduced on the Senate floor was:
to insure that those who perform tasks which are determined to be equal shall be
paid equal wages. The wage structure of all too many segments of American indus-
try has been based on the ancient but outmoded belief that a man, because of his role
in society, should be paid more than a woman even though his duties are the same.
This bill would provide, in effect, that such an outmoded belief can no longer be
implemented and that equal work will be rewarded by equal wages.
109 CONG. REC. 8914 (1963) (remarks of Sen. McNamara).
[Last year] we went from "comparable" to "equal" meaning that the jobs involved
should be virtually identical, that is they should be very much alike or closely related
to each other.
We do not expect the Labor Department people to go into an establishment and
attempt to rate jobs that are not equal ....
....... [We want the private enterprise system ... to have a maximum degree
of discretion in working out the evaluation of the employee's work and how much he
should be paid for it.
109 CONG. REC. 9197-98 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell). See generally 109 CONG. REC.
9197-208 (remarks of Rep. Goodell), 9196 (remarks of Rep. Frelinghuysen), 9197-98 (remarks
of Reps. Griffin and Thompson) (1963).
192. For text of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). See supra note 10 and accompany-
ing text. Similar to the WLB, the 88th Congress assumed that employers utilized job evalua-
tion plans to compare jobs and to determine wages. See Equal Pay Act, 1963: Hearings on S.
882 and 910 Before the Subcomm. on Lab. of the Senate Comm. on Lab, and Pub. Welfare,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, 73, 79, 138, 178 (1963); Equal Pay Act, 1963: Hearings on H.R. 3861
Before the Special Subcomm. on Lab. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Lab., 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 145-46 (1963).
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duction, or any other factor other than sex (FOTS). 193
The United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts have in-
terpreted equal work to mean either identical or "substantially equal"
jobs. 194 In applying the "substantially equal" standard, courts have de-
termined whether the performance of two jobs requires virtually the
same amount of skill, effort and responsibility under similar working
conditions.195 Under the EPA, the employee must prove that the content
of both jobs is substantially similar and that a disparity exists between
male and female wages. The burden then shifts to the employer to prove
the differential is based on seniority, merit, production or FOTS.' 96 The
Supreme Court has rejected the following employer defenses under the
EPA: "red-circled jobs," recruiting difficulties, gender-based wage dis-
parities established prior to the Act and marketplace demands including
market rates. 197 Courts have not determined that different jobs found
equivalent under a job evaluation plan justify the same wages under the
EPA. Moreover, the EPA prohibits only the most obvious form of gen-
der-based wage discrimination, guaranteeing that men and women who
perform virtually the same work will be paid equal wages.
B. Title VII May Prohibit Discrimination for Comparable Work
One year after enacting the EPA, the 88th Congress passed Title
193. See supra note 10 and accompanying text for text of Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d).
194. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). Corning Glass is the only
Equal Pay Act case to come before the United States Supreme Court. In Corning Glass, male
night shift quality control inspectors were paid a greater base wage than female day shift qual-
ity control inspectors, yet both performed the same tasks. Originally, all quality control in-
spectors were female and on the day shift. At that time, New York and Pennsylvania laws
prohibited women from working at night. The company decided to establish a quality control
operation on its night shift and, following a job evaluation study, revised its wage structure and
established a night shift differential, and paid a higher base rate to the male night shift quality
control operators. Following passage of the EPA, the company determined that all inspectors'
jobs should be paid at the lower day shift rate. The company "red-circled" the male inspec-
tors' jobs receiving the higher rate, meaning that the company would preserve their higher
base rate differential. Id. at 191-94. The Court found that the company paid the male workers
higher wages to induce men to perform what was perceived as women's work, not to compen-
sate for night work and rejected market conditions as any other factor other than sex (FOTS)
where equal work is performed. Id. at 191-92 n.3, 204-05, 209-10. See Brennan v. Prince
William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 285-91 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975)
(applying the "substantially equal" standard to nurses' aides and orderlies).
195. Courts have applied the standard even to jobs with different titles. See Prince William,
503 F.2d 282 (applying the "substantially equal" standard to nurses' aides and orderlies).
196. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 196-97.
197. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964198 which established broader prohibi-
tions against wage discrimination. The scope of Title VII extends be-
yond wages to all "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment."' 99 Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate against an
individual in hiring, discharge, compensation or other conditions of em-
ployment because of an individual's sex. 2" Further, Title VII prohibits
depriving an individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affecting an employee's status on the basis of sex by limiting, seg-
regating or classifying an individual.20 1 Differences in compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges are permitted when based on bona fide
seniority or merit systems, production or location.2 °2 Compensation may
also be differentiated on FOTS.2 °3 Title VII, then, provides women ac-
cess to higher-paid jobs traditionally filled by men. The EPA provides
that once women are in higher-paid jobs performing the same work as
men, women will receive the same pay as men.
Since the Civil Rights Act was directed primarily at protecting black
Americans, the protected classification "sex" was added late in the de-
bate on Title VII, 2 5 creating notably brief legislative history. On the last
day of the House floor debate, the classification "sex" was added to the
Civil Rights Act.20 6 Senate debate about the relationship between the
EPA and Title VII was even more brief and lasted only three minutes.20 7
As a result, courts were divided in interpreting the intent of the 88th
198. See supra note 11 for text of Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-18, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2000e-17 (1982) (Title VII).
199. Title VII § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
200. Id.
201. Title VII § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
202. Title VII § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
203. Id.
204. "[R]ead together, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act provide a balanced approach to
resolving sex-based wage discrimination claims. Title VII guarantees that qualified female em-
ployees will have access to all jobs, and the Equal Pay Act assures that men and women
performing the same work will be paid equally." International Union of Elec., Radio and
Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1114 (3d Cir. 1980) (Van Dusen,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
205. Representative Howard Smith presented the amendment adding "sex" to Title VII.
See Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VI1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. Rv.
877, 880-82 (1967).
206. Id.
207. See generally General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125. (1976) (legislative history of
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Bennett Amendment inconclusive regarding intended coverage of
Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination); see also 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964) ("The
standards in the Equal Pay Act for determining discrimination as to wages, of course, are
applicable to the comparable situation under title VII.") (statement of Sen. Clark, chief spokes-
man for Civil Rights Act); 110 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1964) ("The purpose of my amendment is
to provide that in the event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be
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Congress regarding the relationship between the two statutes until 1981.
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided County of Washington v. Gunther2" 8
and held that only the four affirmative defenses in the Equal Pay Act, not
the equal work standard, were incorporated into Title VII.
2°9
1. Title VII burdens of proof
A plaintiff may prove impermissible wage discrimination and resul-
tant Title VII liability through either of two theories: disparate treat-
ment or disparate impact. Disparate treatment focuses on the employer's
intent and disparate impact, on the effects of the employer's practices.21°
Under the disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must show that the em-
ployer intentionally treated member(s) of one gender less favorably than
members of the opposite gender, because of their gender.21 1 Evidence of
an employer's discriminatory intent may be direct or inferred from cir-
cumstantial evidence of disparity in treatment.212 A plaintiff claiming
gender-based wage discrimination under the disparate treatment model,
for example, must demonstrate that the employer intentionally treated
women less favorably than men in the job evaluation or wage-setting
process.
213
nullified.") (statement of Sen. Bennett, offering his amendment for purposes of distinguishing
Title VII from Equal Pay Act). The Bennett Amendment reads:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for any employer to
differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or com-
pensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is
authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of title 29 ....
Title VII, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (emphasis added).
One year following passage of the Civil Rights Act, Sen. Bennett explained his amend-
ment: "[My] amendment means that discrimination in compensation on account of sex does
not violate title VII unless it also violates the Equal Pay Act." 111 CONG. REC. 13, 359 (1965)
(statement of Sen. Bennett); "[Tihe Equal Pay Act standards requiring equal work.., would
also be applied under the Civil Rights Act." 111 CONG. REC. 18,263 (1965) (statement of Sen.
Clark, quoting letter from Anne Draper, Chairman, National Committee for Equal Pay, to
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Chairman, EEOC, U.S. Dep't of Commerce (June 30, 1965)); Sena-
tor Bennett's explanation of his amendment had been the subject of differing opinion; i.e.,
whether the statement he made introducing his amendment, or the explanatory memorandum
submitted one year after the amendment's passage controlled.
208. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
209. Id. at 179. The Court stated that if the Bennett Amendment were interpreted to in-
clude the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act, "discriminatory compensation by em-
ployers not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act [would be] 'authorized'-since not
prohibited-by the Equal Pay Act." Id.
210. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
211. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (setting out basic
allocations of burdens of proof in disparate treatment case). See also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
335 n.15 (summarizing disparate treatment and disparate impact theories).
212. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
213. In an individual discrimination claim, the employer's illegal motive may be inferred
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In traditional Title VII litigation, the burden then shifts to the em-
ployer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its ac-
tion.2" 4 The employer's burden is not persuasion, but production.21 5
The employer is not required to prove it utilized the "best" employment
procedures21 6 or to prove the absence of a discriminatory motive.217 If,
however, the employer invokes the FOTS defense to an equal-pay claim
brought under Title VII, the employer bears the burden of persuasion,
not production.218 In effect, the employer must demonstrate the reason-
able use of a business-related practice.219 Once the employer has met its
burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the employer's
proffered reasons were not its true reasons, but a mere pretext for dis-
crimination. 221 Under Title VII, absent an equal-pay claim, the burden
of persuasion remains with the plaintiff in a disparate treatment case.22'
An alternative to the disparate treatment model to prove Title VII
liability, disparate impact theory222 promotes "Title VII's prohibition of
discriminatory employment practices [which] was intended to be broadly
when the plaintiff shows she is a member of a protected class who was qualified, applied for
and failed to obtain a job which remained open after her rejection. McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802. The McDonnell Douglas model serves as a guideline to be applied broadly to
different sets of facts. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6
(1981). In government or class actions alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination under
disparate treatment analysis, plaintiffs must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating
"that unlawful discrimination has been the regular policy of the employer, i.e., that discrimina-
tion was the company's standard operating procedure-the regular rather than the unusual
practice.'" EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1274 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (quoting
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 360 (1977)). The focus
often is on a pattern of discriminatory decision-making, not on individual employment deci-
sions. Id. at 1280 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360
n.46 (1977)). The plaintiff's prima facie case leading to an inference of illegal motive usually
consists of statistical evidence of gross disparities between the protected and unprotected
groups, buttressed by policies and specific instances of discrimination. Segar v. Smith, 738
F.2d 1249, 1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985) (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977));
see also Sears, Roebuck, 628 F. Supp. at 1280 (citing Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d
524, 532 (7th Cir. 1985).
214. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 (quoting
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
215. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 (quoting
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
216. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577-78.
217. Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978).
218. Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1982). The court noted that
Burdine does not controvert this affirmative defense. Id.
219. Id.
220. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
221. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
222. The United States Supreme Court announced the disparate impact theory in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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inclusive, proscribing not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.' "223 A disparate
impact claim challenges "employment practices that are facially neutral
in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.
2 24
Proof of the employer's discriminatory motive is not necessary to dispa-
rate impact analysis.225 Instead the disparate impact model requires the
plaintiff to prove that a facially neutral employment practice had a dis-
proportionate adverse impact upon his or her protected class (sex).226
The burden of persuasion then shifts to the employer to refute the evi-
dence by showing that no disparity exists.227 Alternatively, the employer
may explain the disparity by proving business necessity or job related-
ness.228 The burden on the employer is substantial and differs from a
treatment case by shifting to the employer not merely the burden of go-
ing forward, but the burden of persuasion. 229 Finally, the plaintiff may
defeat the employer's defense by showing that other less discriminatory
means would serve the employer's legitimate interest.230
In class actions, plaintiffs often assert both a disparate treatment and
a disparate impact theory--disparity in treatment from the employer's
practices and disproportionate adverse consequences from those prac-
tices.231 In presenting evidence, the plaintiffs may show, for example,
that the employer sometimes waives its promotional requirements for
223. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
224. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
225. Id.
226. Id.; see e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-32. Proof of the disparity is often through statisti-
cal evidence. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339.
227. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
228. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
To demonstrate business necessity, the employer is required to show its practice promoted
more than its business's purpose; rather it must show that the practice "substantially pro-
mote(d) the proficient operation of the business." Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 87 L.A.
Daily Journal D.A.R. 5850, 5851 (Sept. 4, 1987). To refute plaintiff's showing of the availabil-
ity of other less discriminatory means, the employer may wish to demonstrate that no other
less harmful alternative would suffice. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329.
229. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252 n.5 (1981); see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Segar, 738 F.2d
at 1267.
230. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; see also Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
231. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1266. The class plaintiff's disparate treatment claim may invoke a
disparate impact analysis when the plaintiff challenges either specific employment practices or
the employment system as a whole. Id. The class seeks to prove disparate treatment by show-
ing a disparity and the employer seeks to defend by designating a specific, nondiscriminatory
employment practice as the cause of the disparity. Id. The court thereby has been presented
the elements of a disparate impact claim. As a result, the employer must prove the job-related-
ness of its practices. Id.
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men (disparate treatment) and that these requirements disproportion-
ately exclude women from promotion (disparate impact). Either theory
may be applied to a particular set of facts.232 The outcome of a case may
greatly depend on which theory is relied upon. If the facts fit the dispa-
rate treatment model, the plaintiff's burden of proving the employer's
intentional discrimination is usually a heavy one, and the employer can
easily articulate a non-discriminatory reason for its practice. If the dis-
parate impact model is implicated, the plaintiff's task is easier because
discriminatory intent need not be shown, and the employer's evidentiary
burden of justifying its practice is often a heavy one.
2. Evidentiary sufficiency: claims and defenses under
disparate treatment
Traditional disparate treatment analysis offers a plaintiff alleging
gender-based wage discrimination the opportunity to demonstrate that
the employer intentionally depressed her wages because she is a female.
In County of Washington v. Gunther,233 the County of Washington con-
ducted and implemented internal and external studies indicating that its
female prison guards should be paid 95% of the salary paid its male cor-
rection officers, yet the County paid the female guards 70% of their job's
value while paying the males 100% of their job's value.2 34 The United
States Supreme Court held that the female prison guards who performed
work not substantially the same as that of male guards could maintain an
action of intentional wage discrimination under Title VII. 235 Gunther
thus held that Title VII did not require a plaintiff to prove her work was
equal or substantially equal in skill, effort, responsibility and working
conditions to work performed by a male.236 Moreover, the Court estab-
lished that equal work was not a requirement for a cause of action under
Title VII.
The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue of whether a
claim based solely on comparable worth theory may provide sufficient
evidence to sustain a finding of intentional discrimination. While the
Court held that Title VII allows claims involving jobs which are not sub-
stantially equal, it simultaneously asserted that the Gunther "claim is not
based on the controversial concept of 'comparable worth,' under which
plaintiffs might claim increased compensation on the basis of a compari-
232. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15.
233. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
234. Id. at 180-81.
235. Id. at 181.
236. See id.
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son of the intrinsic worth or difficulty of their job with that of other jobs
in the same organization or community. ' 237 In a dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Rehnquist interpreted the Gunther decision to "suggest that allega-
tions of unequal pay for unequal, but comparable, work will not state a
claim on which relief may be granted." '238 Following Gunther, a Title
VII claim may be viable when the employer deviates from its own job
evaluation and salary survey by applying its own standard unevenly to
the disadvantage of employees in predominantly female, but not male,
job classifications.239 Yet, beyond the narrow issue in Gunther which
involved the most obvious form of an employer's direct intent to depress
women's wages, the Gunther Court was not called upon to and did not
define "the precise contours of lawsuits challenging sex discrimination in
compensation under Title VII.' 24  Instead, the Supreme Court has left
the lower courts to grapple with the issue of what proof establishes a
sufficient prima facie case of disparate treatment in a gender-based wage
discrimination claim under Title VII.2a
Lower federal courts allow plaintiffs alleging gender-based wage dis-
crimination to rely on traditional Title VII principles which permit both
237. Id. at 166.
238. Id. at 203 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "Mhe opinion does not endorse [the] so-called"
comparable worth theory: though the court does not indicate how a plaintiff might establish a
prima facie case under Title VII, the court does suggest that allegations of unequal pay for
unequal but comparable work will not state a claim on which relief may be granted. Id. at 203
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Cf Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). Christensen
is a pre-Gunther case in which the employer undertook a job evaluation, determined that the
jobs of exclusively female clerical workers were equal in value to the jobs of predominantly
male plant workers and placed both jobs in the same salary grade; however, it paid the plant
jobs a higher starting salary on the basis of prevailing rates in the marketplace. Id. at 354-55.
The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case of sex dis-
crimination because they "failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they ha[d]
been discriminated against in terms of compensation because of sex." Id. at 357. The court
explained, "We do not interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market in
setting wage rates for genuinely different work classifications." Id. at 356..
239. Id. at 180-81.
[The female guards] contend that the County of Washington evaluated the
worth of their jobs; that the [Clounty determined that they should be paid approxi-
mately 95% as much as the male correctional officers; that it paid them only about
70% as much, while paying male officers the full evaluated worth of their jobs; and
that the failure of the [C]ounty to pay respondents the full evaluated worth of their
jobs [could] be proved to be attributable to intentional sex discrimination. Thus, [the
suit] does not require a court to make its own subjective assessment of the value of
the male and female guard jobs, or to attempt by statistical technique or other
method to quantify the effect of sex discrimination on the wage rates.
Id. at 180-81.
240. Id. at 166 n.8, 181.
241. See infra text accompanying notes 242-93 for a discussion of cognizable gender-based
wage discrimination claims under the disparate treatment model.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:305
direct and circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. "Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. 2 42 The courts
have addressed whether a claim based on comparable worth provides suf-
ficient evidence from which to infer that the employer engaged in a dis-
criminatory practice. Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has set forth
his definition of the parameters of a comparable worth claim.
"Comparable Worth" is... the view that paying higher
wages in jobs held mostly by men than in jobs held mostly by
women is discriminatory and improper unless the difference is
justified by demonstrable differences in skill, responsibility, ef-
fort, or working conditions; it is no defense that men and wo-
men in the same jobs receive the same wages and that women
are neither excluded from the higher-paying jobs by some crite-
rion that cannot be justified on sex-neutral grounds of business
need, nor otherwise steered into the lower-paying jobs by tac-
tics for which the employer is responsible. Insofar as they are
challenging different wages in... jobs that we have held to be
different jobs ... yet neither relying on a theory of intentional
discrimination nor attacking some criterion that excludes them
from the higher-paying... jobs, [they] are making a compara-
ble worth claim .... "I
Lower federal courts have consistently held that "comparable
worth" is not a sufficient basis on which to bring a cognizable claim
under Title VII.24 When plaintiffs have tried to base liability on the fact
that their employer paid higher wages to predominantly male-occupied
job classifications than to predominantly female-occupied job classifica-
tions, they have failed.245 The courts have found that a comparable
worth claim does not challenge the employer's deliberate decision to ben-
efit men at the expense of women.246 Instead a comparable worth claim
242. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
243. EEOC v. Madison Community Unit School Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 578, 587 (7th Cir.
1987).
244. Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1126 (7th Cir. 1987); American Nurses'
Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 719-23 (7th Cir. 1986); AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401 (9th Cir. 1985) (relying in part on Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th
Cir. 1983). Id. at 1406-07); Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984), overruled in part, Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810
F.2d 1477 (1987) (en banc) (explained, 87 L.A. Daily Journal D.A.R. 5850 (Sept. 4, 1987)).
245. AFSCME, 770 F.2d 1401; Spaulding, 740 F.2d 686; Lemons v. Denver, 620 F.2d 228
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir.
1977).
246. American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 722. The courts also have found that comparable worth
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challenges wage differences between different job classifications.247
Courts reason that female workers are permitted to seek employment in
higher-paying job classifications, and wage disparities, therefore, reflect
the relative market value of the jobs.24 8 Courts proffer that they can cor-
rect discrimination when the employer pays male and female employees
different wages for the same work by ordering the employer to pay the
same wages or to allow females to compete for jobs.2 4 9 Yet, they contend
that a court cannot correct the discrimination reflected in the market-
place.2 50 The courts also view a comparable worth case as requiring a
court to correct the wage differential between different job classifications
independent of the marketplace. 251 They proffer that separating compen-
sation from market wages could seriously impair the efficiency of labor
markets.252
[E]mployers may be constrained by market forces to set salaries
under prevailing wage rates for different job classifications ....
We find nothing in the language of Title VII or its legislative
history to indicate Congress intended to abrogate fundamental
economic principles such as the laws of supply and demand or
to prevent employers from competing in the labor market
253
One court has even concluded that it can "find no basis for thinking that
Congress want6d the courts to get involved in the comparable worth
question.
254
Lower federal courts thus hold that reliance on the market to set
wages may be non-discriminatory and can justify the employer's com-
pensation system.255 Courts have upheld, for example, the employer's
defense that it has not based wage differentials on gender, but on the
competitive market.256 Participation in the market to set salaries has not
by itself created an inference that the employer had a discriminatory mo-
tive to affect women's whges adversely.2 57 Conversely, the employer can-
does not challenge the employers' rule, test or criterion which might be challenged for its
discriminatory effect (disparate impact). Colby, 811 F.2d at 1126.
247. Colby, 811 F.2d at 1126.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1407.
254. Colby, 811 F.2d at 1126.
255. See American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 725; AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1408.
256. AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1406. See infra note 322 and accompanying text.
257. Id.; American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 725.
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not use the market to justify pay differentials for "substantially equal"
work under the Equal Pay Act.258 Yet, a market defense is valid under a
Title VII wage discrimination claim involving jobs which are not sub-
stantially similar but are of comparable value to the employer.25 9 An
important issue in a disparate treatment claim is whether a plaintiff can
demonstrate that her employer's market reliance was based on an illegiti-
mate motive or that her employer did not rely primarily on the market to
establish her compensation. If the plaintiff carries this burden, the em-
ployer might be well advised to show, rather than articulate, that it deter-
mined the employee's compensation primarily by the market for a non-
discriminatory reason.
The courts have exhibited unwillingness to infer discriminatory in-
tent from circumstantial evidence of comparable worth presented in dis-
parate treatment cases. These courts have been unwilling to infer that
the employer possessed a discriminatory motive when it failed to elimi-
nate gender-based wage disparities identified through a comparable
worth study.260 "Knowledge of a disparity is not the same thing as an
intent to cause or maintain it ... [T]he failure to act would have to be
motivated at least in part by a desire to benefit men at the expense of
women."26' Courts also have held that wage disparities reflecting senior-
ity do not raise an inference of discriminatory treatment. 62
A separate issue is whether comparable worth properly pleaded and
proved may provide evidence admissible to bolster proof of the em-
ployer's intent to discriminate. The courts have determined that com-
plaints of gender-based wage discrimination require a liberal reading.
263
258. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 205.
259. AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1406. See, e.g., American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 720; Spaulding,
740 F.2d at 708.
260. American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 722; AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1408.
261. American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 722.
262. Dugan v. Ball State Univ., 815 F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir. 1987).
263. See American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 727. Post-Gunther cases generally have held that
Title VII gender-based wage discrimination claims, unlike Equal Pay Act claims, do not re-
quire a showing that the jobs which are being compared are similar. See, e.g., Craik v. Minne-
sota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 479 (8th Cir. 1984); Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d
1127, 1133-34 (5th Cir. 1983); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 445 (W.D. Wis.
1982). Nonetheless, a district court in the Seventh Circuit narrowly construed viability of
claims under Title VII and stated that dissimilar jobs cannot be compared for the purpose of
establishing a prima facie case. Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 656 F. Supp. 1461, 1472
(N.D. Ind. 1987). Moreover, that court requires the plaintiff's job to be similar in some re-
spect to the job of the group allegedly receiving favorable treatment. Id. at 1473-74. The court
noted that to compare entirely dissimilar jobs "would essentially entitle any protected group to
an inference of discrimination merely because that group was compensated unequally . .. "
Id. at 1473. If other courts were to follow this court's position, plaintiffs seeking relief for
different, but comparable, jobs would be unable to bring a cause of action. The notion that S.
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Consequently, following Gunther and the invalidity of comparable worth
as the sole basis for a claim of disparate treatment, the lower courts have
been evaluating the evidentiary sufficiency of comparable worth
"plus." '264 To demonstrate intentional discrimination under the dispa-
rate treatment theory, the courts have required a plaintiff to show job
552 and H.R. 387 could be interpreted by the courts as a standard from which to infer inten-
tional discrimination would be negated. Consequently, absent explicit congressional intent to
create legislation such as S. 5 which provides relief for different, but comparable jobs, no such
relief would be available. See infra text accompanying notes 431-49 for a discussion of S. 552
and H.R. 387 and text accompanying note 450-63 for a discussion of S. 5.
264. The Ninth Circuit struck down a specific formula where the "plus factors" would be
required in inverse proportion to the degree of comparability shown and stated that "such an
unwieldy test might allow plaintiffs to bolster inadequate showings of comparability with a
confusing potpourri of "plus factors," plunging courts into standardless supervision of em-
ployer-employee relations." Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 702. Even though the Ninth Circuit re-
jected a specific formula for "comparability plus," the courts have been looking at a broad
combination of comparable worth and "plus" factors to determine the sufficiency of a claim of
intentional discrimination. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 265-92.
The United States Supreme Court recently may have provided the lower courts with the
basis on which to uphold a comparable worth claim independent of "plus" factors. In a unani-
mous 1986 Supreme Court decision, Justice Rehnquist established the "hostile environment"
gender-based discrimination claim under Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106
S. Ct. 2399 (1986). In Meritor, a former bank employee brought an action against the bank
and her former supervisor claiming that during her employment she had been subjected to
sexual harassment involving sexual advances by her supervisor in violation of Title VII. Id. at
2402. The Court found that: (1) Title VII is not limited to economic or tangible discrimina-
tion and sexual harassment leading to a non-economic injury can violate the Act, id. at 2404;
and (2) a hostile environment is determined by whether an employee indicated the sexual
advances were unwelcome, not whether her participation was voluntary. Id. at 2406.
The Meritor Court noted that employees have the "right to work in an enviornment free
from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Id. at 2405 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676
(1980); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
Justice Rehnquist analogized a Title VII hostile employment environment claim based on dis-
criminatory sexual harassment to a hostile employment environment claim based on race. Id.
In drawing the analogy, the Court noted that work environments polluted with racial discrimi-
nation can completely destroy minority workers' emotional and psychological stability. Id.
(citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
Yet, the Meritor Court only recognized sexual harassment as a cognizable claim under Title
VII when it was "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the condition of [the victim's] em-
ployment and create an abusive working environment.'" Id. at 2406 (quoting Henson v. Dun-
dee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
Members of Congress in commentary and states in pay equity policy statutes describe the
effects of underpayment on female employees in a manner similar to the Meritor Court's de-
scription of the effects of sexual harassment. Introducing federal legislation to rectify the ef-
fects of wage discrimination on federal workers, Representative Mary Rose Oakar stated: "It
is imperative that our federal government be free of any discriminatory practices that violate
our laws and sap the morale and productivity of employees." Rep. M. R. Oakar, Statement to
the House on the introduction of H.R. 387, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (Jan. 6, 1987) (available
at Loyola of Los Angeles Law School library). State pay equity statutes note that unequal pay
for comparable jobs creates low morale, a decrease in employee mobility, discouragement from
training for and seeking career advancement, a threat to maintenance of an adequate standard
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comparability accompanied by wage disparities plus additional circum-
stantial evidence of the employer's discriminatory conduct. Courts will
recognize comparable worth theory to uphold a Title VII disparate treat-
ment claim when a plaintiff also presents circumstantial evidence that the
employer: failed to implement the results of a comparable worth study
because it believed men ought to be paid more than women;265 steered
women into the lower-paid, predominantly female jobs, but courts are
not required to find that scattered evidence of steering amounts to inten-
tional discrimination;266 discouraged women from applying for higher
paid predominantly male jobs; 267 and excluded women from positions for
which they were qualified, and nonapplicants may claim exclusion when
the employer has created an atmosphere in which employees understand
they "need not apply" for certain positions.268
A disparate treatment claim may also be viable when unequal pay is
related to circumstantial evidence of sex-segregated job classifications.
The Seventh Circuit deemed an employer's maintenance of sex-segre-
gated job classifications highly suspect, reasoning that segregated classifi-
cations cannot be perpetuated absent discriminatory recruiting, hiring,
transfer and promotion practices.269 Plaintiffs need not allege steering or
of living and an overall threat to the general welfare and well-being of employees. See infra
text accompanying notes 368-78 for text and discussion of state pay equity statutes.
Arguably, a pinch or a proposition provides stronger evidence of sexual harassment than
women's lower wages provide of gender-based wage discrimination. Yet, wage discrimination,
although voluntarily accepted, will result in unwelcome, diminished psychological well-being,
discouragement from seeking advancement, decreased work productivity, intimidation and
even ridicule. In light of the severity of the effects attributed to gender-based wage discrimina-
tion and their similarity to effects which the Supreme Court has used to strike down racial
discrimination and sexual harassment claims, supra, it would not be unreasonable for courts to
lower plaintiff's evidentiary burden by recognizing comparable worth as a sufficient prima
facie case of wage discrimination under Title VII. The Ninth Circuit recently has taken a step
in this direction in Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (explained, 87 L.A. Daily Journal D.A.R. 5850 (Sept. 4, 1987)). Following Atonio,
plaintiffs may establish a prima facie case of disparate impact gender-based wage discrimina-
tion under Title VII simply by articulating specific employment practices which plaintiffs
demonstrate collectively have caused an adverse impact on them. Id. at 1482. See infra notes
318 and 322.
265. American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 726.
266. Id. at 727.
267. Id. at 720.
268. Id. at 725; Madison Community, 818 F.2d at 588. A claim of exclusion requires two
determinations: the nonapplicant would have applied but for discrimination and the nonappli-
cant would have been rejected. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 368 n.52.
269. Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 866 (7th Cir. 1985). The court noted that
the "Supreme Court has recognized that ordinarily 'nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in
time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of
the population in the community from which employees are hired.'" Id. at 865 (citing Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977)).
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some other method of segregating jobs by sex even if it is in some sense
implicit in their claim.270 Use of hiring ratios constitutes evidence of the
defendant's discriminatory practices and may be relevant to proving the
defendant's discriminatory intent to treat women less favorably than men
in payment of wages. 27' Disparate terms and conditions for promotion
and advancement for traditionally male and female job classifications
also constitute cognizable claims under Title VII. 272 The terms and con-
ditions include but are not limited to: imposing test and other require-
ments for promotion in traditionally female jobs, but not for promotion
in traditionally male jobs; denying job training for employees in tradi-
tionally female jobs while providing training for employees in tradition-
ally male jobs; establishing shorter career ladders for traditionally female
jobs than for traditionally male jobs;2 73 or advancing employees in female
jobs more slowly in their career paths than employees in male jobs.27 4
Presence of shorter, slower career path scenarios tends to prove that wo-
men have been discriminatorily relegated to low-wage, dead-end jobs.27 5
Denials of requests for transfer and demotions to inferior job titles and
duties while maintaining same salaries also are cognizable claims under
Title VII.
276
Some evidence when considered alone may be insufficient to state a
claim for relief under disparate treatment theory; however, the evidence
may state a sufficient claim when considered in its totality: failure to
classify female employees according to the work actually performed re-
sulting in lower pay than the employer's rules entitled them to; hand-
picked successors and word-of-mouth recruitment; and female jobs abol-
ished to spare males during layoff.2 7 7 An employer's policy of paying
predominantly male and female jobs on the basis of two different types of
compensation schemes may also be discriminatory, and at a minimum,
entitles plaintiffs to injunctive relief.278 While these assertions of inten-
270. American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 728-29.
271. Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 865.
272. District Council 33, AFSCME v. City of Philadelphia, No. 85-7418, 2-3 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 4, 1986) (WESTLAW, DCT file).
273. Id.
274. American Nurses, No. 84 C 4451 at 3 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 1987) (WESTLAW, DCT
file).
275. Id.
276. Cox v. American Cast Iron Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1561 (11th Cir. 1986).
277. American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 728-29.
278. Cox, 784 F.2d at 1561. The traditionally male jobs in the manufacturing division were
compensated on the basis of an objective system of detailed job descriptions, standardized
evaluations, formal job classifications, pay scales and review provisions, while compensation
for non-manufacturing women's jobs were subjectively determined. Id. at 1560-61.
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tional gender-based discrimination are cognizable to show an employer's
intent to treat female employees less favorably than male employees, it
remains unclear specifically what combination of cognizable factors will
create employer liability under Title VII.2 79
Plaintiffs also may rely on statistics, including comparable worth
and sex-based job segregation statistics, as circumstantial evidence to
support an inference of discrimination when the statistics clearly show
differences in treatment.280 Courts find statistical evidence critical to cre-
ating an inference of discriminatory intent.28' In some cases when "gross
disparities" are shown, statistics alone may constitute a prima facie
case.282 Plaintiffs also may use statistics to show that a defendant's ar-
ticulated nondiscriminatory reason for wage disparities is pretextual. 2 3
The weight which courts will give to statistical evidence implicitly
depends on corroboration of supporting facts and the absence of unmea-
sured variables which respectively could bolster or undermine a reason-
able inference of discriminatory motive.284 The more sophisticated the
statistical method used, such as multivariate regression analysis, the
more likely a discriminatory factor can be identified.285 All variables
thought to effect salary and meaningful comparisons are necessary for a
statistical analysis to distinguish legitimate differences from discrimina-
tory factors.286 Yet, even though regression analyses can provide useful
information, the more complex the intricacies involved in the decision-
making being measured, generally the less accurate a regression model
will be.287 Nonetheless, "failure to include variables will affect the analy-
279. American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 724-28; Philadelphia, No. 85-7418 at 2-3.
280. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 703.
281. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 87 L.A. Daily Journal D.A.R. 5850, 5852 (Sept. 4,
1987).
282. Coates, 756 F.2d 532 n.6; Segar, 738 F.2d at 1278; Sears, Roebuck, 628 F. Supp. at
1285.
283. Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 816 F.2d 458, 462 (1987). The Penk court
reviewed not only all of the statistical evidence of pretext but also evidence of sexist attitudes
on the part of male administrators and the State Board's compliance with affirmative action
policies. Id.
284. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 703; Dugan, 815 F.2d at 1137 (female professor failed to pro-
vide anecdotal support to statistical evidence which did not include important variables).
285. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 704. The Seventh Circuit has recommended using "extreme
caution" in drawing any conclusions from statistical significance at a two-to-three standard
deviation level. Sears, Roebuck, 628 F. Supp. at 1286.
286. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 704. Statistical evidence of general underrepresentation of wo-
men in a position, absence of information indicating the number of males and females who
applied for promotion and failed a requisite test, and an absence of information about the
gender composition of the relevant workforce during a meaningful time period fails to provide
statistical evidence from which to infer discriminatory intent. Dugan, 815 F.2d at 1137.
287. Sears, Roebuck, 628 F. Supp. at 1287.
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sis' probativeness, not its admissibility."2 ' Thus, plaintiffs may establish
the employer's discriminatory intent by offering statistical, nonstatistical,
and anecdotal evidence.
289
Defendants may rebut statistical evidence of disparate treatment by
showing its inaccuracy, unreliability, statistical insignificance or inappro-
priateness to the question at issue.290 Rebuttal evidence usually explains
statistical disparities through neutral factors which dispel the plaintiff's
proposed inference of intentional discrimination. 291 Although discrimi-
natorily-based salary disparities created prior to the time Title VII ap-
plied to the employer is not actionable, the preexisting disparities can
support an inference that the employer perpetuated the discriminatory
practice for which a court may impose liability.
292
Beyond the most obvious form of intentional discrimination present
in Gunther, lower federal courts are developing guidelines for a prima
facie case of intentional gender-based wage discrimination under the dis-
parate treatment theory. They are noting that claims based on some evi-
dence alone or in combination with comparable worth demonstrates the
employer's intent to discriminate against women in compensation. A
plaintiff might establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination if
she proves (1) her job classification is sex-segregated; (2) a predominantly
male classification is equivalent in value; (3) the equivalent, predomi-
nantly male classification is paid higher compensation; (4) the employer
is not relying totally on the market to establish the wages it pays these
equivalent job classifications; and (5) the employer excludes or channels
its female employees or engages in other practices in recruiting, hiring,
promoting, transferring or training which treat women less favorably
than men. Even though not clearly delineated at the present time, the
burden on plaintiff appears quite heavy. As plaintiffs test claims based
on newly framed circumstantial evidence of employers' intent to discrim-
inate in female compensation, the contours of a claim of disparate treat-
ment in compensation may become more precise.
293
288. Penk, 816 F.2d at 464.
289. Id. at 463.
290. Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 867.
291. Penk, 816 F.2d at 464.
292. Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000, 3010 (1986). Although Bazemore is a race-based
wage discrimination case, a plaintiff claiming gender-based wage discrimination might rely on
the principles set out in Bazemore.
293. Cases are currently pending in federal court in California, Michigan and Illinois.
California State Employee's Ass'n (CSEA) v. California, C-84-7275 (N.D. Cal.). In this
case plaintiffs are claiming historical evidence of a discriminatory wage and classification sys-
tem since the 1930s. Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ments at 29-36, CSEA v. California (No. 84-7275) (N.D. Cal. 1987). Plaintiff's also claim
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3. Evidentiary sufficiency: claims and defenses under
disparate impact
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court announced the disparate
impact model for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under
Title VII. The Supreme Court interpreted congressional intent in enact-
ing Title VII and decided Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 2 94
[Title VII was designed] to achieve equality of employment op-
portunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past
to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neu-
tral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices. 95
Since 1971, the Court has applied the disparate impact theory which,
unlike disparate treatment, does not require proof of discriminatory mo-
tive. The Court has invoked the disparate impact model in cases involv-
ing objective criteria and found Title VII violations where adverse impact
on a protected classification resulted from use of intelligence tests,
296
high school diplomas,2 97 height and weight requirements, 29 and written
statistical evidence, evidence of job segregation, and other circumstantial evidence, including
channeling women into predominantly female jobs and tolerating harassment of women in
predominantly male classes, maintaining a transfer policy adversely affecting women and fail-
ure to make a good faith effort to implement the affirmative action plan. Id. at 37. Further,
plaintiffs challenge the state's job classification and wage setting system as highly subjective.
Id. at 39. Charges of discriminatory wage-setting include starting, average and promotional
salary disparities between predominantly male and female classes as well as failure to adhere to
asserted reliance on market rates. Id. at 9-16, 17-19. This case is in discovery until early 1988.
Telephone interview with Mel Dayley, Attorney for Plaintiff, August 6, 1987.
UAW v. Michigan, 85CV75483 (E.D. Mich.). In this case, plaintiffs claimed sex-based
segregation and assignment ofjob classifications, lower payment of predominantly female clas-
sifications than predominantly male classifications with equivalent job evaluation points, set-
ting maximum on job evaluation points lower for females in a job family than males in the
same job family and not basing wage rates on market as alleged. Plaintiff's Brief in Response
to Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment at 8-16, UAW v. Michigan (No.
85CV75483 (1986). This case went to trial in August, 1987 and a decision was pending as this
article went to print. Telephone interview with Laura Einstein in the office of Plaintiff's Attor-
ney, Winn Newman (Aug. 19, 1987).
American Nurses Ass'n v. Illinois, 606 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. III. 1985), rev'd and re-
manded, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986), is in discovery until July 1988. Telephone interview
with Edith Barnett, Attorney for Plaintiff, August 6, 1987. See American Nurses, 783 F.2d at
727-28 for a discussion of plaintiffs' claims.
294. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
295. Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added).
296. Id. at 436; Albemarle, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
297. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
298. Dothard, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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examinations. 99 Under disparate impact, the Court has upheld the re-
jection of narcotics/methadone-using job applicants as job related3" and
the exclusion of pregnancy from disability benefits as non-sex-based. 0 1
Courts have applied standard disparate impact analysis to wage dis-
crimination claims. They have found Title VII violations when employer
fringe benefit policies adversely impacted women and involved not obvi-
ously job-related, identifiable practices about which an employer exer-
cised business judgment and could offer proof of job relatedness or
business necessity.3°2 Generally, however, courts have held the disparate
impact model inapplicable to comparable worth gender-based wage dis-
crimination claims.30 3 Plaintiffs have not been able to establish a viola-
tion of Title VII when they show that employees of different genders
receive different compensation for comparable work of equal value to the
employer because of the employer's facially neutral policy to set wages
according to the market.31 Courts which have denied comparable worth
claims do not find the employer's reliance on the market a neutral non-
job-related pretext shielding a discriminatory judgment.3°5 They reason
that the employer's reliance on a market which creates wage disparities is
not the result of a policy about which the employer made an independent
business judgment.30 6 Thus, employers are not held to engage in culpa-
299. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
300. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979).
301. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Congress undid the result in Gilbert by granting rights
to pregnant women. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), added by Pub. L. 95-555, Oct. 31, 1978, 92
Stat. 2076.
302. Colby, 811 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987) (challenges to "head of household" policy deter-
mining spousal eligibility for medical benefits); Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492
(9th Cir. 1983) (same).
303. American Nurses, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986) (nurses paid differently than equivalent
predominantly male jobs); Spaulding, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984) (female nursing faculty
paid differently than male faculty); Lemons, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980) (comparable worth
claim by city-employed nurses); Christensen, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977) (comparable worth
claim by university female clerical employees); Beard, 656 F. Supp. 1461 (N.D. Ind. 1987)
(female office and clerical group denied wage increase and benefits based on market survey).
304. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 705-06. See also American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 722.
305. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708 (Reliance on market prices does not constitute a policy or
practice for purposes of disparate impact analysis); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668
F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982); Beard, 656 F. Supp. at 1469 n.7.
306. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708. In Spaulding, the Ninth Circuit held that relying on the
market was not the sort of policy at which disparate impact analysis is aimed and reasoned:
Every employer constrained by market forces must consider market values in
setting his labor costs. Naturally, market prices are inherently job-related, although
the market may embody social judgments as the worth of some jobs. Employers
relying on the market are, to that extent, "price-takers." They deal with the market
as a given, and do not meaningfully have a "policy" about it in the relevant Title VII
sense. Fringe policies, which are discretionary, are altogether another matter. Addi-
tionally, allowing plaintiffs to establish reliance on the market as a facially neutral
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ble discrimination in the form of business decisions which have a dis-
criminatory impact and which are not justified by their job
relatedness.3 °7
Alternatively, a plaintiff may state a claim for relief under the dispa-
rate impact model if she does not claim that two different jobs should be
paid equally. She may claim she should not be excluded from the higher-
paying job by a criterion which, even if not deliberately discriminatory,
has no business justification outweighing its discriminatory impact.
30 8
Also, if a plaintiff shows that the employer discourages females from en-
tering the higher paying jobs, she will establish a prima facie case of gen-
der discrimination. 3 9 The pre-eminent issues that will decide whether a
plaintiff can use a disparate impact model in a gender-based wage dis-
crimination case rests on whether the employer's market reliance results
from a policy about which the employer made an independent business
judgment, and whether the employer is in fact relying solely on the mar-
ket to set wages.
If a plaintiff can pass the market-based hurdle, she may then have a
cognizable claim under the disparate impact model. The United States
Supreme Court has not delineated the types of cases to which a disparate
impact theory may be applied. Nonetheless, the Court obliquely sug-
gested in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States3" that
disparate impact may be applicable to claims of discrimination involving
subjective criteria.311 Subsequently, in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
3 12
policy for Title VII purposes would subject employers to liability for pay disparities
with respect to which they have not, in any meaningful sense, made an indpendent
business judgment.
Id. A district court of the Northern District of Indiana stated the broader societal reasons for
refusing to allow disparate impact claims to focus on the employer's policy of paying the
market.
The practice of paying market rates is an impermissible focus for a disparate
impact claim, not because it is too broad but because it is a manifestation of, and
fully consistent with the nation's basic economic policy: that goods and services are
to be produced through the functioning of product and labor markets. This market-
oriented policy has existed and continues to exist despite its obviously different im-
pacts on societal groups. Therefore, paying market rates is beyond challenge under a
disparate impact claim unless Congress decides otherwise.
Beard, 656 F. Supp. at 1470 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs might question what legitimate dif-
ferences exist in the employer's decision to grant a variety of benefits as a part of an employee's
total compensation package as opposed to the salary portion of the package when both are
discretionary and determined by the market.
307. American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 725; Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708.
308. Madison Community, 818 F.2d at 589.
309. Id.
310. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
311. Id. at 336 n.15.
312. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
November 1987] PAY EQUITY OR PAY UP
the Court addressed by footnote whether disparate impact theory applied
to subjective criteria.313 Interpreting the Furnco footnote, the lower
courts have emerged with two conflicting views as to the scope of the
impact model-whether impact analysis is applicable only to evaluate
objective criteria or is also applicable to subjective criteria. The First,
Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and District of Columbia
Circuits apply impact analysis to subjective criteria and practices. 3 14 The
Fourth Circuit does not apply impact analysis to subjective criteria and
313. Id. at 575 n.7. In Furnco, plaintiffs were not hired because they applied at the job site,
rather than through the regular hiring process of referrals and rehires. Id. at 570. The Court
ruled that the hiring policy should be evaluated under a disparate treatment, not disparate
impact, analysis as the case did not involve height and weight requirements, standardized tests
or a class action. Id. at 575 n.7. The Court found the employer's referral-in-hiring practice
was not discrimination. Id. at 578.
314. The First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and District of Columbia Cir-
cuits apply disparate impact analysis to subjective criteria and practices.
FIRST CIRCUIT: Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1984) (layoff guidelines,
including evaluations of employees' knowledge, past performance and potential).
SECOND CIRCUIT: Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1984) (prior experience require-
ments held job-related for women professors and classified staff); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729
F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984) (tenure decision involving peer evaluations upheld); Grant v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981) (haphazard hiring
process).
THIRD CIRCUIT: Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1983) (fire depart-
ment promotion system incorporating performance evaluations); Green v. United States Steel
Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (hiring process dependent on interviewer's "gut-level
reaction" to individual applicants).
SIXTH CIRCUIT: Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982) (rehire, pro-
motion and transfer procedures almost entirely dependent on recommendation of foreman).
NINTH CIRCUIT: Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (1987) (explained, 87
L.A. Daily Journal D.A.R. 5850, 5851 (Sept. 4, 1987)) (separate hiring channels, word-of-
mouth recruitment, nepotism and rehire policies); Peters v. Lieuallen, 746 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.
1984) (interviews for hiring); Yartzoff v. Oregon, 745 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1984) (promotion
criteria in age discrimination case); Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1982) (hiring
and promotion policies); Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981) (requirements
that delivery truck drivers be neat, articulate and personable).
TENTH CIRCUIT: Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985) (United States Post
Office standardless promotion system based on temporary appointment to higher positions as
basis for later permanent appointment); Lasso v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Co., 741 F.2d
1241 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985) (promotion practices); Mortenson v.
Callaway, 672 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1982) (multiple factors combined to evaluate chemists for
promotion to supervisory positions); Coe v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 646 F.2d 444 (10th
Cir. 1981) (employee attending law school applied for and was rejected for management train-
ing program); Williams v. Colorado Springs School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835 (10th Cir.
1981) (hiring practices).
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: Griffin v. Carlin, 755"F.2d 1516 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (promotion practice);
Watson v. National Linen Serv., 686 F.2d 877 (11 th Cir. 1982) (standardless hiring procedure
based on daily policies not communicated to employees and not followed).
D.C. CIRCUIT: Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Meese v.
Segar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985) (performance appraisal).
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practices, 315 and the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have split inter-
nally on the issue.316 Thus, a substantial majority of circuit court rulings
support a disparate impact analysis to evaluate the legality of subjective
criteria and procedures. The courts consider wage-setting to involve sub-
jective criteria317 and, therefore, a plaintiff may bring a wage discrimina-
tion suit under the disparate impact model in the majority of circuits.
315. The Fourth Circuit does not apply disparate impact analysis to subjective criteria and
procedures.
FOURTH CIRCUIT: Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarkets, 720 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984) (management's unbridled discretion creating disparity in hiring
rates did not permit disparate impact analysis); E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d
633 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S.
867 (1984) (promotion policies); Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20 (4th Cir. 1982) (hiring
criteria; Fourth Circuit upheld District Court opinion that statistical sample size was too small
to show disparate impact); contra Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972) (hiring and promotion practices including failure
to post job vacancies); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971) (seniority system).
316. The Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits sometimes apply disparate impact analysis to
subjective criteria and practices.
FIFrH CIRCUIT: Bunch v. Bullard, 795 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1986) (disparate impact analysis
applied in employment and promotion practices); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 1038 (5th
Cir. 1984) (applying impact analysis to subjective promotion system dependent on evaluation
and recommendation of supervisor); Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.
1983) (employment tests subject to disparate impact analysis); Pegues v. Mississippi State Em-
ployment Service, 699 F.2d 760 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983) (applied disparate
impact analysis to employment referrals and tests); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d
348 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying impact analysis to promotion and transfer policies involving
foreman recommendation and no notice to employees of opportunity or requirements); contra
Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073
(1984) (disparate impact analysis inapplicable to hiring policies involving statistical proof);
Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982) (disparate impact model
inapplicable to promotional criteria).
SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1985) (merit in-
creases based on evaluations by supervisors subject to disparate impact analysis); Clark v.
Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 873 (1982) (disparate impact
analysis applied to employment practices); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (hiring/selection and promotion requirements includ-
ing character, moral conduct and habits subject to disparate impact analysis); Frink v. United
States Navy, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 67 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd without opinion, 609
F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980) (promotion standards including two
supervisory appraisals, review by panel, and detailed written instructions for appraisers subject
to disparate impact analysis); contra Griffin v. Board of Regents, 795 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1986)
(excluding disparate impact analysis from supervisory evaluation of work quality).
EIGTH CIRCUIT: Gilbert v. Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
972 (1984) (promotion system including oral interview and performance appraisal subject to
disparate impact analysis); Talley v. United States Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 952 (1984) (disparate impact applied to firing); contra Harris v. Ford
Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1981) (refusing to apply impact analysis).
317. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1478.
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Even if subjective criteria and procedures fall within disparate im-
pact analysis, the next issue is whether a plaintiff may challenge an entire
system or must challenge a specific practice at a single point in the sys-
tem. On this issue, the circuit courts also have split.3"' Under Connecti-
cut v. Teal3 19 and the Pouncy32 ° line of cases, plaintiffs are required to
challenge a specific component of the employer's program. The Segar321
line of cases permit broad-based challenges to employment practices.
Courts consider the employer's compensation decisions, including its re-
liance on the market, to be the result of multifaceted decision-making
involving complex factors.322 Thus, even if she overcomes the market
defense and passes the objective criteria hurdle, a plaintiff may bring a
cognizable gender-based wage discrimination claim only in those circuits
not requiring challenges to specific employer practices.
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case in circuits permit-
ting a gender-based wage discrimination claim under impact analysis,
courts will require the employer to prove that virtually all its challenged
employment decisions and programs are job-related or substantially pro-
mote the efficiency of the business. Affected practices could include re-
cruitment, hiring, training, promotion, demotion, layoff, and
termination. Additionally, the courts could scrutinize the employer's en-
tire job classification and wage-setting methodology. To illustrate, if the
plaintiff were to identify the component(s) of the job classification and/or
318. Compare Pouncy, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982) (requiring challenges to a specific com-
ponent of an employer's program), and Spaulding, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1036 (1984) (same) overruled on related grounds, Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co.,
810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (explained, 87 L.A. Daily Journal D.A.R. 5850 (Sept.
4, 1987)) (requiring only articulation of specific employment practices plus proof of their indi-
vidual or collective adverse impact), with Segar, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied
sub nom., Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985) (allowing broad challenges to entire systems),
and Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (1lth Cir. 1985) (same).
'319. 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (a favorable bottom-line does not preclude individual employees
from establishing a prima facie case by challenging a specific component of the employer's
system).
320. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982). See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
321. 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
322. AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1406. "[T]he decision to base compensation on the competitive
market, rather than on a theory of comparable worth, involves the assessment of a number of
complex factors not easily ascertainable, an assessment too multifaceted to be appropriate for
disparate impact analysis." Id. (citing Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 708
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984), overruled on related grounds, Atonio v.
Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (explained, 87 L.A. Daily
Journal D.A.R. 5850 (Sept. 4, 1987))). Even though the courts have yet to determine the
implications of Atonio, plaintiffs and defendants in the Ninth Circuit would be well advised to
note that Atonio in part overruled Spaulding, the case upon which theAFSCME court relied to
find that a claim based on comparable worth was not viable.
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wage-setting process that caused an adverse impact on her salary and
demonstrate the bottom-line adverse impact of the practice on her wages,
the burden of proof would shift to the employer. Courts could require
the employer to meet its burden by proving the business necessity for its
choice of factors, factor weights, job description, evaluation points as-
signed the job, grade cutoff levels, selection of benchmark jobs, salary
survey, pay ranges, performance appraisals and the timing and amount
of increases. If the employer has documented its decisions and has a
rationally-based systematic program, it will be capable of carrying its
burden.
Given the difficulty of overcoming the market defense, which is
available to the employer in all circuits, as well as the objective and spe-
cific criteria hurdles required of the employee in several circuits, a plain-
tiff's likelihood of success in establishing employer liability under
disparate impact analysis will often present an uphill battle. Conse-
quently, a plaintiff claiming gender-based wage discrimination would be
well advised to claim intentional discrimination as well as disparate im-
pact when challenging the employer's compensation practices.
The scope of cognizable gender-based wage discrimination claims
based on both disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses,
although evolving, appears limited at present. The employer's failure to
adhere to its own standard, as in Gunther, was only the first of several
gender-based intentional wage discrimination claims which the courts
could capably construe as viable. Nonetheless, with seven years in which
to act following the Gunther decision, the federal judiciary has failed to
establish a formula beyond that presented in Gunther for a cognizable
prima facie case of disparate treatment. Cases also may succeed under
disparate impact analysis when a plaintiff challenges the market defense
and the employer's job evaluation or wage-setting methods showing that
they operate to depress women's wages. Yet, to the present no plaintiff
has succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of gender-based wage
discrimination under the disparate impact model unless she attacked the
fringe benefit portion of her compensation package. Absent additional
evidence of congressional intent, the federal judiciary will likely continue
to construe Title VII as providing women substantially limited entitle-
ments to equitable compensation.
The scope of women's federal statutory protections from unequal
compensation for work equivalent to men's appears narrow or, under a
liberal reading, laced with ambiguity. Congressional limitations on wo-
men's entitlements to fair compensation began with the 88th Congress in
1963 and continued through the 99th Congress in 1986. Brief legislative
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history at the onset of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the absence of
congressional clarification of women's rights regarding compensation
through the 99th Congress have contributed to women's narrow protec-
tion from unfair employer compensation practices. Several alternatives
are available for expanding women's protections from gender-based wage
discrimination: (1) Congress can expressly clarify its intent to expand
employer prohibitions against discriminatory compensation practices;
(2) the federal judiciary can construe Title VII's prohibitions more
broadly than it has to the present; and (3) the states can act to provide
women greater protection against discriminatory employer practices
than the federal government currently provides.
V. STATE ACTIVITY
Justice Brennan recently commented on the emerging development
of state level activity as a primary force in shaping the constitutional
jurisprudence of individual rights:
We can and should welcome this development in state constitu-
tional jurisprudence-indeed, my own view is that this redis-
covery by state supreme courts of the broader protections
afforded their own citizens by their state constitutions-
spawned in part certainly by dissatisfaction with the decisional
law being announced these days by the United States Supreme
Court-is probably the most important development in consti-
tutional jurisprudence of our times. For state constitutional
law will assume an increasingly more visible role in American
law in the years ahead. Lawyers should take heed: . . . "A
lawyer today representing someone who claims some constitu-
tional protection and who does not argue that the state consti-
tution provides that protection is skating on the edge of
malpractice." '323
Justice Brennan noted that "state supreme courts are increasingly evalu-
ating their state constitutions and concluding that those constitutions
should be applied to confer greater civil liberties than their federal
counterparts .... 324
Comparable worth theory has not been incorporated into any state
constitution to date, but in recent years state legislators, governors and
executive officials have launched an accelerating state level effort to apply
323. Brennan, Color-Blind, Creed-Blind, Status-Blind, Sex-Blind, 14 HUMANRIGHTS 30, 37
(1987) (citation omitted) [hereinafter BRENNAN].
324. Id.
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comparable worth to wage discrimination prohibitions.325 This state
level activity is antithetical to the federal agenda and primarily attributa-
ble to a congressional unwillingness to move into the comparable worth
arena, lack of specificity in congressional intent as to the scope of prohib-
ited gender discrimination in compensation under Title VII and the fed-
eral judiciaries' unwillingness to read comparable worth/pay equity into
Title VII. Despite the increased level of state activity in the comparable
worth arena, the state judiciary, like their federal counterparts, are de-
clining to construe comparable worth in their statutes prohibiting gen-
der-based wage discrimination.3 26  This section of the Comment will
examine what protections against gender-based wage discrimination the
states have and have not conferred and could justifiably confer on its
citizens.
A. State Legislation
While two federal laws, the Equal Pay Act3 27 (EPA) and Title
VII,328 provide individual workers with relief from wage discrimination,
most states also have equal pay and fair employment practice laws.329
The state equal pay movement began with the first state EPA statute,
twenty-four years before the 1963 federal EPA was passed, and since
then many more state statutes have been passed.330 Presently, only
eleven states have no form of state equal pay law.33' Seven states model
325. "Th[is] new 'era' legislation tends to deal exclusively with the state employer and with
pay equity in state employment." Cook, Developments in Selected States, in COMPARABLE
WORTH, supra note 60, at 271.
The [state comparable worth] activity begins typically with a study of the degree of
job segregation into sex-dominated occupations and then proceeds to relate wage
differentials to these categories. Much of the job evaluation work that is the key to
determinations of comparability is being carried out by outside consultants who are
experts in this field. The assignment of wages to the reclassified categories is the
work of the collective bargaining partners where union activity is legal in public em-
ployment. Where it is not, the personnel departments or civil service commissions
proceed on their own to put the recommendations into operation. Funds for studies
have usually been part of the enabling legislation.'
Id. at 282. State and local governments have been settling federal litigation by providing pay
equity adjustments for state and city employees. See generally Pay Equity and Comparable
Worth, Special Rep. (BNA) (1984) (state and local developments in comparable worth).
326. See infra text accompanying notes 414-20.
327. See supra note 10 for text of Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
328. See supra note 11 for the text of Title VII, §§ 701-18; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
329. Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth under Various Federal and State Laws, in
COMPARABLE WORTH supra note 60, at 239.
330. Id. at 240.
331. Equal pay standard refers to equal pay for equal work. Comparable pay standard
refers to equal pay for work of comparable value. States without equal pay laws of any kind
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their EPAs after the federal EPA and use identical language.332 Of the
remaining thirty-two states, fifteen have EPAs with a comparable pay
standard333 and seventeen have a standard other than equal pay or com-
parable pay.3 34 All state equal pay acts cover public and private sector
include: Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. See id. at 241-43, 265-66.
332. States with an equal pay standard include the following: Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 448.07, § 725.06 (West 1985); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-2-4 (Bums 1985); Minne-
sota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.67 (West 1986); Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. 608.017 (1985);
Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.17 (Baldwin 1985); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43 § 336.3 (Purdon 1986) (first enacted 1947), and VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.6 (1984). See id.
These state statutes use the same language as the federal Equal Pay Act:
No employer having employees subject to any provision of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, be-
tween employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establish-
ment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite
sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions.
Id. at 242 n.2.
333. States with a comparable pay standard include the following: Arkansas, ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 81-624, 81.333 (using equal pay for comparable work and equal compensation for
equal services respectively); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 54-100 (1985) (using comparable
worth); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 44-1702 (1985) (using comparable work); Kentucky, Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 337.423 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986) (using comparable work); Maine, ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 628 (1985) (using comparable work); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE
art. 100, § 55A (1986) (using comparable work); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch.
149, § 105A (West 1984) (using comparable work); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1219
(1985) (using comparable work); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1-03 (1985) (using
comparable work); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 198.1 (West 1985) (using compa-
rable work); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220 (1985) (using comparable work); South Da-
kota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-12-15 (1986) (using comparable work); Tennessee,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-321 (1984) (using comparable work); and West Virginia, W. VA.
CODE § 21-58-1 (1985) (using comparable work). See Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable
Worth under Various Federal and State Laws, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 241-
43, 265-66.
334. States with a standard other than equal or comparable pay include: Arizona, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.340 (1983) (using equal pay for the same classification); California,
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1997.5 (Deering 1984) (using equal pay for the same classification); Colo-
rado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-5-05 (1983) (prohibiting discrimination in wages solely on ac-
count of sex); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-75 (1984) (prohibiting discrimination in
wages solely on the basis of sex); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 724.06 (West 1983) (using equal
pay for equal services); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 387-4 (1983) (prohibiting "discrimination
in any way in payment of wages... as... between the sexes"); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48 para. 4a (1983) (using equal work); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.556 (West
1981) (prohibiting sex-based wage discrimination for persons similarly employed); Missouri,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.400 (Vernon 1983) (using equal pay for the same classification); Mon-
tana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-104 (1985) (using equal pay for equivalent services or for the
same amount or class of work or labor); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37
(1986) (using equal work); New Jersey, N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56.2 (1982) (prohibit-
ing discrimination "in any way in the rate or method of payment of wages.., because of sex");
New York, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 199.a (McKinney 1985) (prohibiting discrimination because of
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employees except for that of Texas, which extends only to public
employment.33 5
State Fair Employment Practice (FEP) laws generally address the
same issues which Title V11 336 addresses federally. 337 Exactly half the
states passed FEP laws prior to the passage of the federal Civil Rights
sex); Texas, TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. tit. 117, art. 6825 (1979) (using same work); and
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.75 (1983) (prohibiting sex-based wage discrimination
for persons similarly employed). See Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth under Vari-
ous Federal and State Laws, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 241-43, 265-66.
335. Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth under Various Federal and State Laws, in
COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 241 n.1.
336. See supra note 11 for text of Title VII, §§ 701-18; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
337. Typically, Fair Employment Practice (FEP) laws prohibit discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex and age. "Many of the laws include language
prohibiting discrimination in 'compensation' or acts that 'limit, segregate, or classify' an indi-
vidual on the basis of sex or other protected categories." Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable
Worth under Various Federal and State Laws, in COMPARABLE WORTH supra note 60, at 244.
The following is a listing of the state FEP laws together with the year of enactment/year
gender added as a protected category (if known). Designations after the state name indicate
specific language on compensation (*), and specific language on classification and/or segrega-
tion (**):
Alaska *, ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.010 (1953/1972) (the only FEP law specifically men-
tioning comparable work pay disparities as a discriminatory employment practice); Arizona *
*, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.1461 (1965); California, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West
1959); Colorado *, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301 (1957); Connecticut * **, CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46a-51 (1947/1967); Delaware * **, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 710 (1953); Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.161-167 (West 1967/1972); Georgia * **, GA. CODE ANN. § 89.1707
(1978); Hawaii * **, 5 HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-1 (1963); Idaho * **, 11 IDAHO CODE § 67-
5909 (1961); Illinois **, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 9, para. 15 § 81-1216 (1961); Indiana, IND. CODE
ANN. § 22-9-1-1 (Bums 1961/1971); Iowa **, IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.1 (West 1963); Kan-
sas * **, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001 (1953); Kentucky * **, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 344.030 (Baldwin 1966/1977); Maine *, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4551 (1965/1973);
Maryland * **, MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 1-28 (1951); Massachusetts *, MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (1964/1965); Michigan * **, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2201 (1964);
Minnesota * **, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01 (West 1955/1969); Missouri * **, Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 296.010 (Vernon 1961); Montana *, MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-301 (1947); Nebraska
*, NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1116 (1965); Nevada * **, NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330 (1961/1965);
New Hampshire *, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A (1965/1971); New Jersey *, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-.1 (West 1945/1970); New Mexico *, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-1 (1949/1969);
New York *, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 290 (McKinney 1945/1965); North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-422 (1977); North Dakota *, N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-19 (1979); Ohio, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.99 (Baldwin 1959); Oklahoma *, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 25:1101
(1963); Oregon *, OR. REV. STAT. § 659.110 (1949/1955); Pennsylvania *, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 956 (Purdon 1955/1969); Rhode Island * **, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-1 (1949/1971);
South Carolina * **, S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-10 (Law. Co-op. 1972); South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-1 (1972); Tennessee * **, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (1967/
1972); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6 (1953) (using "substantially equal experience, re-
sponsibilities and competency for the particular job."); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495
(1963/1971); Washington **, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (1949/1969); West Vir-
ginia *, W. VA. CODE § 5-11-1 (1967/1977); Wisconsin *, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West
1945/1961); and Wyoming *, Wvo. STAT. § 27-9-101 (1965). See Dean, Roberts & Boone,
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Act 338 in 1964.339 New York's was the first in 1945, although "sex" was
not added as a protected category until 1965. 340 Only six states have no
form of FEP law. 34 ' The remaining forty-four states have FEP laws
which vary in specific language on statutory scope including compensa-
tion, job classification, segregation or a combination of these.342 A few
state FEP laws specify conduct constituting sex-based wage discrimina-
tion. 43 Alaska is the only state with a statute which specifically men-
tions "comparable" work pay disparities as a discriminatory employment
practice.3 " All state FEP laws cover both private and public sector em-
ployees except those of Georgia, Texas and North Carolina. 45
Federal EPA and Title VII statutes provide minimum protection to
prospective plaintiffs in wage discrimination actions. These federal stat-
utes state that they do not preempt state EPA and FEP statutes when the
latter are more stringent.346 Thus, litigants who bring EPA wage dis-
Comparable Worth under Various Federal and State Laws, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra
note 60, at 246-47, 265-66.
338. See supra note 11 for text of Title VII, §§ 701-18; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
339. See Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth under Various Federal and State
Laws, in COMPARABLE WORTH supra note 60, at 244.
340. Id.
341. States without fair employment practices laws include: Alabama (Alabama has no
FEP law, but in 1976, 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1982, the state budget bill included a clause
forbidding discrimination based on race or sex in state employment); Arkansas, Louisiana (in
1981 an FEP bill was introduced in the Louisiana legislature but died during the legislative
session), Mississippi, Texas and Virginia. Id. at 246-47, 265-66.
342. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
343. Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth under Various Federal and State Laws, in
COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 244. For instance, Utah's Anti-Discrimination Act
defines compensation discrimination as "the payment of differing wages or salaries to employ-
ees having substantially equal experience, responsibilities and competency for the particular
job." UTAH CODE ANN., § 34-35-6 (1953). Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth
under Various Federal and State Laws, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 247 n.6,
266.
344. Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth under Various Federal and State Laws, in
COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 247 n.3. Alaska's statute provides that it is unlawful
for:
an employer to discriminate in the payment of wages as between the sexes, or to
employ a female in an occupation in this state at a salary or wage rate less than that
paid to a male employee for work of comparable character or work in the same
operation, business or type of work in the same locality.
Id. at 245 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.010 (1980)). This 1980 amendment replaced an
Alaskan EPA law which contained identical language. Id. (currently Alaska Stat.
§ 18.80.220(a)(5) (1981)).
345. Id. at 247 n.1.
346. Id. at 239. The federal EPA does not excuse noncompliance with any state equal pay
standards higher than those set forth in the federal law. Additionally, Congress expressly
provides that state statutes defining sex discrimination more comprehensively than Title VII
are not pre-empted or superseded by Title VII. Two sections address this issue:
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crimination claims in either state or federal court may rely on state stat-
utes which contain language broader than the narrow equal work
standard. Litigants should be aware, however,, that to the present the
state judiciary have interpreted their EPA laws as applying only to jobs
which are substantially equal. Similarly, comparable pay claims may be
brought under state FEP laws which, because of specific language, or
state judicial statutory construction, may also afford plaintiffs greater
protection than does Title VII.
B. State Executive Orders and Local Laws
Approximately eighty-five state and local goverhments have either
studied or implemented pay equity.347 Comparable worth mandates may
be found in state and city executive orders as well as in city and county
government laws, ordinances and statutes. 4 s These regulations vary
considerably in requirements and cover governmental entities and private
42 U.S.C. 2000h-4: Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such
title operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any
provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless
such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision
thereof.
42 U.S.C. 2000e-7: Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve
any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present
or future law of any State or political'subdivision of a State, other than any such law
which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under this subehapter.
Id.
See Comment, Preemption of Recovery in Cigarette Litigation: Can Manufacturers Be
Sued for Failure to Warn Even Though They Have Complied With Federal Warning Require-
ments, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 867, 869-878 (1987) (authored by Taylor A. Ewell) for an exten-
sive discussion of the theories under which current preemption challenges may be brought.
347. Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political Realities: Concluding Re-
marks, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 299.
348. Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth under Various Federal and State Laws, in
COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 251.
In June 1984, the U.S. Conference of Mayors adopted a resolution urging cities and other
governmental jurisdictions "to address any existing pay inequities within their jurisdictions"
and calling "upon the Congress, the Administration, the States and the Courts to study further
the issues raised by 'comparable worth' with particular attention to ways any existing pay
inequities can be addressed in a prompt, orderly and fiscally responsible manner."
In July 1984, the National Governors Association supported "equal pay for equal work"
for public employees. In considering the policy, it was noted that 21 pay equity lawsuits were
pending against public employers, and that 30 states had taken action on comparable worth.
CONG. RES. SERV., LIBR. OF CONG., PAY EQUITY/COMPARABLE WORTH ACTIVITIES BY
STATE GOVERNMENTS: A SUMMARY, REP. No. 954E (Sept. 30, 1986) (A. Ahmuty & M.
Jickling, analysts) (footnotes omitted).
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employers alike. 49 Furthermore, state and local governments, like the
federal government, often regulate government contractors to ensure that
they do not discriminate on the basis of gender.3 '
One city government regulation is San Francisco's Non-Discrimina-
tion in Contract Ordinance 35 1 Which prohibits contractors, subcontrac-
tors and suppliers from discriminating on the basis of gender. 352 This
law authorizes a commission to promulgate regulations within the scope
of those adopted under federal Executive Order 11,246, as amended.353
Moreover, a government contractor has a contractual duty not to dis-
criminate on the basis of sex and a corresponding obligation to take "af-
firmative action" to increase women's employment opportunities in
accordance with employer-established goals and timetables.
3 5 4
Through an alternative model for implementing pay equity, the city
of Madison, Wisconsin adopted the unique program of "pay parity."
The affirmative action plan for the City of Madison Vendors 355 bars dis-
crimination and sets affirmative action goals on the basis of "making pro-
gress toward achieving wage parity., 356  Accordingly, government
contractors must pay ".... the extent to which salary distribution approx-
imates the representation of women, minorities and handicapped persons
in the workforce. ' ' 357 In Madison, then, women must earn the percent-
349. Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth under Various Federal and State Laws, in
COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 251.
350. Id. "Regulating private employers who do business with state and local governments
is one way in which rule-making bodies can reach beyond the confines of their own employ-
ment settings to reduce sex bias and the wage gap in the private sector." Id. at 252-53.
351. SAN FRANCISCO ADMIN. CODE, NON-DISCRIMINATION IN CONTRACTS, chs. 12, 13
(1984) (cited in Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth under Various Federal and State
Laws, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 252 n.14.
352. Dean, Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth under Various Federal and State Laws, in
COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 252.
353. Id.
354. Each President since Lyndon Johnson has promulgated executive orders and imple-
mented regulations requiring government contractors to undertake affirmative action to hire
and promote women. While no private right of action exists, injured individuals may file com-
plaints with the Department of Labor and receive a contractual-type remedy. If the govern-
ment concludes in an administrative hearing that the employer is not in compliance with its
affirmative action obligation, the government may specifically enforce the contract provisions,
cancel the contract or bar the contractor from future government contracts. 2 C.F.R. § 339
(1986).
355. The plan was adopted November 15, 1983, and is available from the Affirmative Ac-
tion Office, City-County Bldg., 210 Monona Ave. Rm. 515, Madison, Wisconsin 53710. Dean,
Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth under Various Federal and State Laws, in COMPARABLE
WORTH, supra note 60, at 252 n.16.
356. Id. at 252 (quoting the City of Madison's affirmative action plan, RCW 41.06.010 at
IX.A.1, Goals and Timetables).
357. Id.
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age of total payroll equal to the percentage of women employees in the
contractor's workforce.3 s8 This pay parity program is designed to elimi-
nate the gender-based wage gap, not on the basis of job evaluation, but on
the basis of workforce representation. Consequently, women could not
be segregated into devalued, low-paid job classifications, and women
could be paid the same as men performing work of equal value.
C. Status of State Pay Equity Activities
In 1986, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) con-
ducted a survey and reported that of forty-eight states responding, forty-
six states use job evaluation to set pay levels for classified positions, 3 9 ten
states have a pay equity policy3 ° and twenty-eight states have conducted
pay equity studies.361 Although more than fifty percent of all states have
conducted pay equity studies, only twenty-two percent of these studies
resulted in pay equity increases.362
1. State use of job evaluation
The states use one or a combination of four general methods of job
evaluation: poiht-factor (twenty-one of thirty-four states using only one
system), grading (thirteen states), ranking (seven states) and factor com-
parison (three states). 363 Of sixty-four job evaluation systems used by the
states, thirty-four have been used for more than ten years and nineteen
for more than twenty years.3 1 While thirty-four states use only one
method of job evaluation for all jobs, 365 twelve use between two and
358. For example, if the employer's workforce is eighty percent female and the total payroll
is $1,000,000, the employer's aggregate female payroll must total $800,000.
359. PAY EQUITY STATUS, supra note 6, at 15, Table II.4. Every state which reported
except Kansas and Mississippi has a job evaluation system. Id. Pennsylvania and Alabama
chose not to provide information. Id. at 15 nn.2 & 5.
360. Id. States with pay equity policies include: Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin. "California personnel officials said
they could not say whether the state had a pay equity policy or not, as it may be superseded by
the state's collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 15 n.3. "Though Massachusetts stated
that it did not have a written pay equity policy, officials indicated that the governor, in concert
with the legislature, made a public commitment to deal with pay equity through the collective
bargaining process." Id. at 15 n.4.
361. Id. at 15, Table II.4. States with pay equity studies include: Arizona, California, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyo-
ming. Id.
362. Id. at 12. For states with pay equity policies, see infra notes 368-378.
363. PAY EQUITY STATUS, supra note 6, at 7.
364. Id. at 9, Table 11.3.
365. Id. at 7.
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eleven such systems to set pay.3 66 Reasons most commonly given for use
of job evaluation include administrative efficiency, internal consistency
and pay equity.
367
Job evaluation, then, has been the tried and familiar method of
choice for determining job value and setting wages in at least ninety per-
cent of the states for an average of over thirteen years. Further, approxi-
mately two-thirds of the states employ a single evaluation plan.
Consequently, the states are sufficiently positioned to inject comparable
worth as just one more factor in their existing systems.
2. State pay equity policies
Ten states have a pay equity policy, meaning legislation, executive
order or administrative policy which states a compensation goal of equal
pay for work of comparable value for state employees.368 Pay equity
studies or evaluations of job classes, by themselves, are not pay equity
policies.369 The governor, the legislature, the union and women's interest
groups have provided the impetus for establishing these policies.37 °
California, for example, enacted a broad comparable worth policy:
The legislature, having recognized December 1980 statis-
tics from the U.S. Department of Labor, finds: that 60 percent
of all women 18 to 64 are in the workforce, that two-thirds of
all those women are either the head of household or had hus-
bands whose earnings were less that ten thousand dollars
($10,000), and that most women are in the workforce because
of economic needs; that the average working woman has earned
less than the average working man, not only because of the lack
of education and employment opportunities in the past, but be-
cause of segregation into historically undervalued occupations
where wages have been depressed; and that a failure to reassess
366. Id. at 8, Table 11.2. Nine of the twelve states using more than one system use different
job evaluation systems for different types of postions. Id. at 9. Forty states use their primary
system to evaluate administrative, clerical/secretarial, laborer, craftsperson, managerial, pro-
fessional and technical positions. Id. at 8.
367. Id. at 7.
368. Id. at 10. Six states are considering implementation of a pay equity policy. Id. The
accuracy of the states' information to the GAO is questionable. For example, ten states not
including Nebraska reported the existence of a state pay equity policy. Yet, Nebraska has a
statute which parallels other states' pay equity policies. See infra note 372 and accompanying
text for text of Nebraska's pay equity statute; and see infra text accompanying notes 368-78 for
text and discussion of state pay equity statutes.
369. PAY EQUITY STATUS, supra note 6, at 10.
370. Id. Of the 10 state pay equity or comparable worth policies, seven were established by
legislation, two by administrative policy and one by executive order. Id.
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the basis on which salaries in state service are established will
perpetuate these pay inequities, which have a particularly dis-
criminatory impact on minority and older women; and, there-
fore, it is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this statute to
establish a state policy of setting salaries for female-dominated
jobs on the basis of comparability of the value of the work.37'
Similar to the California statute, other state comparable worth policies
explicitly acknowledge that pay disparities between men and women con-
tinue to exist in general and in state government in particular.372 The
statutes note that these disparities exist because of both overt sex dis-
crimination and subtle biases which, although more difficult to recognize,
inherently undervalue the work of women.373 Further, the statutes cite a
statistical basis for their findings, including statistics from studies being
conducted throughout the states.374 Finally, the statutes promote setting
salaries by a standard of equal pay for jobs of comparable worth.375
371. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19827.2(a) (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
372. For example, Nebraska's pay equity statute recognizes the imperative to be free of
discriminatory pay practices.
Discriminatory wage practices based on sex; policy.
(1) The practice of discriminating on the basis of sex by paying wages to em-
ployees of one sex at a lesser rate than the rate paid to employees of the opposite sex
for comparable work on jobs which have comparable requirements:
(a) Unjustly discriminates against the person receiving the lesser rate;
(b) Leads to low worker morale, high turnover, and frequent labor un-
rest;
(c) Discourages workers paid at the lesser wage rates from training for
higher level jobs;
(d) Curtails employment opportunities, decreases workers' mobility, and
increases labor costs;
(e) Impairs purchasing power and threatens the maintenance of an ade-
quate standard of living by such workers and their families;
(f) Prevents optimum utilization of the state's available labor resources;
and
(g) Threatens the well-being of citizens of this state, and adversely affects
the general welfare.
(2) It is therefore declared to be the policy of this state through exercise of its
police power to correct and, as rapidly as possible, to eliminate discriminatory wage
practices based on sex.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1219 (1984). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.01(3) (West 1983);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1-01 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 240.190 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 41.06.155 (1986).
373. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.01(3) (West 1983); NEa. REV. STAT. § 48-1219 (1984);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1-01 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 240.190 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 41.06.155 (1986).
374. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.01(3) (West 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1219 (1984);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1-01 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 240.190 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 41.06.155 (1986).
375. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.01(3) (West 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1219 (1984);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1-01 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 240.190 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 41.06.155 (1986).
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While these state policies appear to provide the basis for a viable
cause of action based on disparate impact, not on intent, they do not
provide for a private cause of action. Further, any branch of state gov-
ernment can bar implementation of its state's pay equity statute. Califor-
nia provides an illustration of one branch of state government
continuously thwarting legislative intent to implement the state's pay eq-
uity policy statute. In this state, the legislature enacted the policy in
1983.376 The legislature then appropriated funds for pay equity adjust-
ments for state employees in 1984 and in 1985. 37 7 Both legislative appro-
priations were vetoed by Governor Deukmejian who prefers "concession
bargaining" to achieve pay equity.3 78 Moreover, Governor Deukmejian
would require that both male and female employees abrogate some ex-
isting benefits, such as sick pay, to ensure that females receive pay com-
mensurate with the value of their work. Although pay equity policy
statutes may appear to commit the states to equal pay for women, they
fail to provide women an enforceable right to equal pay.
3. State pay equity studies
The states have conducted three general categories of pay equity-
related studies: (1) data collection efforts, which identified sex-based
wage differences or occupational segregation by sex among state employ-
ees; (2) job content pay equity studies, which compared the pay of male
and female job classes with comparable job evaluation scores; and
(3) economic pay equity studies, which compared the pay of male and
female employees with comparable individual characteristics, such as ed-
ucation or experience.
3 79
The states have demonstrated substantial concern over the status of
gender-based wage differences within their own borders by conducting
voluminous pay equity-related studies. Yet, few results have flowed from
the states' major investment of human and financial resources. Twenty-
376. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 19827.2(a) (West Supp. 1986).
377. Budget Act of June 27, 1984, ch. 258; Budget Act of June 28, 1985, ch. 111. The
California legislature is evaluating appropriation of funds for 1988 to establish a pay equity
commission which would conduct a pay equity study of the state civil service classification and
wage-setting system. SB 511. (1987). The Governor vetoed two similar bills, SB 2 and SB
1957. See Fact Sheet on SB 511, Hearing before Assembly Public Employees, Retirement and
Social Security Committee (July 14, 1987) (available at Loyola of Los Angeles Law School
library).
378. Governor's Message to the State Legislature Exercising Line Item Veto of Pay Equity
Adjustments (June 27, 1984); Governor's Message to the State Legislature Exercising Line
Item Veto of Pay Equity Adjustments (June 28, 1985). Telephone interview with Steve
Cooney, Legislative Aide to Senator Roberti, President Pro Tem of the Senate (Aug. 12, 1987).
379. PAY EQuITY STATUS, supra note 6, at 11.
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seven states conducted thirty-nine data collection studies of which
twenty-nine demonstrated gender-based wage differences and twenty-
eight found gender-based occupational segregation.380 Only six states
implemented pay equity increases to correct pay on the basis of gen-
der.38' Further, twenty states conducted twenty-nine job content studies
of which twenty exhibited gender-based wage differences.382 Only five
pay equity increases were implemented.38 3 Additionally, five states con-
ducted five economic studies in which three exhibited sex-based pay dif-
ferences.384 No pay equity increases resulted.385
The reasonable conclusion to be drawn from state pay equity studies
parallels that of pay equity policies: while job classification studies may
appear to stand for the states' commitment to achieving equal pay for
women, they fail to provide women pay commensurate with the value of
their work. Moreover, even when employers-the states-determine
that they have historically paid or are currently paying women less than
men to perform equal work because the work is performed by women,
the states may continue the practice without risk of liability. Studies
demonstrating gender-based wage differentials do not provide women an
enforceable right to equal pay. Alternatively, state administrative and
judicial decisions may require that employers pay women the same wages
as men for comparable work.
D. State Judicial and Administrative Decisions
The majority of state judicial and administrative decisions have con-
strued state FEP and EPA laws to provide no broader protection than
the federal EPA or Title VII in gender-based wage discrimination claims.
Alaska serves as an example of one state which has broadly construed its
FEP law to include comparable worth claims.
1. Alaska: harbinger or deviate?
Alaska historically has 'supported wage-discrimination claims based
on comparable worth. A 1979 case interpreting the Alaska EPA,386 now
repealed and amended to the state FEP law,387 addressed comparable
worth in the form of a unique job. In Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Con-
380. Id. at 11-12.
381. Id. at 12.
382. Id. at 13.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 13-14.
385. Id. at 14.
386. For Alaskan EPA language, see supra note 344 and accompanying text.
387. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.810 (1980).
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tractors, Inc.,388 a female plaintiff alleged that the unique job she occu-
pied would have been paid more had a male performed the work.389 The
Alaska Superior Court allowed the plaintiff to pursue an equal pay claim
which was not viable under the federal EPA.3 90 The federal law covers
only similarly-situated jobs and plaintiff's job lacked a male counter-
part.3 91 The Alaska state court found the state statute provided for pe-
nalizing the employer for the wage differential it would have paid a male
employee in the same position and concluded that Alaska's statute covers
unique jobs.392
More recently, the Alaska State Commission of Human Rights has
construed the Alaskan FEP statute393 to uphold a claim of gender-based
wage discrimination based on work of "comparable character., 394 The
gravamen of the complaint in Alaska State Commission of Human Rights
ex rel. Bradley v. State of Alaska 395 was that the State of Alaska violated
state law by paying its almost exclusively female Public Health Nurses
(PHNs) less than its exclusively male Physician's Assistants (PAs) for
work of comparable character.396 Considering the nurses' claim under a
388. 20 EPD 30,222 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1979).
389. Id. at 30,224. The job was unique because no one else performed the same or substan-
tially similar work. The unique job was not named in the decision. Id.
390. Id. at 30,223.
391. Id. at 30,226.
392. Id. at 30,222.
393. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(5) (1981).
394. Alaska State Comm'n of Human Rights ex rel. Bradley v. State, No. D-79-0724-188-
E-E (Alaska St. Comm'n on Hum. Rts. Jan. 29, 1986).
395. Id.
396. Id. at 1-2. The court stated that Public Health Nurses (PHNs) "are responsible for the
promotion and preservation of wellness, the early detection of disease and the minimization of
the disability of disease .... They focus on health concerns such as tuberculosis, maternal/
child care, family planning, and venereal disease." Id. at 1. Further, the court noted that
PHNs make home visits, conduct clinics at various locations and work in established health
centers. Id.
[Physician's Assistants (PAs)] are the primary health care providers to inmates at the
state's correctional facilities. They conduct sick call and physical examinations of
the inmate population and are also available on an on-call basis. The PAs medically
diagnose and treat the more straightforward medical abnormalities presented to
them. They are also expected to identify those conditions outside of their compe-
tence and refer the patient to the appropriate specialist, while providing life-sus-
taining treatment in emergency situations until specialist care is available ....
[They] work under the supervision of a physician, who is usually not present at the
facility ....
Id. at 1-2.
These two job descriptions reflect biases in words used to capture job content. The female
positions are descriptive, using nurturing, inactive words. They fail to describe the level of
judgment exercised, supervision received and specific tasks performed. Conversely, the male
jobs are described by action verbs specific in nature. They describe the level of independent
judgment exercised and specific tasks in specific situations. Subjective biases are present in
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disparate treatment theory, the Commission evaluated whether "PA and
PHN job classifications [were] so similar in their requirements of skill,
effort, responsibility and working conditions that it can reasonably be
inferred that they are of comparable value to the employer. ' 397 The
Commission held that "if the character of the tasks is comparable, that
is, if the evaluated worth of the two positions is essentially equivalent to
the employer and one position is held by a female employee, the other by
a male employee," the positions should receive the same wages.3 98
Interpreting the state FEP statute, the Commission found that a
prima facie case of sex-based wage discrimination was established when:
(1) the complainants are members of a protected class of female
employees; (2) they occupy a sex-segregated job classification;
(3) they are paid less than a sex-segregated job classification
occupied by men; and (4) the two job classifications at issue are
so similar in their aggregate requirements of skill, effort, respon-
sibility and working conditions that it can reasonably be inferred
that they are of comparable value to the employer.399
Both an independent job-evaluation expert and the Commission
evaluated PHN and PA classifications using the a priori4°° approach to
job evaluation."° The Commission found that results of a job evaluation
using this approach provided sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case of comparable value between PHN and PA classifications.
40 2
The Commission also found that a policy-capturing40 3 approach to
job evaluation, which included the market as a factor, cannot rebut the
showing of job comparability. "[W]e conclude that reliance on market
rates to justify wage disparities, either in a direct sense or, as is presented
here, through a job evaluation methodology expressly designed to perpet-
uate market wages, will not create a defense to a claim of wage discrimi-
nation . . . ."I Accordingly, the Commission unilaterally rejected the
market as the appropriate criterion to determine job worth because that
rate reflects biases and operates to freeze the status quo of prior discrimi-
these descriptions and these biases apparently influenced grade and resultant pay level. See
supra text accompanying notes 181-84.
397. Bradley, No. D-79-0724-188-E-E at 66.
398. Id. at 63.
399. Id. at 65 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
400. See supra text accompanying note 144.
401. Bradley, No. D-79-0724-188-E-E at 70.
402. Id.
403. See supra text accompanying note 145.
404. Bradley, No. D-79-0724-188-E-E at 75.
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nation." 5 The Commission found that job evaluation factors which mea-
sure job value determine job worth. The Commission also determined
that its holding was consistent with the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co." 6 It used the Griggs opinion to
support the proposition that market rates, although fair on their face,
serve as a proxy to perpetuate historical and impermissible sex-based
wage discrimination which has depressed women's wages.
The Commission concluded that objective job evaluation techniques
aimed at achieving pay equity were important tools for reducing sex-
based wage discrimination in the Alaskan economy." It proffered that
had "the state implemented a properly constructed, objective job evalua-
tion system to determine the relative worth of these positions, the results
of such an evaluation would be presumptively valid.' ""9 Complainants
would then have the burden to prove to the Commission that the compa-
rability determination on the basis of objective methodology was inva-
lid.410 "Such proof could be made either by challenging the evaluation
methodology employed by the state and producing independent compa-
rability conclusions, or challenging the specific application of the State's
chosen methodology to the job position at issue." '4 11 Thus, had the State
used an objective, bias-free job evaluation methodology as a defense,
rather than the market, the nurses' burden would have been much
greater than was presented in this case.
Alaskan statutory protection against wage discrimination extends
405. Id. at 78 (citing McLean v. State, 583 P.2d 867, 870-71 (Alaska 1978)).
406. Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (practices cannot be
maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discrimination employment
practices)).
407. The Commission noted that:
[D]iscrimination against women by their employers is responsible for much of the
difference between wages paid to men and those paid to women. To allow an em-
ployer to simply point to the market as justification for a wage differential would
undoubtedly perpetuate this latent discrimination. Reliance on market rates is par-
ticularly inappropriate for the state of Alaska-the largest employer in our state. It
can hardly be refuted that in that role, the state exerts a dominant influence in deter-
mining the market rates in the state. To then allow it to rely on such rates which it, in
effect, had created, would clearly run counter to the goal of elimination of discrimina-
tion on account of sex within our state boundaries.
Id. at 79 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
408. Id. at 93.
409. Id. at 76 (footnote omitted). The Commission found job evaluation techniques which
the state used to classify the jobs and set the wages of state employees were inadequate. The
non-quantitative state classification method established a number of classes or grades of jobs
and then subjectively fit jobs into the classes. Id. at 65.
410. Id. at 76.
411. Id.
November 1987]
370 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:305
further than federal legislation and includes comparable worth theory.412
Notably, Alaska is the first state to construe comparable worth in its
state law. Federal court decisions on the subject are inapposite.
4 13
Alaska focuses on job evaluation methodology as the basis for a gender-
based wage discrimination claim. It suggests that a plaintiff's best ap-
proach is to challenge the employer's evaluation methods or their appli-
cation and produce comparability conclusions independent of the
employer's findings. Finally, Alaska rejects the market defense because
of the market's inherent gender biases. Similar to Alaska, other states
could capably construe comparable worth in their state statutes.
2. Other states' construction of state EPA and FEP laws
State judiciaries have arrived at results different from Alaska's when
interpreting their state FEP and EPA laws in gender-based wage dis-
crimination claims. The most recent interpretations of state EPA and
FEP laws uphold pay differentials between men and women on the basis
of defenses such as recruitment,414 retention,415 market,
41 6 merit pay,417
employee morale 18 and red circle rates.419 They strike down pay differ-
entials based on cost.42 Essentially, the states' construction of their state
laws parallel the federal courts' construction of the federal EPA and Ti-
tle VII. Apparently then, state courts are not providing women any
greater protection against wage discrimination than federal courts.
State activity in the comparable worth area has been substantial
only in the form of pay equity studies, collective bargaining agreements
and litigation. At the present time, Alaska is the only state to construe
its statutory protections against wage discrimination to include compara-
ble worth theory and extend its protections further than the other states
and the federal courts. Most states already have statutes which provide
their courts with explicit authority to confer greater protection against
wage discrimination than is presently conferred on women. Fifteen
states have EPA's with a comparable pay standard and forty-four states
have FEP laws which contain specific language on compensation. Thus,
412. Id. at 92.
413. See supra text accompanying notes 233-322.
414. Latona v. Department of State Civil Serv., 492 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 1986); Smith v.
Bull Run School Dist. No. 45, 80 Or. App. 226, 722 P.2d 27 (Or. App. 1986).
415. Latona, 492 So. 2d 27.
416. Bohm v. L.B. Hartz Wholesale Corp., 370 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. App. 1985).
417. Smith, 80 Or. App. 226, 722 P.2d 27.
418. Adams v. University of Wash., 106 Wash.2d 312, 722 P.2d 74 (1986).
419. Id.
420. Bureau of Labor and Indus. v. City of Roseberg, 706 P.2d 956 (Or. App. 1985).
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women bringing wage discrimination claims in either state or federal
court could rely on existing state statutes to provide them pay commen-
surate with the value of their work. Accordingly, state laws could as-
sume an increasingly more visible role to provide women an enforceable
right to equal pay in the future.
While state courts may potentially confer greater civil rights on wo-
men than the federal judiciary, the need for federal governmental action
cannot be ignored. "One of the great strengths of our federal system is
that it provides a double source of protection for the liberties of our citi-
zens. Federalism is not served when the federal half of that protection is
crippled."421 What appears necessary to achieve pay equity for women is
a combination of federal and state action.
VI. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
A. Federal Legislation Presently Proposed
In Washington, the political agenda on comparable worth did not
end with the Kennedy Era,422 but reemerged under the Carter Adminis-
tration.423 During the Reagan Administration, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has asserted a narrow theory of gen-
421. BRENNAN, supra note 323, at 37.
422. See supra text accompanying note 189. Senator Hubert Humphrey also exemplified
congressional commitment to female economic equality.
"It would be ironic indeed if [the Equal Pay Act,] a law triggered by a Nation's
concern over centuries of [sexual discrimination] and intended to improve the lot of
those who had been excluded from the American dream for so long" were to lead to
the contraction of their rights under Title VII.
International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1107 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (quoting United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (quoting Sen. Humphrey, 110
Cong. Rec. 6552 (1964)) (alterations in Judge Higginbotham's opinion).
423. In 1980, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), the federal
agency which monitors affirmative action programs of federal contractors, revised its affirma-
tive action regulations to include comparable worth language. See Pay Equity and Comparable
Worth, Special Rep. (BNA), at 43 (1984). Scheduled to become effective after the Reagan
Administration took office in January 1981, the regulations were never implemented. Id. The
Carter Administration's proposed revisions would have modified OFCCP guidelines § 60-20.5.
Id. See also Pay Equity: Equal Pay for Work of Comparable Value-Part P" Joint Hearings
before the Subcomms. on Hum. Resources, Civ. Serv. Compensation and Employee Benefits of
the House Comm. on Post Off. & Civ. Serv., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1982) (statement of
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). See, e.g.,
EEOC, HEARINGS BEFORE THE UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N. ON JOB SEGREGATION AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION (Apr. 28-30, 1980); MANUAL
ON PAY EQUITY: RAISING WAGES FOR WOMEN'S WORK (J. Grune ed. 1980); WOMEN,
-WORK, AND WAGES, supra note 6 (produced after EEOC commissioned study on comparable
worth from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)).
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der-based wage discrimination for comparable jobs under Title VII,
424
and the United States Commission on Civil Rights has concluded that
"the implementation of the unsound and misplaced concept of compara-
ble worth would be a serious error."425 The Reagan Administration also
has dismissed comparable worth as a "cockamamie idea ' 426 and as
"probably the looniest idea since Looney Tunes came on the screen., 427
The executive branch's attack on comparable worth has not been limited
to political dialogue, but has included political subterfuge involving over-
zealous tactics of the Watergate and Irangate genre.42 8 Conversely, the
424. Title VII, §§ 701-18; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982); 37 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1889, 1891 (1985).
425. 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIV. RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80'S (1984)
(1984 Commission conference on comparable worth). The Commission formally adopted this
staff report one year later. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON Civ. RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH:
AN ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 70 (June 1985).
426. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1985, at A7, col. 6 (quoting President Reagan).
427. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1985, at A25, col. 6 (quoting Clarence Pendleton, Reagan-ap-
pointed chairman of the United States Commission on Civil Rights).
428. In a single memorandum, James L. Byrnes, Deputy Associate Director of the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM), left the Reagan administration open to charges of political
chicanery and violations of the Hatch Act.
If the Oakar Bill passes, it would be a tremendous opportunity for OPM to develop a
real comparable worth system, and show how preposterous it would be.... [A] little
more irrationality wouldn't hurt that much. But it would show a clear picture to the
private sector about how ridiculous the concept of comparable worth is, and that in
fact it is only job discrimination....
The political possibilities of this situation should not be underestimated. By
doing job evaluation across clerical and blue collar occupations, a comparable worth
study would immediately divide the white collar and blue collar unions. This would
not be limited to those in the Government,... but it would also directly affect the
private sector unions. Since our occupational standards are often applied outside
Government, private sector unions could not afford to let the Government go too far.
The blue collar craft union would especially be concerned, since they would be the
inevitable losers in such a comparable worth adjustment process. Moreover, the
unions would be pitted against the radical feminist groups and Oakar to manipulate
the Administration on the gender issue, we could create disorder within the Demo-
cratic House pitting union against union and both against radical feminist groups.
This situation presents opportunities that we should not ignore. Of course, it is
a dangerous course, but it might change the nature of the whole debate on compara-
ble worth.
Memorandum from James L. Byrnes, Deputy Director of the Office of Personnel Management
to Donald J. Devine, Director, reprinted in Federal Pay Equity Act of 1984: Part 2, Hearings
on H.R. 4599 and H.R. 5092 Before the Subcomm. on Compensation and Employee Benefits of
the Comm. on Post Off. and Civ. Serv., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984).
Dr. Donald Devine, Director of the Office of Personnel Management, took the first step in
implementing this memorandum by holding a meeting on May 22, 1984 with representatives of
the half-million federal blue collar union workers. Devine warned the unions that some of
their members might suffer if the pay equity bill before the House were enacted into law. Id. at
4,6.
Speaking of the Byrnes and Devine activities, George Hobt, director of pay and classifica-
tion of the American Federation of Government Employees, commented:
I think it is a sorry commentary on our system, that ... this administration is so
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Democratic Party has continued its endorsement of the comparable
worth theory in its platform and most Democrats and some Republicans
have endorsed comparable worth in Congress.429 Since the Democrats
constitute the majority in the 100th Congress, comparable worth theory
may become the law.430
1. H.R. 387431 & S. 552432: a pay equity study
of the federal work force
The 100th Congress is examining H.R. 387, the "Federal Equitable
morally bankrupt to come up with an individual in a position of responsibility that
would propose destroying or damaging the pay systems and the livelihood of 2 mil-
lion Federal workers all in a ploy to defeat a piece of legislation that represents a first
step in attempting to provide a fair day's pay for a fair day's work for the 45 million
working women in this country.... The arrogance shows and the worst thing would
be to attempt to implement and so misjudge the solidarity of Federal unions and
unions in general. We may not be the smartest people in the world, but we didn't
just come into this town on a load of squash either ....
Id. at 51.
Further, an AFL-CIO official noted that "[T]his obvious political activity on the part of
Mr. Byrnes, a high-ranking official of the Office of Personnel Management, is a clear violation
of the Hatch Act. The conduct of Mr. Devine... [is also] a Hatch Act violation." Id. at 53.
429. "We will insist on pay equity for women .... The Democratic Party defines nondis-
crimination to encompass both equal pay for equal work and equal pay for work of compara-
ble worth, and we pledge to take every step, including enforcement of current law ... to close
the wage gap." THE REPORT OF THE PLATFORM COMMITrEE TO THE 1984 DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL CONVENTION 32 (1984). See also Options for Conducting a Pay Equity Study of
Federal Pay and Classification Systems-Report of the General Accounting Office: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. Civil Service, Post Office, and General Services of the Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 22-23, July 24-25, 1985); Options for Conducting a
Pay Equity Study of Federal Pay and Classification Systems: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Compensation and Employee Benefits of the Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 28, Apr. 4, May 2, May 30 and June 18, 1985); Federal Pay Equity Act
of 1984: Parts I & II. Hearings on H.R. 4599 and H.R. 5092 Before the Subcomm. on Compen-
sation and Employee Benefits of the Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Apr. 3-4, May 30, July 17, Oct. 18, 1984); Pay Equity: Equal Pay for Work of Compara-
ble Value, Parts I & II, Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Human Resources, Civil
Service, Compensation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
430. See 133 CONG. REC. 82383 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1987) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
431. H.R. 387, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Representative Mary Rose Oakar (D-Ohio)
introduced H.R. 387, the Federal Equitable Pay Practices Act of 1987 to the 100th Congress
on January 6, 1987, with 47 co-sponsors. 133 CONG. REc. E32 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987)
(statement of Rep. Oakar). Rep. Oakar introduced and the House passed similar legislation
during the 98th Congress, H.R. 5680, The Federal Pay Equity and Management Improvement
Act of 1984, and during the 99th Congress, H.R. 3008, The Federal Equitable Pay Practices Act
of 1984. Id.; Pay Equity and Comparable Worth, A BNA SPECIAL REPORT at 53 (1984)
[hereinafter BNA SPECIAL REPORT].
432. S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Senator Daniel Evans (R-Wash.) introduced
S. 552, the Federal Employee Compensation Equity Study Commission Act of 1987, to the 100th
Congress on February 19, 1987, with 23 co-sponsors. 133 CONG. REc. S2239 (daily ed. Feb.
19, 1987). Almost one-third of the Senate had joined in co-sponsoring S. 552 two months after
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Pay Practices Act of 1987,"1 3 ' and S. 552, "The Federal Employee Com-
pensation Equity Study Commission Act of 1987,"'431 which require a
pay equity study of the entire federal job classification and wage-setting
system.4 35 Pay equity is "the notion that individuals will be paid fairly
for their work, regardless of their sex, race, or ethnic heritage.) 436 Sena-
its introduction. Federal Employee Compensation Equity Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 552
Before the Subcomm. on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 22, 1987) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
Senator Evans introduced similar legislation to the 98th Congress, S. 83. BNA SPECIAL
REPORT, supra note 431, at 53. Senator Daniel Evans sponsored and Senator Alan Cranston
(D-Cal.) co-sponsored S. 519, the Federal Employee Anti-Sex Discrimination in Compensation
Act of 1985, in the 99th Congress. S. 519, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 27, 1985). Senator
Cranston introduced S. 5, the Pay Equity Act of 1987, to the 100th Congress on January 6,
1987, which provides in part for a pay equity study of the federal classification and wage-
setting system. 133 CONG. Rc. S173 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987) (statement of Sen. Cranston); see
infra text accompanying notes 450-63.
433. H.R. 387, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1987).
434. S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
435. This detailed legislation is not a novel idea, but is the result of extensive information
compiled through bi-partisan congressional hearings initiated in 1982 and continued through
1986. See supra notes 429 and 432 and accompanying texts for congressional hearings on pay
equity. Furthermore, both houses of Congress have introduced similar legislation since 1983.
For a synopsis of comparable worth legislation which has been presented to the Congress, and
its subsequent history, see BNA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 431, at 53.
See generally General Accounting Office, B-217675 App. II (July 29, 1986) for an in-
depth discussion of the statutory and judicial authority for the proposed legislation. "The
classification principles expressed in 5 U.S.C. Chapter 51 are similar to the Equal Pay Act
insofar as 5 U.S.C. § 5101(l)(A) requires 'equal pay for substantially equal work.'" Id. at 3.
"[T]he Equal Pay Act does not require equal pay for dissimilar jobs of equivalent value. In
contrast ... 5 U.S.C. Chapter 51 ... contain[s] language which strongly indicates that an
objective of the General Schedule system is to align pay with job worth." Id. at 7 (citing 5
U.S.C. § 5102(a)(5); § 5104; § 5101(l)(B)). "[P]rinciples expressed in 5 U.S.C. Chapter 51 are
broader than the Equal Pay Act's requirement of 'equal pay for equal work'... they reflect
[the] ... tenet [that] ... the worth of a position, measured in terms of its duties and responsi-
bilities, should determine... pay .... Id. at 6. "[l]mplementation of 5 U.S.C. Chapter 51
should result not only in equal pay for equal work, but also in (1) equal pay for different work
which is valued equally in terms of difflculty, responsibility and qualification requirements, and
(2) proportionate pay for work that differs in value." Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
"[T]he Supreme Court has held that the principle of 'equal pay for substantially equal
work' stated in 5 U.S.C. § 5101(1)(A) does not vest individual employees with an entitlement
to backpay for a period of wrongful classification." Id. at 5 (citing United States v. Testan, 424
U.S. 392, 398-405 (1976)). Furthermore, 5 U.S.C. § 5101(l)(A) has been construed to allow
reducing the wage rates of employees who are reclassified in order to conform with the equal
pay requirements of that section. Id. at 6 (quoting Haneke v. Secretary of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 535 F.2d 1291, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). Such a reduction is specifically prohibited
under the Equal Pay Act. Id. Proposed legislation also prohibits this latter option. H.R. 387,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(c)(3).
436. 133 CONG. REC. E32 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987) (statement of Rep. Oakar introducing
H.R. 387).
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tor Daniel Evans (R-Wash.) introduced S. 552 to the Senate with an ex-
planation of its underpinnings and purpose:
The public policy concern underlying this study is the
same as it was in 1938 when Congress passed the Fair Labor
Standards Act. It is the same as it was in 1963 when the Equal
Pay Act was enacted and it is the same as it was when title VII
of the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964. The only thing new
about the issue is that in 1986 we call it "comparable worth" or
"pay equity." But our express objective has not changed-the
elimination of unfair practices in the workplace based on race,
sex and ethnicity.437
When introducing the proposed legislation to the House, H.R. 387, en-
dorsed by forty-seven co-sponsors, Representative Mary Rose Oakar (D-
Ohio) stated that existing federal pay and classification systems are
anachronistic and potentially disciminatory:
The Federal Pay and classification systems were developed over
half a century ago, at a time when classified ads listed jobs as
"Help Wanted-Male" and "Help Wanted-Female." We need
to reexamine our federal pay and classification practices, there-
fore, to see if they need updating to conform with Fair Pay
Laws.
The Federal Equitable Pay Practices Act of 1987 man-
dates a study of the federal pay and classification systems to
determine whether they are marred by illegal dis-
crimination ....
... [W]ithin the federal workforce, a pay gap of nearly
$12,000 exists between the annual salaries of male and female
employees. Furthermore, . . . most female federal employees
are clustered in the lowest-paying occupations ....
... [A]lready allfifty states have begun examining the is-
sue of sex-based discrimination within their own government
pay systems, either through studies, collective bargaining, or
legislation. As an employer and as the defender of civil rights
in this nation, the federal government must now address the
issue of pay equity among its own employees. We must make
certain that our pay practices continue to conform to national
laws guaranteeing protection from discrimination. ...
... It is imperative that our federal government be free of
437. 133 CONG. REC. S2239 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987) (statement of Sen. Evans).
November 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:305
any discriminatory practices that violate our laws and sap the
morale and productivity of employees.438
The purpose of H.R. 387 and S. 552411 is to determine whether the fed-
eral government's job classification and prevailing rate systems comply
with Title V, the EPA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 0
Moreover, the government would evaluate whether sex, race and ethnic-
ity are among the factors determining the rate of pay for any federal
employee or position." Specifically, the bills provide for a study to de-
termine if the wages paid in predominantly female and minority positions
are lower than the position skill, effort, responsibilities, difficulty or qual-
ifications required by the work performed." 2
H.R. 387 and S. 552 establish a Commission 443 to select and oversee
438. 133 CONG. REC. E32 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987) (emphasis added) (statement of Rep.
Oakar introducing H.R. 387).
439. S. 552 states that its purpose is
[tlo determine whether distinction between rates of basic pay for Federal jobs in
executive agencies of the United States Government reflect substantial differences in
the duties, difficulty, responsibility, and qualification requirements of the work per-
formed, in accordance with sections 5101 and 5341 title 5, United States Code, and
are not based on considerations of sex, race, or national origin, the Commission will
provide, by contract with the consultant selected pursuant to section 9, for-
(1) the conduct of a study of classification, grading, and pay-setting processes
within and between the position-classification system chapter 51 of such title and
the job-grading system under subchapter IV of chapter 53 of such title, using stan-
dard subjective job--evaluation and economic analysis techniques, to determine
whether the development or implementation of these processes result in the payment
of rates of basic pay for positions in which either sex is numerically predominant or
any race or ethnic group is disproportionately represented that are not in proportion
to the duties, difficulty, responsibility, and qualification requirements of the work
performed; and
(2) the preparation and submission of a report containing the findings of such
study, including a list of any such positions and the extent of the differences in the
rates of pay in such cases.
S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a). H.R. 387 states:
[Ihe purpose of this Act [is] to determine (1) whether the Government's position-
classification system under chapter 51 of title 5, United States Code, and prevailing-
rate system under subehapter IV of chapter 53 of such title, are designed and admin-
istered in a manner consistent with the general policy, as expressed in title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
that sex, race, and ethnicity should not be among the factors considered in determin-
ing the rate of pay payable to any individual or for any position ....
S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a).
440. H.R. 387, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2; S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4(a), 10.
Nothing in this Act may be construed to limit or expand any of the rights or reme-
dies provided under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 6(d) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, or any other provision of law relating to discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, or age.
S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10.
441. H.R. 387, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(a); S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a).
442. H.R. 387, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b); S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a).
443. H.R. 387, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a); S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3. The Coin-
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a consultant who would conduct a job evaluation study utilizing both job
content and economic analyses. 4' The study would focus on "a repre-
sentative sample of occupations in which either sex is numerically pre-
dominant, any race is disproportionately represented, or either ethnic
group is disproportionately represented."" 5 The consultant would com-
pare jobs on an intraagency and interagency basis, and within and be-
tween the several federal job classification systems." 6 Finally, the bills
would require the consultant and Commission to report their findings
and recommendations, which would be advisory in nature, to both the
'House and the Senate." 7 During the 98th and 99th Congresses, the
House of Representatives passed similar pay equity legislation which
stalled in the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs."4 Yet, repre-
sentatives from both Houses of Congress proffered that their bills would
be voted out of committee for floor debate during 1987.4
2. S. 5:410 a pay equity program for federal contractors
During the 100th Congress, Senator Cranston (D-Cal.) introduced
S. 5, The Pay Equity Act of 1987,451 which includes a pay equity study of
the federal workforce in a pay equity proposal more expansive than H.R.
387 or S. 552 as it would reach into the private sector.452 When intro-
ducing S. 5, Senator Cranston noted that:
[D]iscrimination against female employees has persisted
despite applicable State and Federal laws and directives and
court decisions outlawing gender-based wage discrimination.
mission would be composed of appointees by the President, by the House, by the Senate and by
the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (union representatives). H.R. 387, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b); S. 552, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a)(1).
444. H.R. 387, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5(b), 6(a); S. 522, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 9(c),
4(a)(1) (1987).
445. H.R. 387, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 6(a); S. 522, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4(a)(1) (1987).
446. H.R. 387, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b); S. 522, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(1) (1987).
447. H.R. 387, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 8(b) (1987); S. 522, 100th Cong.,
Ist Sess. §§ 5(b), 5(e) (1987).
448. Telephone interview with Curtis Copeland, General Accounting Office, Azar Kattan,
Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues, and legislative assistants to: Sen. Cranston-Bar-
bara Masters; and Sen. Evans-Lisa Marchese (Dec. 16, 1986).
449. Telephone interviews with minority Staff Director for the Senate Subcomm. Civil Ser-
vice, Post Office, and General Services of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs Jeff Landry,
majority Staff Director for Comm. on the Senate Governmental Affairs Comm., Ed Gleiman
(Aug. 5, 1987), and Public Relations Director for Rep. Oakar, Joe Grimes (Aug. 12, 1987).
450. S. 5, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Senator Alan Cranston (D-Cal.) introduced similar
bills, S. 1900, The Pay Equity Act of 1983, and S. 5, The Pay Equity Act of 1985, to the 98th
and 99th Congresses respectively.
451. Id.
452. Id. §§ 5, 6. See infra text accompanying notes 460-63.
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Unfortunately, the existence of these laws and court decisions
has not been translated into elimination of these unlawful prac-
tices. What is clearly needed is a strong national commitment
to ending once and for all the practice of paying certain em-
ployees lower wages because those employees are female.
45 3
The stated purpose of S. 5 is "[t]o require the executive branch to enforce
applicable equal employment opportunity laws and directives so as to
promote pay equity by eliminating wage-setting practices which discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex, race, ethnicity, age or disability, and result in
discriminatory wage differentials." '454 The bill establishes the existence,
discriminatory causes and impact of the earnings gap between male and
female workers and the failure of federal agencies to enforce applicable,
enacted laws and directives.455
S. 5 also recognizes that objective job evaluation techniques utilizing
job content and economic analyses are necessary for elimination of dis-
criminatory wage-setting practices and differentials.4 16 Further, it re-
quires equal pay for work of comparable value.4 57 The bill directs the
federal agencies responsible for enforcement of federal equal employment
opportunity laws, specifically the EEOC, to research, develop and dis-
seminate to public and private sector employers equitable job evaluation
and wage-setting techniques.4a 8 The bill encourages public and private
employers to use equitable, objective job evaluation techniques to elimi-
nate discriminatory wage-setting practices and differentials. 4 9  S. 5
would ensure that employers not utilizing such techniques will be subject
to an indefensible position with their employees and, possibly, the courts.
Finally and most significant for its reach into the private sector, S. 5
would require all federal contractors to identify and eliminate discrimi-
natory wage-setting practices and differentials. 460 Federal contractors
would be required to submit written affirmative action plans identifying
453. 133 CONG. REC., S173 (daily ed., Jan. 6, 1987).
454. S. 5, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1. See generally 131 CONG. REC. S595 (daily ed. Jan. 24,
1985) for an extensive discussion of the EEOC's failure to enforce Title VII under the Reagan
Administration.
455. S. 5, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a). S. 5 specifies that these discriminatory practices
"prevent[ ] full utilization of the talents, skills, experience, and potential contributions [of
female workers] and result in the exploitation of those workers." Id. § 2(a)(5).
456. Id. § 2(a)(9), -(b)(1).
457. Id.
458. Id. §§ 2(b)(2)-(3), 4. To ensure EEOC compliance, Congress would require the EEOC
to report to the President and Congress on its activities for achieving the purposes of the
proposed Act. Id. § 4(c).
459. Id. § 2(b)(2)-(3), § 4.
460. Id. § 5(a)(1).
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their discriminatory wage-setting practices and a plan of action to correct
such discrimination.461 The potential impact of this provision parallels
that of Executive Order 11,246;462 it could bring comparable worth the-
ory into the private sector. If enacted, S. 5 would establish explicit con-
gressional support for comparable worth theory.463
3. Arguments for and against federal study legislation
H.R. 387 and its Senate counterpart S. 552 (the legislation) propose
a pay equity study of federal job classifications.464 Among those who
oppose the proposed legislation, Senator Orrin Hatch acknowledges the
residual disparity between male and female wages. He argues, however,
that the remedy of a pay equity study would create dire consequences:
[P]ay rates for these jobs would not relate to their value in the
labor market. Instead, the rates would be determined by a
court or a bureaucratic pay board.
There are obvious problems with this approach. First, it
would perpetuate the notion that there are male jobs and fe-
male jobs. One of the objectives of our civil rights laws is to
eliminate the inflexible stereotype of "women's work." Second,
it would treat the employer's reliance on the market as discrim-
inatory, even though the courts have uniformly endorsed this
practice. And third, it would eliminate the ability of employers
or the collective bargaining process to control wage determina-
tions. Instead, responsibility for wage assignments would ulti-
mately lie with the government.
The federal government should not be in the business of
assigning wage rates or choosing evaluation systems. Nor
should the government be penalizing employers because of the
occupational choices of employees.465
Senator Jesse Helms urged his colleagues to vote against the "compara-
ble worth legislation."
The studies required by this bill cannot demonstrate the
461. Id. § 5(a)(1)(B).
462. See supra text accompanying note 353.
463. S. 5 was referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs. S. 5, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 1.
464. S. 5 also proposes a study of federal jobs. See supra text accompanying note 452.
465. Letter from Sen. Orrin Hatch to Gail Kaplan (Aug. 13, 1987) (available at Loyola of
Los Angeles Law School library).
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existence of discrimination. Nevertheless, the bill will misuse
the comparable worth concept for just such a purpose.
[T]he bill creates a house of cards: a subjective job study
that cannot define the worth of a job and an economic analysis
which cannot explain all of the reasons for differences in pay
between two allegedly "comparable" jobs.
The bill establishes far more than an "advisory" study....
[Alny federal judge can admit these studies into evidence in a
class-action lawsuit if the judge chooses to do so. No "advi-
sory" language in the bill can govern the co-equal judicial
branch.
The bill, as described, makes selective reference to federal
pay principles to support its misguided approach to payset-
ting.... [I]f these studies "find" pay discrepancies-as they are
calculated to do-their misuse by plaintiffs in class-action law-
suits seeking back-pay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
raises the very real spectre of a massive recovery, as occurred at
the District Court level in the Washington State case.466
Opponents argue that "[a]lthough the legislation ask[s] for merely a
'study,' studies have consistently been used as triggers for litigation in the
states and localities which have begun them." '467 Consequently, they fear
that the courts will use the study to subject the federal government to
liability for discrimination.468 Opponents thus contend that while the
466. Letter from Sen. Jesse Helms to "Colleagues" (Oct. 2, 1986) (arguing against S. 519).
Sen. Helms also opposed expansion of the proposed study to race and ethnicity.
The Evans/Cranston comparable worth study adds race and ethnicity to sex as
criteria by which to compare jobs. These "analyses," of course, can no more show
race and ethnic discrimination in pay than they can show sex discrimination in pay.
These additional criteria, however, are sure to increase the ultimate cost of this con-
cept to the taxpayer.
Id.
467. Chamber of Commerce handout on S. 519 (available at Loyola of Los Angeles Law
School library).
468. Id. See also Letter from Sen. Jesse Helms to "Colleagues" (Oct. 2, 1986) (arguing
against S. 519); V. LAMP, COMPARABLE WORTH IS NOT ABOUT PAY EQUITY 2 (Cong. Ac-
tion Special Rep. May 10, 1985) [hereinafter V. LAMP, COMPARABLE WORTH]. "General
Accounting Office ... report ... suggests that an employer who commissions a pay-equity
study for informational purposes may be legally bound by the results, even if the employer
lacks confidence in the study's methodology." S. KONDRATAS, H.R. 3008: MISLEADING AD-
VERTISING FOR COMPARABLE WORTH (The Heritage Found. Issue Bull. No. 117, July 25,
1985) [hereinafter S. KONDRATAS].
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bills are limited to a comparable worth study of the public sector, the
implications for the private sector have not been fully appreciated.469
Opponents argue further that proponents of comparable worth legis-
lation make three faulty assumptions: "(a) that wage gaps can be
equivalent to gender discrimination; (b) that each job has a measurable
economic worth which can be determined free of bias; and (c) that differ-
ent jobs can be objectively compared."470 In essence, opponents argue
that while the study may provide evidence that the existing pay system is
not consistent with one consultant's assessment of comparable worth,
such a finding cannot establish that the existing system is discrimina-
tory.471 Further, they contend a study cannot override the legitimate
market forces of supply and demand.472 Opponents argue that job evalu-
ation is an imprecise art and no scientific or objective means exist to
evaluate job worth except the free market.473 Furthermore, they claim
that job evaluation was never intended for use outside of or apart from
market considerations, and such an application could result in job losses
from the increased labor costs to marginal businesses.474 Opponents
claim implementation of the proposed legislation would be granting the
comparable worth theory official congressional approval.475 They state
that the study of federal job classifications could result in enormous costs
to taxpayers.476 Opponents also fear that legislatures will use study re-
469. See id. at 1, 5-6; V. LAMP, COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 468, at 1-2.
470. Chamber of Commerce handout on S. 519 (available at Loyola of Los Angeles Law
School library).
471. L. KESSLER & J. McGUINESS, LABOR POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC. ON S. 519, 1-2
(Apr. 9, 1986) (available at Loyola of Los Angeles Law School library) [hereinafter LABOR
ASSOCIATION]. See also Letter from Albert D. Bourland, Vice President of Congressional
Relations of the Chamber of Commerce to Senators who voted "yes" on Comparable Worth
(Sept. 18, 1986) (available at Loyola of Los Angeles Law School library).
472. LABOR ASSOCIATION, supra note 471, at 3.
473. 10 AMERICAN LEGIs. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, COMPARABLE WORTH: "WOMEN'S IS-
SUE" OR WAGE CONTROLS?, No. 5 at 9 [hereinafter EXCHANGE COUNCIL].
474. V. LAMP, COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 468, at 4.
475. Federal Employee Compensation Equity Act of 1987. Hearings on S. 552 Before the
Subcomm. on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service Senate Committee on Governmen-
tal Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 22, 1987) (statement of Bobbi Thompson, President,
Aviation Sales, accompanied by Virginia Lamp, Labor Relations Attorney for the United
States Chamber of Commerce) (available at Loyola of Los Angeles Law School library).
476. One United States Chamber of Commerce official termed the measure "an outrageous
waste of taxpayers' money, capable of costing up to $8 billion and inevitably triggering litiga-
tion." United States Chamber of Commerce, Press Release No. 85-242, House Passage of
Comparable Worth Study Assailed by U.S. Chamber Official (Oct. 10, 1985) (available at
Loyola of Los Angeles Law School library). See also V. LAMP, COMPARABLE WORTH, supra
note 468, at 1 (stating that the minimal cost to taxpayers would be $6.6 billion). Further,
opponents argue that while the statute governing federal job classifications-title 5 of the
United States Code-does not allow potential plaintiffs the remedy of backpay for a period of
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sults to determine pay increases.477 Nonetheless, an employer coalition
proffers that:
[T]he public interest in sound employment programs demand a
rejection of the rationale that any job evaluation study which
suggests a different scheme of values must be implemented.
[E]qual opportunity and affirmative action programs are well
served by a continued willingness on the part of employers to
examine new approaches and new ideas. Inherent in such a
process, however, is that while some new approaches may be
adopted, others necessarily are going to be rejected. Not every
"study" can be expected to produce alternatives that are better
than existing practices.478
Senator Evans stated that S. 552 was not designed to implicate Title
VII but to determine whether the federal pay system is achieving title 5
objectives-equal pay for different work valued equal and proportionate
pay for work that differs in value.479 In response to adversaries' opposi-
tion to job evaluation, Senator Evans argues that:
Job evaluation was born in the private sector and has been used
there for years. Today, it is not surprising that many compa-
nies have incorporated the concept of pay equity within their
job evaluation systems and find it easily done.
wrongful classification, this fact does not eliminate the federal government's potential exposure
to backpay litigation. See supra note 435.
Opponents also argue that these studies will change existing law without legislating the
change directly. "Comparable worth is not existing law. Equal opportunity is the law. Equal
pay for equal work is the law." V. LAMP, COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 468, at 1. See
also S. KONDRATAS, supra note 468. "[Tjhis bill seeks to change existing law .... While
seemingly calling for an innocent 'study,' it significantly redefines discrimination and alters the
evidence needed to prove discrimination. The new definitions are based squarely on the theory
of comparable worth .... Id. at 1; "Comparable worth legislation proposes to change
sharply the law ... by eliminating the need for proof of intentional discrimination and by
declaring that discrimination can be demonstrated by merely showing the existence of a differ-
ence in pay." V. Lamp, Statement of the United States Chamber of Commerce to the Subcom-
mittee on Post Office, Civil Service and General Services of the Senate Governmental Affairs
Comm., at 9 (May 22, 1985) (emphasis deleted). Conversely, substantial evidence suggests
that title 5 as applied to federal employee job classifications supports a contrary position. See
supra note 435 and accompanying text.
477. V. LAMP, COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 468, at 2.
478. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 19, American
Nurse's Ass'n v. State of Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1766). The Council's
membership includes individual employers as well as national trade and industry associations
which have hundreds of employer members. Id. at 1-2.
479. Federal Employee Compensation Equity Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 552 Before the
Subcomm. on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service Senate Committee on Governmen-
tal Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (April 22, 1987) (statement of Sen. Evans).
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According to these skeptics, job evaluation is also subjec-
tive; therefore, inherently unreliable. This characterization is
misleading at best. GAO found that job content analysis could
be used responsibly and effectively as a measuring stick of the
relative worth of various jobs. It went on to make some con-
structive suggestions on how to use this method most fairly....
Economic analysis can be valid in exposing some of the
abnormalities and distortions present in the external market-
place which may account for some of the wage differential be-
tween occupations. The internal alignments of the some 7,000
job types within the federal classification system, however, can
best be examined by using job-content analysis.480
The senator added that the proposed study of the federal workforce does
not start with the conclusion that discrimination exists but would be con-
ducted to ascertain if a problem exists.48' He noted that even if mis-
classifications are found, the federal government could not be held liable
for discrimination under existing law for two reasons: no federal court
has allowed the results of an employer study alone to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination and backpay is not an available remedy.482
Senator Cranston, a co-sponsor of S. 552, stated that its purpose is
to study the federal classification, grading and pay-setting practices "to
determine whether the wages paid in positions in which women or mi-
norities are disproportionately represented are lower than the responsi-
bilities, duties, difficulty or qualification requirements of the work
performed." '483 He noted that the scope of the study and the methodolo-
gies utilized, both a job content and an economic analysis, "can provide a
clearer understanding of how federal wages are set and would be less
susceptible to charges that important explanatory variables have been
ignored."4 4
Proponents of public sector initiatives agree with opponents that the
pay equity study of federal jobs is a springboard for implementing equita-
ble wage-setting practices in the private sector. One proponent testified
before Congress' Joint Economic Committee that many public and pri-
vate employers model their wage practices on the federal government48 5
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id. (statement of Sen. Cranston).
484. Id.
485. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, supra note 473, at 2 (testimony by Winn Newman, attorney
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and industry will have to respond in the marketplace.
Proponents explain that the United States Code requires that federal
job classifications and wages be based on comparable worth and a pay
equity study would determine whether this purpose is being achieved, or
whether predominantly female and minority occupations are underval-
ued.48 6 They contend that the proposed legislation makes no assump-
tions about the existence of discrimination in federal compensation and a
study of the federal pay system should provide information about the
causes of the pay gap.487 Proponents argue that if unexplained differ-
ences in compensation exist, those differences are not unreasonably as-
sumed the result of unlawful discrimination. This discrimination,
proponents state, has persisted since 1923 when the federal compensation
system was established on the assumptions that women would not work
or work only temporarily, and that women need not be paid the same as
men.
488
The national pay equity coalition commissioned a national poll to
assess public opinion on pay equity.489 The results showed that 69% of
workers in the United States think women are not paid as fairly as men
for the work they do and the most frequent reason cited for this by those
polled was sex discrimination.49 0 Citing discrimination as the primary
cause of the wage gap, 83% believe the gap is a serious problem which
should be corrected.491
While its passage and subsequent impact are yet to be determined, a
federal pay equity study portends five likely effects: (1) the states and
private sector employers will be forced to match federal wage adjust-
ments, if they occur, to remain competitive in attracting and retaining
qualified personnel; (2) wage-setting through job evaluation based on
bothJob content and economic analyses will be perceived by the govern-
ment, the general public, and public and private sector employers and
employees as the requisite evaluation technique to help eliminate dis-
criminatory wage-setting practices and differentials; (3) federal and state
judges can admit the federal study into evidence as a standard to evaluate
who represented AFSCME in the landmark Washington case, AFSCME v. Washington, 578
F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rev'd 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985)).
486. Federal Employee Compensation Equity Act of 1987. Hearings on S. 552 Before the
Subcomm. on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service Senate Committee on Governmen-
talAffairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (testimony by Eileen Stein, Chair, National Commit-
tee on Pay Equity).
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
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the sufficiency of challenges and defenses to the employer's job classifica-
tion and wage-setting methodology; (4) the employer's system would be
subject to a comparison with the federal classification and pay system
whether or not the employer has a formal job evaluation program; and
(5) on the basis of public policy as expressed by Congress regarding job
evaluation, the federal and state judiciaries can find comparable worth
theory a viable basis for a prima facie case of gender, ethnic or minority
based wage discrimination under Title VII, FEP and EPA laws. Alter-
natively, the courts could continue to strike down comparable worth as a
cognizable claim until Congress establishes more explicit support for the
theory.
While the proposed federal legislation is not a panacea for equaliz-
ing women's with men's wages, the bills would provide a step toward pay
equity. Encouraging employers to use equitable, objective job evaluation
methods for wage-setting would ensure that some women receive pay
commensurate with the value of their work. Simultaneously, some job
classifications will continue to be undervalued because of societal values
and unidentified biases in job evaluation techniques.
B. A State Model for Future State and Federal Legislation
Techniques exist in addition to those in the proposed federal legisla-
tion to bolster pay equity for women. Many states already have enacted
statutes which provide a substantial basis for furthering equal pay for
women and minorities. As illustration, Washington State statutes re-
quire state agencies to comply with detailed methods and documentation
for administering equitable pay practices.4 9 In 1983, the Washington
Legislature added a comparable worth statute to its already detailed
compensation program for state employees.493 The statute requires sal-
ary and compensation plans to reflect similar salaries for aggregate
equivalent responsibilities, judgment, knowledge, skills and working con-
ditions.494 Annual salary adjustments to rectify inequities are to be im-
plemented until pay equity is met, but no later than 1993.495
The Washington program specifies the bases and procedures for job
classifications, wage-setting and salary range increases.496 It requires af-
492. See Appendix.
493. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.06.155 (1986). Legislation passed after a series of job
evaluation studies beginning in 1973 and after AFSCME filed an $800 million suit affecting
15,000 employees. AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985).
494. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41.06.150, -.155; 28B.16.116 (1986).
495. Id. § 41.06.155.
496. Id. §§ 41.06.160, -.163, -.165.
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firmative action goals and timetables.497 The program also requires pub-
lic and private sector rates to be a factor in job classifications, salaries
and fringe benefits ranges and includes specific criteria for decision-mak-
ing, reports and recommendations to the governor and legislature. 498
Significantly, deviations from salary and fringe benefits are discouraged,
but where granted, are to be detailed with specificity for public disclo-
sure.499 The program also requires detailed justifications for all criteria,
reports and recommendations."° Additionally, standardized perform-
ance appraisal, and training and career development programs justify sal-
ary differentials and job mobility.50 1 The Washington statutes provide
models for the private sector and for future state and federal legislation.
The Washington statutes also can capably provide the courts with a stan-
dard from which to evaluate evidentiary sufficiency for establishing a
prima facie case as well as defenses in a gender-based wage discrimina-
tion case.
A system like Washington's predictably would take many years for
the federal government to implement, through legislation and through
EEOC guidelines. Concurrently, the states may provide such greater
protections of individual rights for their citizens. For government and
the private sector, the Washington statutes provide the basic model in
sound management techniques which could benefit both employer and
employee. With an active comparable worth program, the employer
would likely benefit from higher employee morale and productivity, a
larger available employee talent bank and resultant competitive market
advantage. Also, the employee could gain dignity, fair compensation and
greater employment opportunities.
VII. CONCLUSION
At the present time, comparable worth is a social, political and judi-
cial issue. As one commentator has stated, the goal of equal pay for
work of comparable value is an especially sensitive social policy because
it threatens to modify both the current and historical ordering of soci-
ety.50 2 To adjust women's wages to match men's wages for relatively
equivalent work also would adjust women's power position relative to
497. Id. § 41.06.150.
498. Id. §§ 41.06.150, -.160, -.163, -.165.
499. Id. §§ 41.06.163, -.165.
500. Id. §§ 41.06.163, -.165.
501. Id. §§ 41.06.169,-.400,-.420,-.430.
502. Steinberg, A Want of Harmony: Perspectives on Wage Discrimination and Comparable
Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH, supra note 60, at 24.
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men's-in the labor market, specifically and in society, generally.50 3 As
wages serve as a proxy for power, wage reallocation among groups of
employees changes their relative power position.5 ' Because of its pro-
spective impact, the theory of comparable worth appears to cause dis-
comfort to some men and women and this discomfort encourages
resistance to its implementation.0 5
The decisions of the federal courts of appeal and state courts por-
tend that comparable worth is not likely, by itself, to be recognized as a
valid claim under Title VII, FEP or EPA laws even though these laws
can justifiably encompass comparable worth. Federal courts refuse to
uphold comparable worth even though the government and employers
have recognized that since World War I employers compensate jobs per-
formed by women less than comparable jobs performed by men. The
courts rule against comparable worth while simultaneously acknowledg-
ing that employers compensate women less because they are women. Ar-
guably, courts failing to equalize women's compensation with men's can
point to a lack of congressional support for comparable worth. While
congressional history clearly states a policy which opposes the recog-
nized underpayment of women, it correspondingly fails to provide ex-
plicit support for comparable pay. State court decisions mirror those of
the federal judiciary. State courts fail to require comparable worth even
in those states with explicit public policies mandating comparable worth.
Judicial interpretations, then, can defeat legitimate gender-based claims
of wage discrimination.
Since 1982, the House has compiled voluminous testimony on the
comparable worth issue and congressional representatives in both houses
have introduced bills on the subject during every session. The trend of
congressional support for comparable worth is evinced by the fact that
bills requiring a comparable worth study of the federal workforce were
introduced in the House and the Senate of the 100th Congress with forty-
seven and twenty-three co-sponsors respectively. This legislation is likely
to be debated and pass both houses in the near future. Consequently,
Congress may explicitly establish the scope of its support for pay equity
for women which could provide the judiciary the public policy necessary
to support a finding of gender-based discrimination based on comparable
worth.
With this newly established public policy, the courts would need to
identify the requisite criteria for establishing a viable comparable worth
503. Id. at 25.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 24.
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claim of gender-based wage discrimination under Title VII disparate
treatment and disparate impact models. The disparate treatment ap-
proach should be invoked when the employer intentionally used subjec-
tive policies and procedures to perpetuate the undervaluation of women's
comparable jobs. The courts should examine the employer's job classifi-
cation and wage-s~tting policies and practices to determine whether they
incorporate illegal biases for women but not men and whether the poli-
cies and practices are applied evenly to men and women. The disparate
impact model should be employed when the employer's methods or pro-
cedures appear neutral on their face, but disproportionately affect wo-
men's job classifications and wages. The courts should scrutinize the
employer's methods and procedures under the strict job relatedness stan-
dard. They also should strike down arguments that market forces are
solely responsible for women's remuneration.
This Comment has analyzed overt and subtle biases in job evalua-
tion methodologies and their application to Title VII, EPA and FEP liti-
gation. It urges Congress and state legislators to prohibit public and
private employers from perpetuating gender-based wage discrimination
in comparable jobs. It urges judges to embrace a new public policy that
employers who perpetuate prior discrimination are culpable. It also
urges the state and federal judiciaries to evaluate allegations of gender-
based wage discrimination and employer defenses on the basis of the pro-
posed federal legislation, including job content and economic analyses
and affirmative action. This Comment further suggests the Washington
State statutes on compensation administration as an additional threshold
standard by which the courts determine non-discrimination. A uniform
national public policy on comparable worth is necessary to the establish-
ment of women's economic equality.
Gail C. Kaplan *
* The author dedicates this Comment to the memory of Samuel Koirth who honored
and advanced individual and political dignity, rights and liberties.
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APPENDIX
EXEMPLARY COMPENSATION LEGISLATION
The following pertinent portions of Washington State statutes are rele-
vant to a comparable worth program and litigation.
Salaries-Implementation of changes to achieve comparable worth'
Salary changes necessary to achieve comparable worth shall be imple-
mented during the 1983-85 biennium under a schedule developed by the
department in cooperation with the higher education personnel board.
Increases in salaries and compensation solely for the purpose of achiev-
ing comparable worth shall be made at least annually. Comparable worth
for the jobs of all employees under this chapter shall be fully achieved not
later than June 30, 1993.
Rules of Board-Mandatory Subjects- Veterans' preference2
... personnel administration, regarding the basis and procedures to be
allowed for:
(15) Adoption and revision of a comprehensive classification plan for
all positions in the classified service, based on investigation and analysis
of the duties and responsibilities of each such position;
(16) Allocation and reallocation of positions within the classification
plan;
(17) Adoption and revision of a state salary schedule to reflect the pre-
vailing rates in the Washington state private industries and other govern-
mental units but the rates in the salary schedules or plans shall be
increased if necessary to attain comparable worth under an implementa-
tion plan under RCW 41.06.155, such adoption and revision subject to
approval by the director of financial management in accordance with the
provisions of chapter 43.88 RCW;
(18) Increment or merit increases within the series of steps for each pay
grade;
(21) Affirmative action in appointment, promotion, transfer, recruit-
ment, training, and career development; development and implementa-
tion of affirmative action goals and timetables; and monitoring of
progress against those goals and timetables.
1. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.06.155 (1986).
2. Id. § 41.06.150.
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The board shall consult with the human rights commission in the
development of rules pertaining to affirmative action. The department of
personnel shall transmit a report annually to the human rights commis-
sion which states the progress each state agency has made in meeting
affirmative action goals and timetables.
Classification and salary schedules to consider rates in other public and
private employment-Wage and fringe benefits surveys-Recommenda-
tions to governor, standing committees on appropriations to the legislature,
and the director offinancial management-Data required
3
In preparing classification and salary schedules as set forth in RCW
41.06.150 as now or hereafter amended the department of personnel shall
give full consideration to prevailing rates in other public employment
and in private employment in this state. For this purpose this depart-
ment shall undertake comprehensive salary and fringe benefit surveys to
be planned and conducted on a joint basis with the higher education per-
sonnel board, with such surveys to be conducted in the year prior to the
convening of every other one hundred five day regular session of the state
legislature. In the year prior to the convening of every other one hun-
dred five day regular session during which a comprehensive salary and
fringe benefit survey is not conducted, the department shall plan and
conduct on a joint basis with the higher education personnel board a
trend salary and fringe benefit survey. This survey shall measure average
salary and fringe benefit movement for broad occupational groups which
have occurred since the last comprehensive salary and fringe benefit sur-
vey was conducted. The results of each comprehensive and trend salary
and fringe benefit survey shall be completed and forwarded by September
30 with a recommended state salary schedule to the governor and direc-
tor of financial management for their use in preparing budgets to be sub-
mitted to the succeeding legislature. A copy of the data and supporting
documentation shall be furnished by the department of personnel to the
standing committees for appropriations of the senate and house of
representatives.
In the case of comprehensive salary and fringe benefit surveys, the
department shall furnish the following supplementary data in support of
its recommended salary schedule:
(1) A total dollar increase which reflects the recommended in-
crease or decrease in state salaries as a direct result of the specific salary
and fringe benefit survey that has been conducted and which is catego-
3. Id. § 41.06.160.
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rized to indicate what portion of the increase or decrease is represented
by salary survey data and what portion is represented by fringe benefit
data;
(2) An additional total dollar figure which reflects the impact of
recommended increases or decreases to state salaries based on other fac-
tors rather than directly on prevailing rate data obtained through the
survey process and which is categorized to indicate the sources of the
requests for deviation from prevailing rates and the reasons for the
changes;
(3) A list of class codes and titles indicating recommended
monthly salary ranges for all state classes under the control of the de-
partment of personnel with:
(a) Those salary ranges which do not substantially conform
to the prevailing rates developed from the salary and fringe benefit survey
distinctly marked and an explanation of the reason for the deviation in-
cluded; and
(b) Those department of personnel classes which are substan-
tially the same as classes being used by the higher education personnel
board clearly marked to show the commonality of the classes between
the two jurisdictions;
(4) A supplemental salary schedule which indicates the additional
salary to be paid state employees for hazardous duties or other considera-
tions requiring extra compensation under specific circumstances. Addi-
tional compensation for these circumstances shall not be included in the
basic salary schedule but shall be maintained as a separate pay schedule
for purposes of full disclosure and visability; and
(5) A supplemental salary schedule which indicates those cases
where the board determines that prevailing rates do not provide similar
salaries for positions that require or impose similar responsibilities, judg-
ment, knowledge, skills, and working conditions. This supplementary
salary schedule shall contain proposed salary adjustments necessary to
eliminate any such dissimilarities in compensation. Additional compen-
sation needed to eliminate such salary dissimilarities shall not be in-
cluded in the basic salary schedule but shall be maintained as a separate
salary schedule for purposes of full disclosure and visibility.
It is the intention of the legislature that requests for funds to support
recommendations for salary deviations from the prevailing rate survey
data shall be kept to a minimum, and that the requests be fully docu-
mented when forwarded by the department of personnel. Further, it is
the intention of the legislature that the department of personnel and the
higher education personnel board jointly determine job classes which are
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substantially common to both jurisdictions and the basic salaries for
these job classes shall be equal based on salary and fringe benefit survey
findings.
Salary and fringe benefit survey information collected from private
employers which identifies a specific employer with the salary and fringe
benefit rates which that employer pays to its employees shall not be sub-
ject to public disclosure under chapter 42.17 RCW.
The first comprehensive salary and fringe benefit survey required by
this section shall be completed and forwarded to the governor and the
director of financial management by September 30, 1988.
Comprehensive salary and fringe benefit survey plan required- Contents4
(1) In the conduct of salary and fringe benefit surveys under RCW
41.06.160 as now or hereafter amended, it is the intention of the legisla-
ture that the surveys be undertaken in a manner consistent with statisti-
cally accurate sampling techniques. For this purpose, a comprehensive
salary and fringe benefit survey plan shall be submitted to the director of
financial management, employee organizations, the standing committees
for appropriations of the senate and house of representatives, and to each
legislative budget committee six months before the beginning of each pe-
riodic survey required before regular legislative sessions. This compre-
hensive plan shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) A complete explanation of the technical, statistical pro-
cess to be used in the salary and fringe benefit survey including the per-
centage of accuracy expected from the planned statistical sample chosen
for the survey and a definition of the term "prevailing rates" which is to
be used in the planned survey;
(b) A comprehensive salary and fringe benefit survey model
based on scientific statistical principles which:
(i) Encompasses the interrelationships among the vari-
ous elements of the survey sample including sources of salary and fringe
benefit data by organization type, size, and regional location;
(ii) Is representative of private and public employment
in this state;
(iii) Ensures that, wherever practical, data from smaller,
private firms are included and proportionally weighted in the survey
sample; and
4. Id. § 41.06.163.
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(iv) Indicates the methodology to be used in application
of survey data to job classes used by state government;
(c) A prediction of the increase or decrease in total funding
requirements expected to result from the pending salary and fringe bene-
fit survey based on consumer price index information and other available
trend data pertaining to Washington state salaries and fringe benefits.
(2) Every comprehensive survey plan shall fully consider fringe
benefits as an element of compensation in addition to basic salary
data....
(3) Interim or special surveys conducted under RCW 41.06.160 as
now or hereafter amended shall conform when possible to the statistical
techniques and principles developed for regular periodic surveys under
this section....
(4) The term "fringe benefits" as used in this section and in con-
junction with salary surveys shall include but not be limited to compen-
sation for:
(a) Leave time, including vacation, holiday, civil, and per-
sonal leave;
(b) Employer retirement contributions;
(c) Health and insurance payments, including life, accident,
and health insurance, workmen's compensation, and sick leave; and
(d) Stock options, bonuses, and purchase discounts where
appropriate.
Salary surveys-Criteria5
Salary surveys shall be conducted according to the following criteria in
addition to any other provisions under this chapter:
(1) Adjustments of state salaries to prevailing rates in Washington
state private industries and other governmental units shall be determined
by comparisons of weighted averages of salaries, including weighted
averages of salaries from out-of-state sources when necessary to obtain
statistically valid salary surveys; and
(2) Determination of state salaries changes from prevailing rate
data collected in salary surveys shall be based on occupational group
averages containing related job classes where appropriate rather than on
comparisons of survey data to individual state job classes.
5. Id. § 41.06.165.
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[Standardized employee performance evaluation procedures and forms re-
quired to be developed]6
After consultation with state agency heads, employee organizations, and
other interested parties, the state personnel director shall develop stan-
dardized employee performance evaluation procedures and forms which
shall be used by state agencies for the appraisal of employee job perform-
ance at least annually. These procedures shall include means whereby
individual agencies may supplement the standardized evaluation process
with special performance factors peculiar to specific organizational
needs. Performance evaluation procedures shall place primary emphasis
on recording how well the employee has contributed to efficiency, effec-
tiveness, and economy in fulfilling state agency and job objectives.
Training and career development programs-Powers and duties of
director
7
(1) In addition to other powers and duties specified in this chapter,
the board shall, by rule, prescribe the purpose and minimum standards
for training and career development programs and, in doing so, regularly
consult with and consider the needs of individual agencies and
employees.
(2) In addition to other powers and duties specified in this chapter,
the director shall:
(a) Provide for the evaluation of training and career develop-
ment programs and plans of agencies based on minimum standards es-
tablished by the board. The director shall report the results of such
evaluations to the agency which is the subject of the evaluation;
(b) Provide training and career development programs which
may be conducted more efficiently and economically on an interagency
basis;
(c) Promote interagency sharing of resources for training and
career development;
(d) Monitor and review the impact of training and career de-
velopment programs to ensure that the responsibilities of the state to pro-
vide equal employment opportunities are diligently carried out. The
director shall report to the board the impact of training and career devel-
opment programs on the fulfillment of such responsibilities.
(3) At an agency's request, the director may provide training and
6. Id. § 41.06.169.
7. Id. § 41.06.400.
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career development programs for an agency's internal use which may be
conducted more efficiently and economically by the department of
personnel.
Training and career development programs-Agency plan-Report-
Budget8
Each agency subject to the provisions of this chapter shall:
(1) Prepare an employee training and career development plan
which shall at least meet minimum standards established by the board.
A copy of such plan shall be submitted to the director for purposes of
administering the provisions of RCW 41.06.400(2);
(2) Provide for training and career development for its employees
in accordance with the agency plan;
(3) Report on its training and career development program opera-
tions and costs to the director in accordance with reporting procedures
adopted by the board;
(4) Budget for training and career development in accordance with
procedures of the office of financial management.
Entry level management training course-Requirements--Suspension-
Waiver-Designation of supervisory or management positions9
(1) The board, by rule, shall prescribe the conditions under which
an employee appointed to a supervisory or management position after
June 12, 1980, shall be required to successfully complete an entry-level
management training course prior to the employee's appointment which
is, in the judgment of the director, at least equivalent to the entry-level
course required by this section.
(2) The board, by rule, shall establish procedures for the suspen-
sion of the entry-level training requirement in cases where the ability of
an agency to perform its responsibilities is adversely affected, or for the
waiver of this requirement in cases where a person has demonstrated sub-
stitute training.
(3) Agencies subject to the provisions of this chapter, in accord-
ance with rules prescribed by the board, shall designate individual posi-
tions, or groups of positions, as being "supervisory" or "management"
positions. Such designations shall be subject to review by the director as
8. Id. § 41.06.410.
9. Id. § 41.06.420.
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part of the director's evaluation of training and career development pro-
grams prescribed by RCW 41.06.400(2).
Career executive program-Development-Policies and standards-
Duties of board and director"0
(1) The board, by rule, shall develop a career executive program
which recognizes the profession of management and recognizes excel-
lence in managerial skills in order to (a) identify, attract, and retain
highly qualified executive candidates, (b) provide outstanding employees
a broad opportunity for career development, and (c) provide for the mo-
bility of such employees among agencies, it being to the advantage of the
state to make the most beneficial use of individual managerial skills.
(2) To accomplish the purposes of subsection (1) of this section,
the board, notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, may pro-
vide policies and standards for recruitment, appointment, examination,
training, probation, employment register control, certification, classifica-
tion, salary, administration, transfer, promotion, reemployment, con-
ditions of employment, and separation separate from procedures
established for other employment.
(3) The director, in consultation with affected agencies, shall rec-
ommend to the board the classified positions which may be filled by par-
ticipants in the career executive program. Upon the request of an
agency, management positions that are exempt from the state civil ser-
vice law pursuant to RCW 41.06.070 may be included in all or any part
of the career executive program: Provided, That an agency may at any
time, after providing written notice to the board, withdraw an exempt
position from the career executive program. No employee may be placed
in the career executive program without the employee's consent.
(4) The number of employees participating in the career executive
program shall not exceed one percent of the employees subject to the
provisions of this chapter.
(5) The director shall monitor and review the impact of the career
executive program to ensure that the responsibilities of the state to pro-
vide equal employment opportunities are diligently carried out. The di-
rector shall report to the board the impact of the career executive
program on the fulfillment of such responsibilities.
(6) Any classified state employee, upon entering a position in the
career executive program, shall be entitled subsequently to revert to any
10. Id. § 41.06.430.
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class or position previously held with permanent status, or, if such posi-
tion is not available, revert to a position similar in nature and salary to
the position previously held.
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